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A r e A e s t h e t i c J u d g e m e n t s 
O b j e c t i v e o r S u b j e c t i v e ? 
C h a p t e r O a e 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
To b e g i n w i t h , I must confess a c e r t a i n p r e j u d i c e : I 
d i s l i k e the e x p r e s s i o n 'I'm no a r t e x p e r t , but I know what I 
l i k e ' . I suspect t h a t the assumptions which u n d e r l i e t h i s 
t h r e a d b a r e commonplace are a t b e s t n a i v e , a t worst downright 
vacuous. To an e x t e n t , t h i s t h e s i s i s an attempt t o cure me 
o f , or c o n f i r m me i n , my p r e j u d i c e s and s u s p i c i o n s . 
What assumptions, t h e n , are a c t u a l l y b eing made? I f P 
assumes t h a t h i s statement ' l know what p a i n t i n g s I l i k e , and I 
l i k e t h i s ' , a c t u a l l y means 'This i s a good p a i n t i n g because 
I l i k e i t ' , then the s t a t u s of h i s judgement, as a c r i t i c a l 
( a e s t h e t i c ) judgement, i s q u e s t i o n a b l e . I t t e l l s us something 
about the p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s of P but p r a c t i c a l l y n o t h i n g 
about the a e s t h e t i c v a l u e of the p a i n t i n g . P has assumed h i s 
s u b j e c t i v e judgement t o be an o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n . Though 
' l i k i n g ' the p a i n t i n g i s i m p o r t a n t t o P as an i n d i v i d u a l , i t 
i s n o t a c r i t e r i o n f o r j u d g i n g the p a i n t i n g to be o b j e c t i v e l y 
good. I f P says ' I l i k e t h i s p a i n t i n g ' t h i s cannot mean - as 
i t i s o f t e n assumed t o mean - ' t h i s p a i n t i n g i s good', because 
the statement ' I l i k e t h i s p a i n t i n g ' i s t r u e i f P l i k e s the 
p a i n t i n g , b u t f a l s e i f he does n o t . The statement 'This i s a 
good p a i n t i n g ' , on the o t h e r hand, c o n t a i n s no r e f e r e n c e to P 
and can t h e r e f o r e be t r u e or f a l s e whether P l i k e s the 
p a i n t i n g or n o t . Furthermore, i f the statement 'This i s a good 
p a i n t i n g ' , merely means ' I l i k e t h i s p a i n t i n g ' , i t can no 
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l o n g e r be u s e f u l l y taken t o mean ' a l l s i m i l a r l y c o n s t i t u t e d 
people ought t o l i k e t h i s p a i n t i n g as w e l l ' . 
I t i s , o f c o u r s e , unreasonable t o draw the above s y l l o g i s m 
from the gap between what P says and what he means; he may 
i n t e n d no such necessary c o n n e c t i o n . However, i f P says 'This 
i s a good p a i n t i n g ' when what he a c t u a l l y means i s ' I l i k e t h i s 
p a i n t i n g ' , then the burden i s on P t o s t a t e q u i t e 
c a t e g o r i c a l l y what he does mean. He i s i n v i t i n g c o n f u s i o n over 
the meaning o f h i s statement by c o n f u s i n g i t h i m s e l f w i t h the 
c o n d i t i o n s under which i t i s u t t e r e d . Moreover, unless P i s 
w i l l i n g and a b l e t o s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m w i t h a reasoned 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n , then he should not presume t o a r t i c u l a t e such a 
judgement i n t h a t form. I f , on the o t h e r hand, P i s prepared 
t o q u a l i f y h i s judgement by s a y i n g ' I l i k e t h i s . This seems 
l i k e a good p a i n t i n g t o me' ; o r , more s t i l t e d l y but more 
p r e c i s e l y , 'Because I have an e n j o y a b l e a e s t h e t i c experience 
i n response t o t h i s p a i n t i n g I c o n s i d e r i t t o be good', then 
t h i s would n o t be open t o d i s p u t e . I t would be a l e g i t i m a t e , 
s u b j e c t i v e response of t a s t e . To paraphrase James M c N e i l l 
W h i s t l e r : You should not say i t i s n o t good, you should say you 
do n o t l i k e i t , then you know you are p e r f e c t l y safe . , . 
I t i s the i n t e n t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s t o examine the f u n c t i o n 
o f a e s t h e t i c judgement and then, i n the l i g h t of t h i s 
e x a m i n a t i o n , t o c o n s i d e r c e r t a i n fundamental q u e s t i o n s i t 
r a i s e s . These q u e s t i o n s a r e : I . Are a e s t h e t i c judgements 
o b j e c t i v e or s u b j e c t i v e , a b s o l u t e or r e l a t i v e ? I I . According to 
what c r i t e r i a are a e s t h e t i c judgements made? I I I . Do they 
i n v o l v e concepts? I V . Should some a e s t h e t i c judgements be taken 
more s e r i o u s l y than o t h e r s , and, i f so, whose should be and why 
s h o u l d they be? V. I s the a b i l i t y t o make 'sound' a e s t h e t i c 
judgements l e a r n e d or i n t u i t e d ? V I . Do a e s t h e t i c judgements 
r e f e r t o o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s ? V I I , Do they i n v o l v e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and, i f so, are some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s more 
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a p p r o p r i a t e and/or v a l i d than others? V I I I . Can we i n t e r p r e t 
form as w e l l as c o n t e n t ? IX. And, f i n a l l y , can a e s t h e t i c 
judgements be t e s t e d and j u s t i f i e d ? 
F i r s t , though, i t i s necessary t o s e t out the background 
t o t h i s i n q u i r y and t o c o n s i d e r i t s terms o f r e f e r e n c e . I am 
aware o f the u n s a t i s f a c t o r y n a t u r e o f some of the terms I 
employ, b u t , because s a t i s f a c t o r y s u b s t i t u t e s do n ot r e a d i l y 
suggest themselves, they must be used, a l b e i t w i t h c a u t i o n . 
The word ' a e s t h e t i c ' i s ambiguous . . . 
To a l l o w f o r t h i s a m b i g u i t y i t i s t e m p t i n g t o take the 
p r e c a u t i o n o f p u t t i n g the word ' a e s t h e t i c ' i n p a r e n t h e s i s or 
scare quotes. Perhaps, as W h i s t l e r might say, i t should be put 
i n b o t h , ( ' a e s t h e t i c ' ) , j u s t t o be on the safe s i d e . The 
e x p r e s s i o n ' a e s t h e t i c judgement' i s no l e s s ambiguous. 
Depending on the c o n t e x t , i t can r e f e r t o b o t h ' a e s t h e t i c 
v a l u e ' and ' i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e ' . An a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h i s might 
be t o r e f e r t o ' a r t i s t i c v a l u e judgements', or ' c r i t i c a l 
e v a l u a t i o n s o f a r t ' b u t r e a l l y these phrases are too l i m i t i n g 
t o be o f much use.^ Much depends upon the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
' a e s t h e t i c judgement* qua ' c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n ' , and 
' a e s t h e t i c judgement' qua 'response of t a s t e ' . As Harold 
Osborne, among o t h e r s , has suggested, the two r e p r e s e n t q u i t e 
d i s t i n c t modes o f a c t i v i t y . I would take t h i s f u r t h e r and 
suggest t h a t t h e former can be c o n s i d e r e d a q u a s i - o b j e c t i v e 
a c t i v i t y when i t i s concerned w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 
sym b o l i c c o n t e n t ; and t h a t the l a t t e r can be considered a 
s u b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y when i t i s concerned w i t h the a p p r e c i a t i o n 
o f form. The f o r m e r judgement i s t y p i f i e d by the o b j e c t i v e 
s tatement 'This i s good', w h i l s t the l a t t e r judgement, being 
concerned e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h p l e a s u r e , i s t y p i f i e d by the 
s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e m e n t ' I l i k e t h i s ' . R e g r e t t a b l y , i n the realm 
o f p r a c t i c a l a r t e v a l u a t i o n , t h i s dichotomy tends t o i n s p i r e 
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emotive r a t h e r than r a t i o n a l debate. This i s not a l t o g e t h e r 
s u r p r i s i n g though, s i n c e i t i s commonly assumed t h a t t h i s 
dichotomy does n o t even e x i s t . T his common assumption f o l l o w s 
i n e v i t a b l y from the assumption t h a t de g u s t i b u s non est 
disputandum . . . There i s no d i s p u t i n g about t a s t e because i t 
i s assumed t h a t t a s t e i s concerned w i t h beauty, and t h a t t h i s 
vague and m y s t e r i o u s t h i n g c a l l e d beauty i s i n the eye of the 
b e h o l d e r . I t i s f u r t h e r assumed t h a t a t t e m p t s t o d e f i n e beauty 
are f u t i l e because they are i n e v i t a b l y c i r c u l a r - as w i t h John 
Keats's 'Beauty i s t r u t h , t r u t h beauty'. This i s because, as 
Edgar A l l e n Poe would have i t , beauty i s an e f f e c t , and, as 
such, i n s e p a r a b l e from the mind which experiences i t . Now, 
T.E. Jessop accounts f o r t h i s dichotomy i n terms of 
a p p r e c i a t i o n as emotion and a p p r e c i a t i o n as judgement, the 
l a t t e r b e i n g c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a c l a i m . ^ I n a s i m i l a r v a i n , 
u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e s t a t e d , I s h a l l be u s i n g the term ' a e s t h e t i c 
judgement' i n the ' c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n ' sense, r a t h e r than i n 
the sense o f 'response of t a s t e ' . 
The P o l i s h a e s t h e t i c i a n S t e f a n Morawski has summarised the 
n a t u r e o f t h i s dichotomy t o a n i c e t y : 
Taste . . . cannot be learned i f the propensity is lacking; refined taste . 
. . is simply taste manifested and cultivated in favourable circumstances. 
Personal taste can and generally does succumb to outside influences to the 
point where in the end no individual differences are . . . discemible; that 
is, people with different dispositions . . . respond to the same objects or 
qualities as aesthetic stimuli. I f individual sensitivity is therefore elusive, 
i t is much easier to discern the general 'taste' of an age or a 
community , . . 
By c o n t r a s t Morawski r e f e r s t o a e s t h e t i c judgement as: 
. . . a physical act of an intellectual character which results in a 
proposition expressing an aesthetic experience and formulating an appraisal 
based upon certain reasons.^ 
B a r i n g t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i n mind l e t us move on t o the 
q u e s t i o n o f whether such a e s t h e t i c judgements are o b j e c t i v e or 
s u b j e c t i v e . I n 1855 John Ruskin r a i l e d a g a i n s t t h a t 'German 
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d u l l n e s s ' and ' E n g l i s h a f f e c t a t i o n ' which had m u l t i p l i e d the 
use o f two o f the most o b j e c t i o n a b l e words t h a t were ever 
c o i n e d by t h e troublesomeness o f m e t a p h y s i c i a n s : ' o b j e c t i v e ' 
and ' s u b j e c t i v e ' . But, o f course, t h i s debate goes back much 
f u r t h e r than Ruskin. From P l a t o onwards the h i s t o r y of 
a e s t h e t i c s has been c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a search f o r an 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o these p o l a r o p p o s i t e s . I n f a c t , b r o a d l y 
speaking, t h i s b i f u r c a t i o n o f n a t u r e between mind and m a t t e r , 
s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , observer and observed, c o u l d be s a i d t o be 
the r e c u r r i n g theme of Western p h i l o s o p h y . I n the a e s t h e t i c 
r e a l m , though, perhaps t h e most s o p h i s t i c a t e d and i n f l u e n t i a l 
a t t e m p t t o r e s o l v e t h i s dichotomy i s t o be found i n Immanuel 
Kant's C r i t i q u e o f Judgement o f 1790. I n t h i s monumental work, 
Kant i n t r o d u c e d a t h i r d term: i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , t h a t i s , the 
p r o p e r t y o f h o l d i n g i n r e f e r e n c e t o more than one s u b j e c t . More 
r e c e n t l y though, Kant's a e s t h e t i c has i n s p i r e d some 
contemporary p h i l o s o p h e r s t o l o o k beyond t h i s p o l a r i s a t i o n of 
the s u b j e c t i v e and the o b j e c t i v e , and t o acknowledge i n s t e a d 
the autonomy o f one term from the o t h e r . By t h i s I mean e i t h e r 
t he autonomy o f t h e o b j e c t as a t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , e x i s t e n t i a l l y 
independent o f b o t h i t s c r e a t o r and i t s p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t ; or 
the autonomy o f the s u b j e c t ' s e x p e r i e n c e , independent o f the 
o b j e c t . I n my view b o t h are wrong. 
The p e r e n n i a l c o n t r o v e r s y over whether a e s t h e t i c 
p r o p e r t i e s i n h e r e i n the o b j e c t or e n t i r e l y i n the mind o f the 
b e h o l d e r , has been n e a t l y summed up by Gorden Westland: 
To say that something is objective means . . . that i t can be observed, i t 
can be measured, i t can be demonstrated. I suggest that the broad test 
any scientist uses in practice is that refusal to accept the reality of 
something which is objective results in empdrical contradictions. Serious 
consequences wil l follow i f I act upon a refusal to accept the statement 
that arsenic is poisonous. Therefore a scientist can say that a statement 
which he has objectively verified 'ought' (in an intellectual sense) to be 
accepted by others . . . I t cannot be said that anyone 'ought' to accept 
an aesthetic statement - certainly i t cannot have tl^e same force, since no 
contradictory consequences foUow refusal to accept. 
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W h i l s t I agree w i t h the f i r s t p a r t of Westland's a n a l y s i s , 
I t a k e i s s u e w i t h the second. I b e l i e v e t h a t we can say t h a t 
c e r t a i n c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s ( a e s t h e t i c judgements) ought to be 
accepted by most 'normal' people [ f o r reasons I s h a l l e x p l a i n 
i n a l a t e r c h a p t e r ] . The i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n t h a t t h i s 
q u o t a t i o n r a i s e s though i s t h i s : Need o b j e c t i v i t y i n a e s t h e t i c s 
be the same as o b j e c t i v i t y i n s c i e n c e , t h a t i s , u n i v e r s a l , 
a b s o l u t e and d e f i n i t i v e ? Can i t not be of a form t h a t admits of 
a degree o f s u b j e c t i v i t y ? 
When a s u b j e c t a p p r e c i a t e s an o b j e c t ( w h i c h has b o t h form 
and c o n t e n t , as i n a p a i n t i n g , say, or a work of l i t e r a t u r e ) i t 
i s almost a t r u i s m t o say t h a t you cannot have one w i t h o u t the 
o t h e r , ( s u b j e c t w i t h o u t o b j e c t ) . I n a s i m i l a r way, i t i s i d l e 
t o deny t h a t you can have form w i t h o u t c o n t e n t . This was 
c e r t a i n l y the view h e l d by W a l t e r Pater whose r i n g i n g phrase 
' a l l a r t c o n s t a n t l y a s p i r e s t o the c o n d i t i o n of music'^ has 
become p a r t o f t h e language o f a r t a p p r e c i a t i o n . His c l a i m i s 
based upon the assumption t h a t i n music form and c o n t e n t are 
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . As a l r e a d y mentioned, i t i s commonly assumed 
t h a t ' s u b j e c t i v e ' t a s t e s hould be concerned w i t h form (because 
the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f ' c o n t e n t ' i s not d i s i n t e r e s t e d enough); 
w h i l s t ' o b j e c t i v e ' c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n should be concerned w i t h 
c o n t e n t (because the a p p r e c i a t i o n of 'form' i s , as i t were, i n 
th e eye o f t h e b e h o l d e r ) . Now, i f Walter Pater's d i c t u m i s 
c o r r e c t , where does t h a t leave l i t e r a t u r e and p a i n t i n g ? I s the 
form d i s t i n c t from the c o n t e n t ? Should we measure t h e i r 
a e s t h e t i c v a l u e a c c o r d i n g t o the e x t e n t t o which the two p a r t s 
p r e s e n t a u n i f i e d whole? And, i f so, would not such ' u n i t y ' be 
a f o r m a l concept? The d i s t i n c t i o n between form and c o n t e n t i s 
n o t o r i o u s l y muddled. I n Chapter Eleven I argue t h a t i n s o f a r as 
c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n i s concerned w i t h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s a r t i f i c i a l . I argue t h i s on the grounds t h a t 
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of seemingly ' a b s t r a c t ' form are o f t e n no more 
a r b i t r a r y than i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of symbolic c o n t e n t . 
But t o r e t u r n t o my o r i g i n a l q u e s t i o n : Why does the 
s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e debate admit of l i t t l e or no compromise? 
Are they r e a l l y so d i a l e c t i c a l l y opposed? Should we b e l i e v e i n 
t h e procedures of one or the o t h e r , but not i n both? 
C o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom suggests t h a t we s h o u l d , b u t , as ever, the 
problem a r i s e s from our c o n f u s i o n over the meaning of these two 
terms: s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e . I suspect t h a t p a r t of t h i s 
problem i s a l s o t i e d up w i t h the a t t i t u d e w i t h which the 
c o n v e n t i o n a l l y wise approach t h i s debate. Arguably, our most 
fundamental l i b e r t y i s our freedom of choice - a l l men are 
c r e a t e d f r e e and e q u a l , and so on. When t h i s i s a p p l i e d t o the 
a e s t h e t i c realm i t means b e i n g f r e e t o choose what a r t we l i k e 
and d i s l i k e , and, by e x t e n s i o n , what a r t we c o n s i d e r to be 
good and what bad = the p r o o f of the pudding i s , as they say, 
i n the e a t i n g . However, e x e r c i s i n g bur freedom to make an 
a e s t h e t i c judgement t h a t i s n o t h i n g more than a s u b j e c t i v e 
response of t a s t e i s , i n my o p i n i o n , a somewhat f u t i l e 
e x e r c i s e . I t may be a means of e x p r e s s i n g our a p p r e c i a t i o n , or 
of g e t t i n g what we want, b u t , because such a judgement cannot 
be d i s p u t e d , t h e r e i s l i t t l e p o i n t i n a t t e m p t i n g t o communicate 
i t t o o t h e r s . I t l i c e n c e s a c h a o t i c democracy of o p i n i o n to 
which we are a l l o b l i g e d t o show u n l i m i t e d t o l e r a n c e . I f a l l 
t h a t i s meant by the statement 'This p a i n t i n g i s a e s t h e t i c a l l y 
good' i s ' I e n j o y t h i s p a i n t i n g ' , then why b o t h e r saying i t ? 
The statement i s i m p o r t a n t f o r the person who u t t e r s i t , but 
t r i v i a l t o everyone e l s e . 
We can c o n s i d e r a p a i n t i n g t o be 'good' w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y 
l i k i n g i t , and we can l i k e a p a i n t i n g w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y 
c o n s i d e r i n g i t t o be 'good'. By t h i s I mean i t i s p o s s i b l e to 
e x p l a i n t o a person why you c o n s i d e r a p a i n t i n g t o have v a l u e , 
and i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r t h a t person t o understand and a p p r e c i a t e 
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your e x p l a n a t i o n w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y a greeing w i t h i t . For 
example, I m i g h t r e s p e c t someone's judgement t h a t a p a i n t i n g i s 
good i n v i r t u e o f i t s f o r m a l u n i t y , y e t I , p e r s o n a l l y , might 
f i n d such f o r m a l u n i t y u n u t t e r a b l y b o r i n g . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , I 
might enjoy l o o k i n g a t v u l g a r l y s e n t i m e n t a l V i c t o r i a n a r t -
d e p i c t i n g , say, Christmas day i n the poor house - w h i l s t 
a c c e p t i n g t h a t s e n t i m e n t a l i t y i s n ot a p a r t i c u l a r l y e l e v a t e d 
c r i t e r i o n f o r judgement. I n t h i s r e s p e c t s u b j e c t i v e ' a e s t h e t i c 
judgements' are n o t r e a l l y a e s t h e t i c judgements a t a l l , they 
are e m o t i o n a l responses. I f P's s u b j e c t i v e ' a e s t h e t i c 
judgement' i s 'This i s a good p a i n t i n g ' (meaning ' l l i k e t h i s 
p a i n t i n g ' ) and A's s u b j e c t i v e ' a e s t h e t i c judgement' i s 'This 
i s n o t a good p a i n t i n g ' (meaning ' I do n ot l i k e t h i s p a i n t i n g ' ) 
then b o t h statements are u n d i s p u t a b l y c o r r e c t : the p a i n t i n g i s 
b o t h good and n o t good a t the same ti m e . I f they are 
r e l a t i v i s t s b o t h P and A can c l a i m t h a t t h e i r statements are 
r e l a t i v e l y t r u e , b u t , t o be c o n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r r e l a t i v i s m 
they would a l s o have t o admit t h a t because t h i s t r u t h i s 
r e l a t i v e , i t may a l s o be f a l s e i n r e l a t i o n t o o t h e r b e l i e f s . 
Thus t h e i r statements - and, by i m p l i c a t i o n , the t h e o r i e s of 
s u b j e c t i v i s m and r e l a t i v i s m - may be b o t h t r u e and f a l s e a t the 
same t i m e , and t h e r e f o r e s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . 
The same can be s a i d of an appeal t o s o c i o l o g i c a l 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r a judgement. I f I were t o advance a theory 
which s t a t e s t h a t an a r t w o r k i s good because the m a j o r i t y o f 
th e p o p u l a t i o n say i t i s good - w i t h d i s p u t e s b e i n g r e s o l v e d by 
t a k i n g a p o l l - we are sayi n g n o t h i n g about the a r t w o r k , we 
are merely t a l k i n g about t he p r e f e r e n c e s o f the g e n e r a l p u b l i c 
w h ich, a c c o r d i n g t o the p r i n c i p l e of the lowest common 
denominator, would p r o b a b l y rank k i t s c h a r t above 'hig h ' a r t . 
The q u a l i t y o f the a r t b e i n g i n i n v e r s e p r o p o r t i o n t o the 
q u a n t i t y o f people who l i k e i t . I f more people p r e f e r the 
music o f K y l i e Minogue t o t h a t o f Ri c h a r d Wagner then t h a t does 
n o t make K y l i e Minogue's music s u p e r i o r . The m i n o r i t y who 
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p r e f e r Wagner are s u r e l y more e n t i t l e d t o judge of the 
c o m p a r a t i v e m e r i t s of b o t h types of music than are the m a j o r i t y 
who p r e f e r K y l i e Minogue. The few may n o t share the p r e f e r e n c e 
o f the many b u t they are more l i k e l y t o understand why a 
s i m p l e , r e p e t i t i v e 4/4 beat should appeal t o the 'immature' 
t a s t e o f the many. The r e v e r s e i s s i m p l y n o t t r u e . Besides, i n 
t h e l o n g r u n more people ( w i t h 'mature' t a s t e ) w i l l have 
p r e f e r r e d Wagner than p r e f e r K y l i e Minogue a t any g i v e n t i m e . 
Thus Wagner can be judged t o be s u p e r i o r t o K y l i e Minogue 
because t h e r e i s a consensus o f o p i n i o n t o t h a t e f f e c t among 
persons o f 'mature' t a s t e , over a l o n g e r p e r i o d of t i m e . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , i f one were t o c o n t i n u e p l a y i n g d e v i l ' s advocate, 
one c o u l d argue t h a t persons whose t a s t e s are 'mature' can be 
c h a r a c t e r i s e d by t h e i r ' u n i v e r s a l ' p r e f e r e n c e f o r Wagner over 
Minogue.^ But i s t h i s ' s o c i o l o g i c a l ' p r i n c i p l e , by means of 
which an e l i t e o f ' e x p e r t s ' might ' v a l i d a t e ' t h e i r judgement, 
no t the same as the 'lowest common denominator' p r i n c i p l e 
o u t l i n e d above? Not n e c e s s a r i l y . To a l l o w f o r the i n e v i t a b l e 
disagreements t h a t t h e r e would be between these ' e x p e r t s ' , an 
appeal c o u l d be made t o s e v e r a l g e n e r a t i o n s of ' q u a l i f i e d ' 
e x p e r t s - q u a l i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a x, 
y, and z. W h i l s t i t need not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w from the 
judgements o f t h i s e l i t e (whose q u a l i f i c a t i o n s i t would be 
n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e ) t h a t a g i v e n p a i n t i n g i ^ 
a c t u a l l y 'good', perhaps we have t o p r a g m a t i c a l l y accept t h a t 
t h i s i s the c l o s e s t we can get t o a u s e f u l c r i t i c a l ( a e s t h e t i c ) 
judgement, and t h a t t h i s i s a t l e a s t p r e f e r a b l e t o the s e l f -
c o n t r a d i c t o r y and t r i v i a l i s i n g a l t e r n a t i v e s discussed above. 
The q u e s t i o n now i s : Are such a e s t h e t i c judgements c l o s e enough 
t o c a l l e d o b j e c t i v e ? Even under these c o n d i t i o n s we are s t i l l 
l e f t w i t h a d e s c r i p t i o n o f c r i t i c s ' responses t o a work o f a r t , 
r a t h e r than a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the work of a r t i t s e l f . Perhaps we 
have t o e-xcept, t h e n , t h a t t h e r e w i l l always be a d i f f e r e n c e 
between a statement about the v a l u e of a p a i n t i n g ('This i s a 
good p a i n t i n g ' ) , and a statement about the o p i n i o n of those 
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j u d g i n g the p a i n t i n g ('An e l i t e o f q u a l i f i e d c r i t i c s have, over 
s e v e r a l g e n e r a t i o n s , l i k e d t h i s p a i n t i n g ' ) . 
But, t o r e t u r n again t o my e a r l i e r q u e s t i o n : Can we a v o i d 
t h e legacy o f C a r t e s i a n d u a l i s m ; t h a t i s , the assumption t h a t 
a e s t h e t i c judgements must be e i t h e r o b j e c t i v e or s u b j e c t i v e , 
b u t never both? On the s u r f a c e i t would seem t h a t an argument 
i n f a v o u r o f one must be an argument a g a i n s t the o t h e r . Yet 
s u r e l y t h e two terms are f u n d a m e n t a l l y i n t e r c o n n e c t e d . 
A e s t h e t i c judgements r e q u i r e b o t h a p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t and a 
p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t ; the one i s inc o m p l e t e w i t h o u t the o t h e r . 
Consider, f o r i n s t a n c e , Roman Ingarden's t h e o r y o f c o n c r e t i o n : 
. . . a work of art requires an agent existing outside itself, that is, an 
observer, in order . . . to render i t concrete. Through his co-creative 
activity in appreciation the observer sets himself as is commonly said to 
'interpret' the work or, as I prefer to say, to reconstruct i t in its 
effective characteristics, and in doing this, as i t were, under the influence 
of suggestions coming from the work itself he fills out its schematic 
structure, plenishing at least in part the areas of indeterminacy and 
actualizing various elements which are as yet only in a state of 
potentiality. 
I t might be t h a t some c r i t i c s are b e t t e r , or pr e t e n d t o be 
b e t t e r , a t r e n d e r i n g t h i s p o t e n t i a l i t y c o n c r e t e than o t h e r s . 
T h e i r p o s i t i o n as c r i t i c s c e r t a i n l y depends upon t h i s 
p r e t e n s i o n . However, the idea d i s c u s s e d e a r l i e r - of an e l i t e 
o f c r i t i c s d e t e r m i n i n g a e s t h e t i c v a l u e - would not be r e a d i l y 
e n t e r t a i n e d by o b j e c t i v i s t s . Apart from p o i n t i n g out the 
c i r c u l a r i t y o f the Humean approach - t h a t an e x p e r t i s one who 
makes e x p e r t judgements, and an e x p e r t judgement i s t h a t which 
i s made by an e x p e r t - an o b j e c t i v i s t c o u l d a l s o argue t h a t 
t he a t t r i b u t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c v a l u e does n o t c o n s i s t i n the 
judgements o f e x p e r t c r i t i c s anyway, b u t r a t h e r i n the n a t u r e 
of t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f . Perhaps, once a g a i n , the problem i s i n 
t h e p h r a s i n g o f the state m e n t . I f we were t o take an 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t approach t o making o b j e c t i v e a e s t h e t i c 
judgements we c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y say 'This i s a p a i n t i n g , and 
p a i n t i n g s have a f u n c t i o n which t h i s has the c a p a c i t y t o 
Page 10 of 192 Nigd. Famdale 
Introduction Chapter One 
s u c c e s s f u l l y f u l f i l , t h e r e f o r e i t i s good'. But what might t h i s 
f u n c t i o n be? Propaganda? E n t e r t a i n m e n t ? Education? S p i r i t u a l 
e l e v a t i o n ? Pleasure? The evoking o f an a e s t h e t i c experience as 
an end i n i t s e l f ? . . . I f t h i s l a t t e r i s the case then i t 
would seem t h a t a r t does n ot e x i s t f o r i t s own sake but r a t h e r 
as a means t o t h i s end. Th i s seems a p l a u s i b l e , i f somewhat 
l i m i t i n g , s u g g e s t i o n . A p a r t from e s t a b l i s h i n g a c r i t e r i o n f o r 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t a l s o a f f o r d s a means by which one p a i n t i n g 
c o u l d be judged t o be b e t t e r than another: namely t h a t the 
c a p a c i t y o f one work o f a r t t o evoke a e s t h e t i c experiences i s 
g r e a t e r than t h a t o f another. This c a p a c i t y may not be 
a c t u a l i s e d , or indeed v e r i f i a b l e , or q u a n t i f i e d i n terms of the 
number o f people who can r e a l i s e the c a p a c i t y , b u t t h i s does 
n o t mean t h a t i t need n o t be t r u e , nor t h a t t h i s c a p a c i t y i s 
no t a p r o p e r t y o f the o b j e c t . A e s t h e t i c v a l u e c o u l d t h e r e f o r e 
be s a i d t o be a p r o p e r t y o f the o b j e c t - t h a t i s , a c a p a c i t y t o 
produce an a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e under the r i g h t c o n d i t i o n s -
which can be judged by an e l i t e o f c r i t i c s . 
So f a r , I have r a i s e d t h e e p i s t e m i c q u e s t i o n : How do we 
'know' whether or n o t our a e s t h e t i c judgements are o b j e c t i v e 
or s u b j e c t i v e ? L e t me now t u r n t o the semantic q u e s t i o n : What 
does i t a c t u a l l y 'mean' t o say t h a t an a e s t h e t i c judgement i s 
o b j e c t i v e or s u b j e c t i v e ? A d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n p r o v i d e s a 
u s e f u l s k e l e t o n t h a t can, I hope, be f l e s h e d out d u r i n g the 
course o f t h i s t h e s i s . 
' O b j e c t i v e ' r e f e r s t o t h a t which r e l a t e s t o o b j e c t s which 
a c t u a l l y e x i s t , c o n c r e t e l y and in d e p e n d e n t l y of the 
p e r c i p i e n t ' s mind - t h a t i s , independent of the process of 
c o g n i t i o n . ' O b j e c t i v i s m ' r e f e r s t o the d o c t r i n e t h a t knowledge 
based on s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n s corresponds t o r e a l i t y , and t h a t the 
s t a t e o f b e i n g o b j e c t i v e r e f e r s t o the a b i l i t y t o f r e e o n e s e l f 
from p e r s o n a l p r e j u d i c e i n judgement or assessment. Richard J. 
B e r n s t e i n p u t s t h i s i n u n e q u i v o c a l terms: 
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By 'objectivism,' I mean the basic conviction that there is or must be 
some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can 
ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, 
truth, reality, goodness, or rightness . . , Objectivism is closd.y related to 
foundationaMsm and the search for an Archimedean point. The objectivist 
maintains that unless we can ground phdlosophy, know^ge, or language in 
a rigorous manner we cannot avoid radical skepticism.^ 
O b j e c t i v i t y , t h e n , i s by t u r n s o n t o l o g i c a l , u n i v e r s a l , and 
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i n c h a r a c t e r - knowledge t h a t i s not o b j e c t i v e 
can, a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s t h e o r y , o n l y be pseudo-knowledge. The 
amount o f agreement about an o b j e c t i v e judgement i s i r r e l e v a n t 
because the a e s t h e t i c v a l u e i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y t h e r e . I t s 
c o r r e l a t i v e , t h e ' s u b j e c t i v e ' , i s t h a t which does not 
correspond t o e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , b u t r a t h e r a r i s e s from, and i s 
r e l a t i v e t o , one's own mind and f e e l i n g s . The s u b j e c t i s 
dependent upon the sense-data o f the o b j e c t - as, f o r i n s t a n c e , 
w i t h such d i s p o s i t i o n a l p r o p e r t i e s as ' d e l i c i o u s n e s s ' - and the 
o b j e c t i s dependent upon the s u b j e c t , i n s o f a r as n o t h i n g i s 
knowable w i t h o u t a knowing mind. 
Monroe C. Beardsley has taken t h i s d e f i n i t i o n f u r t h e r : 
First, an aesthetic experience is one in which attention is firmly fixed 
upon heterogeneous but interrelated components of a phenomenally 
objective fijeld - visual or auditory patterns, or the characters and events 
in literature . . . in such an experience, as when we are deeply absorbed 
in the tension of a visual design or in the developing design of music, the 
distinction between phenomenal objectivity and phenomenal subjectivity 
itself tends to disappear . . . the eye is kept on the object, and the 
object controls the experience, but of course the connotation is more 
intimate, for the object^ which is a perceptual object, also appears in the 
experience as its phenomenally objective fipld.-*-^ 
As these d e f i n i t i o n s apply t o a e s t h e t i c t h e o r y , then, the 
d i f f e r e n c e i s t h i s : an o b j e c t i v i s t b e l i e v e s t h a t the p r o p e r t i e s 
t h a t make an o b j e c t a e s t h e t i c a l l y v a l u a b l e are p r o p e r t i e s of 
t h e o b j e c t i t s e l f ; a s u b j e c t i v i s t b e l i e v e s t h a t t he a e s t h e t i c 
v a l u e l i e s n o t i n the p r o p e r t i e s o f the o b j e c t but i n the 
ex p e r i e n c e o f the j u d g i n g s u b j e c t . For the s u b j e c t i v i s t , 
a e s t h e t i c v a l u e i s always c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a p e r s o n a l response. 
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I t i s my c o n t e n t i o n t h a t a e s t h e t i c v a l u e concerns not o n l y the 
o b j e c t , and the e x p e r i e n c e of the o b j e c t , but a l s o the r e l a t i o n 
between the two.: 
The above d e s c r i p t i o n i s i n t e n d e d as a framework on which 
t o b u i l d a d e f i n i t i o n . I n my view, most t h e o r i e s concerning 
t h i s s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e debate have i n common one 
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l weakness. Namely, they s t a r t w i t h the c o n c l u s i o n 
t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements must be e i t h e r one or the o t h e r , and 
t h e n s e t out t o c o n f i r m t h i s by, as i t were, wor k i n g backwards, 
a r r a n g i n g t h e i r arguments t o agree w i t h the q u e s t i o n a b l e o r , a t 
l e a s t , c i r c u m s t a n t i a l 'evidence' of t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n s . As an 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h i s approach I s h a l l a t t e m p t t o s t r e n g t h e n my 
argument by acknowledging i t s weaknesses. My approach may not 
be r a d i c a l , e x a c t l y , but I hope, i n s o f a r as i t i s e c l e c t i c , and 
i n s o f a r as i t weighs up the pros and cons of b o t h the 
s u b j e c t i v e and the o b j e c t i v e schools of t h o u g h t , i t i s a t l e a s t 
p r a g m a t i c a l l y compromising. These two schools of thought can 
perhaps bes t be understood i n terms of a continuum of a e s t h e t i c 
judgements. On the one hand t h e r e i s what I w i l l c a l l the 
Humean legacy which seems ' o b j e c t i v i s t ' i n c h a r a c t e r . This has 
been i n h e r i t e d by the l i k e s o f S i b l e y , Osborne, Beardsley, 
Pepper, Best, Seldon and Morawski. On the o t h e r hand t h e r e i s 
t h e K a n t i a n l e g a c y , s u b j e c t i v i s t ( o r i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i s t ) i n 
c h a r a c t e r , the i n h e r i t o r s of which might be s a i d t o i n c l u d e , 
T o l s t o y , Freud, B e l l , Croce, B u l l o u g h , Ducasse, and, more 
r e c e n t l y , B l e i c h . There i s a middle ground, of s o r t s , 
t e n t a t i v e l y e x p l o r e d by the l i k e s of Munro and H e y l , but on 
the whole t h i s , m iddle ground remains l a r g e l y unoccupied. I n 
b o t h camps the t h e o r i e s are c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a c o n c e n t r a t i o n on 
one p a r t i c u l a r aspect of a e s t h e t i c judgement t o the e x c l u s i o n 
o f o t h e r s (as w i t h S i b l e y on ' p r o p e r t i e s ' , or Croce on 
' e x p r e s s i o n ' ) ; and on one p a r t i c u l a r a r t form t o the e x c l u s i o n 
o f o t h e r s (as w i t h the a p p l i c a t i o n of Kant's t h e o r y t o p a i n t i n g 
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or music b u t n o t t o l i t e r a t u r e ) . I accept t h a t I am g u i l t y here 
o f o v e r s i m p l i f y i n g the t h e o r i e s o f the abovementioned 
p h i l o s o p h e r s and a e s t h e t i c i a n s merely i n order t o i l l u s t r a t e a 
p o i n t . They do n o t f i t as n e a t l y i n t o the two camps as I have 
i m p l i e d . Hume and Kant, f o r i n s t a n c e , are more a l i k e i n t h e i r 
t h i n k i n g than d i f f e r e n t . But, i n s o f a r as Hume b e l i e v e s a 
s t a n d a r d o f t a s t e i s p o s s i b l e (even though beauty i s i n the eye 
of t he b e h o l d e r ) and i n s o f a r as Kant b e l i e v e s a standard of 
t a s t e i s i m p o s s i b l e ( a l t h o u g h o t h e r s 'ought' t o agree w i t h our 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d j u dgements), I t h i n k my p o i n t i s worth 
i l l u s t r a t i n g . I n my view t h e r e has been, t o da t e , no t r u l y 
comprehensive and e c l e c t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h i s area of 
r e s e a r c h . 
I f an a e s t h e t e i s one who b e l i e v e s i n a r t f o r a r t s sake, 
and a p h i l i s t i n e one who b e l i e v e s t h a t a r t has an i n s t r u m e n t a l 
v a l u e , t h e n I admit t o b e i n g a p h i l i s t i n e . Apart from a n y t h i n g 
e l s e , the a r t f o r a r t ' s sake f o r m u l a s u f f e r s from a l o g i c a l 
c i r c u l a r i t y inasmuch as i t depends upon a concept of a r t 
which two ae s t h e t e s might d i s a g r e e on. On the face of i t my 
t h e s i s may seem neo-Huraean i n c h a r a c t e r . C e r t a i n l y I have a 
d e a l o f sympathy f o r t h e ideas expressed i n Hume's Standard of 
Taste ( 1 7 5 7 ) , b u t I a l s o e n t e r t a i n c e r t a i n m i s g i v i n g s about i t . 
I n Chapter Two I o f f e r a d e t a i l e d e x p o s i t i o n of Hume's t h e o r y , 
and i n succeeding c h a p t e r s I d i s c u s s v a r i o u s contemporary 
p h i l o s o p h e r s who, i t c o u l d be s a i d , are f o l l o w i n g i n the Humean 
t r a d i t i o n . I n Chapter Three I balance Hume's ' o b j e c t i v i s t ' 
t h e o r y a g a i n s t Kant's more a m b i t i o u s and i n f l u e n t i a l t h e o r y of 
' u n i v e r s a l s u b j e c t i v i t y ' , i n d i c a t i n g i n b o t h cases what I 
c o n s i d e r the shortcomings o f these t h e o r i e s t o be. The 
re m a i n i n g c h a p t e r s are arranged a c c o r d i n g t o themes r a t h e r than 
s p e c i f i c a l l y d e a l i n g w i t h one school o f t h o u g h t . I n Chapter 
Four, f o r i n s t a n c e , I suggest c e r t a i n ' r e l e v a n t ' c r i t e r i a 
a c c o r d i n g t o which a e s t h e t i c judgements might be made. I n 
Chapter F i v e I suggest t h a t ' r e l e v a n t ' r e a s o n - g i v i n g over a 
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p e r i o d o f t i m e , i n the c o n t e x t o f a t r a d i t i o n o f p r o t r a c t e d 
d i s p u t e s between an e l i t e o f ' e x p e r t s ' w i t h i n the c r i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , a f f o r d s a means by which judgements might be 
j u s t i f i e d . I n Chapter Six I suggest t h a t these judgements can 
be suppo r t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o concepts, and good and bad 
examples o f a g i v e n k i n d . I n Chapter Seven I go on t o suggest 
t h a t judgements can be supported by r e f e r e n c e t o ' r e l e v a n t ' 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . I n Chapter E i g h t I examine the form t h a t such 
reasons might t a k e : namely, p o i n t i n g t o p r o p e r t i e s , and using 
a e s t h e t i c terms. I n Chapter Nine I argue t h a t a e s t h e t i c 
judgements can be r e l a t i v e l y o b j e c t i v e i n terms of t h e i r being 
c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c . I n Chapter Ten I d i s c u s s whether or not 
a e s t h e t i c t a s t e i s a c q u i r e d or i n n a t e , and whether or not i t i s 
p r o f i t a b l e t o compare the r e l a t i v e o b j e c t i v i t y o f a e s t h e t i c 
judgements w i t h the a b s o l u t e o b j e c t i v i t y of s c i e n t i f i c 
judgements. F i n a l l y , i n Chapter Eleven, I compare Jungian 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of symbolic c o n t e n t , w i t h G e s t a l t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f , and a f f e c t i v e responses t o , form. By 
s u g g e s t i n g c e r t a i n h y p o t h e t i c a l means by which such 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , and subsequent judgements, might be t e s t e d , I 
conclude t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f b o t h form and c o n t e n t admit of 
a degree o f o b j e c t i v i t y . These, t h e n , are my main areas of 
r e s e a r c h . O b v i o u s l y these areas are n o t e x h a u s t i v e and many of 
them a c t u a l l y o v e r l a p w i t h o t h e r broader issues i n the f i e l d of 
a e s t h e t i c s i n p a r t i c u l a r , and w i t h i n the d i s c i p l i n e s of 
p h i l o s o p h y and psychology i n g e n e r a l . B e a r i n g t h i s i n mind i t 
might be u s e f u l t o c a t e g o r i c a l l y s t a t e a t the o u t s e t which 
areas I s h a l l n o t be a t t e m p t i n g t o cover. These a r e : a e s t h e t i c s 
i n n a t u r e ; moral judgements; and judgements of the sublime. 
Those areas which I s h a l l be r e f e r r i n g t o i n a s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d 
sense o n l y a r e : P h y s i c a l t a s t e - f o r example, of food and d r i n k 
- and p h y s i c a l beauty. For reasons o f space I s h a l l c o n f i n e my 
examples t o p a i n t i n g s , works of l i t e r a t u r e and, t o a l e s s e r 
e x t e n t , music - r a t h e r than t o a r c h i t e c t u r e , s c u l p t u r e and 
dance. 
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An obvious s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r any d i s c u s s i o n of modern 
a e s t h e t i c s has t o be David Hume's Of the Standard of Taste. 
A f t e r b r i e f l y o u t l i n i n g Hume's argument I s h a l l go on, i n the 
n e x t c h a p t e r , t o c o n s i d e r h i s views i n r e l a t i o n t o those o f 
Immanuel Kant. By a t t e m p t i n g a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s o f Kant's 
p r o f o u n d l y i n f l u e n t i a l C r i t i q u e o f judgement, I hope then t o 
e s t a b l i s h a more p r e c i s e v o c a b u l a r y w i t h which t o t a c k l e such 
i s s u e s as t a s t e , judgement, u n i v e r s a l i t y , d i s i n t e r e s t , and 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i n subsequent c h a p t e r s . 
David Hume regards the f a c u l t y o f t a s t e as being an 
e m o t i o n a l l y i n s p i r e d form o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . I n h i s essay Of 
the Standard of Taste he a p p l i e s an e m p i r i c i s t argument t o 
the p r i n c i p l e o f a e s t h e t i c t a s t e and judgement. He proposes 
t h a t : 
I t is natural for us to seek a standard of taste; a rule, by which the 
various sentiments of men may be reconcilsd; at least, a decision, 
afforded, confirming one sentiment, and condemning another. 
N a t u r a l though t h i s search may be, any ' r u l e ' uncovered 
by i t must s u r e l y be q u e s t i o n a b l e . I s i t p o s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h 
an o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d method by means of which a person might 
f o r m u l a t e such a r u l e ? and, i f so, i n what way would such a 
person be q u a l i f i e d t o implement i t ? To an e x t e n t , Hume a f f i r m s 
t h e f i r s t q u e s t i o n i n h i s answer t o the second. For Hume, a 
l e g i t i m a t e a e s t h e t i c judgement o f t a s t e can be made i f and only 
i f t h e person making i t 1) has a ' d e l i c a t e s e n t i m e n t ' ; 2) 
has f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the g i v e n a r t form •= i n order t h a t 
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comparisons might be made. 3) has a ' s t r o n g sense' ( t h a t i s , a 
c a p a c i t y f o r r e a s o n ) ; and 4) i s not p r e j u d i c e d . 
The problem w i t h Hume's n o t i o n o f a competent judge i s , of 
co u r s e , t h a t i t can o n l y be u s e f u l i f i t can be d e f i n e d w i t h o u t 
c i r c u l a r i t y . Thus i t i s n o t enough t o d e f i n e the competent 
j u d g e as b e i n g one who u s u a l l y makes competent judgements, 
s i n c e i t i s the competent judge who has t o decide which 
judgements are competent. Baritr g t h i s i n mind i t may be 
p r o f i t a b l e here t o examine Hume's c r i t e r i a f o r the competent 
j u d g e i n d e t a i l , and, l a t e r , t o suggest how the c r i t e r i a might 
be p r a c t i c a l l y a p p l i e d t o , say, our a p p r e c i a t i o n of Modern 
A r t , 
Hume addresses h i m s e l f t o the r e l a t i o n o f our everyday 
e x p e r i e n c e o f n a t u r e and our a e s t h e t i c experience of a r t . Both, 
he would argue, appeal t o our emotions, whether r e a l or 
imagined. The subsequent a s s o c i a t i o n s = o f sympathy, n o s t a l g i a , 
or whatever o t h e r ' i n t e r n a l ' sentiment = may be bot h 
p l e a s u r a b l e and i n f o r m a t i v e . T h i s p l e a s u r e i s immediate and may 
be t r a n s f e r a b l e t h r o u g h a s s o c i a t i o n . Judgements based upon t h i s 
p l e a s u r e can be c o r r e c t e d t h r o u g h argument and r e f l e c t i o n . I n 
t h i s Hume i s i n f l u e n c e d by F r a n c i s Hutcheson (1694-1746) who 
took from the t h i r d E a r l o f Shaftesbury (1671-1713) the concept 
of an inwa r d eye or sense t h a t grasps harmony and beauty, and 
expanded i t t o account f o r a s p e c i a l f a c u l t y o f a e s t h e t i c 
a p p r e c i a t i o n which sees harmony and beauty i n o b j e c t s t h a t 
have s u i t a b l y harmonious and b e a u t i f u l q u a l i t i e s . ' ^ W h i l s t 
Hutcheson's f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h i s 'sense' assumes n e i t h e r 
i n t e l l e c t nor a s s o c i a t i o n o f ideas i t does, n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
a f f o r d a n o n - r e l a t i v i s t i c s t a n d a r d o f judgement. This i s i n 
v i r t u e o f the somewhat s l i p p e r y means by which he d e f i n e s 
b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t s as b e i n g those t h a t p r e s e n t 'a compound r a t i o 
o f u n i f o r m i t y and v a r i e t y ' ^ i n t h a t , i f one term were h e l d t o 
be c o n s t a n t , v a r i a b i l i t y i n the o t h e r term would determine the 
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beauty or o t h e r w i s e o f the o b j e c t . V a r i a t i o n s i n pr e f e r e n c e -
beauty b e i n g i n the eye of the beholder - are e x p l a i n e d , by 
Hutcheson, i n terms o f the v a r y i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s w i t h which 
d i f f e r e n t s u b j e c t s approach the o b j e c t , Hutcheson's concept of 
sense can be s a i d t o be taken up by Hume i n h i s co n c e p t i o n of 
'a d e l i c a t e s e n t i m e n t ' , t h a t i s , a c r e a t i v e and a s s o c i a t i v e 
i m a g i n a t i o n . L i k e Hutcheson, Hume supposes t h a t t h e r e are 
q u a l i t i e s p r e s e n t i n c e r t a i n o b j e c t s t h a t a q u a l i f i e d 
p e r c i p i e n t can i n d u c t i v e l y i n q u i r e i n t o i n order t o e s t a b l i s h 
c e r t a i n standards f o r judgement. For Hume t h i s ' i m a g i n a t i v e ' 
e x e r c i s e c o n f i r m s t h e v a l u e o f our a e s t h e t i c experiences, 
i n s o f a r as i t evokes ideas which u n i t e us w i t h , and a l l o w us 
b e t t e r t o respond t o , n a t u r e . I n Hume's words: 
One obvious cause, why many feel not the proper sentiment of beauty, is 
the want of the delicacy of imagination, which is requisite to convey a 
sensihnity of those finer emotions. This delijcacy everyone pretends to: 
Every one talks of i t ; and would reduce every kind of taste or sentim ent 
to its standard.^ 
Hume's concern w i t h the f a c u l t y o f the i m a g i n a t i o n has 
prece d e n t s i n the a s s o c i a t i v e t h e o r i e s o f John Locke (1632-
1704). However, whereas Locke b e l i e v e s t h a t we are p e r f e c t i b l e 
- because we are born i n t o the w o r l d w i t h minds l i k e b lank 
sheets o f paper - Hume b e l i e v e s t h a t we are not so m a l l e a b l e , 
and t h a t we have c e r t a i n passions which are i n n a t e and cons t a n t 
t h r o u g h o u t human h i s t o r y . T h i s , f o r Hume, i s evidenced by the 
' u n i v e r s a l beauty' and ' t i m e l e s s n e s s ' of Homer and V i r g i l whose 
o b s e r v a t i o n s p o i n t t o the permanence of the human c o n d i t i o n . 
For Hume, t h e n , t h i s p a s s i o n , l i k e common sense, i s a product 
o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n - and some people are more i m a g i n a t i v e than 
o t h e r s . I n h i s words: 
Though some objects, by the structure of the mind, be naturally calculated 
to give pleasure, i t is not to be expected, that in every individual the 
pleasure w i l l be equally felt. Particular incidents . . . hinder the true from 
conveying to the iraaginatijon the proper sentiment and perception.-^ 
How does Hume account f o r t h i s apparent r e l a t i v i t y ? I t 
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sho u l d f o l l o w t h a t s i n c e a st a n d a r d o f t a s t e i s , f o r Hume, t o 
be d e r i v e d from t he s u b j e c t i v e mechanisms of the mind, t h e r e 
can be no a b s o l u t e c o g n i t i v e a u t h o r i t y . And y e t Hume's i d e a l 
man o f t a s t e i s h e l d t o be p r e c i s e l y t h a t . As he puts i t : 
. . . the judgement of one man had been preferable to that of another.^ 
I n e x e r c i s i n g h i s t a s t e Hume's i d e a l man employs g e n e r a l 
terms which have a u n i v e r s a l l y understood and t h e r e f o r e 
o b j e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n ; such as ' p r o p r i e t y ' , ' s i m p l i c i t y ' , 
' v e r a c i t y ' and 'elegance'. However, he goes on t o say: 
When critics come to particulars, this seeming unanimity vanishes; and i t 
is found, that they had affixed a very different meaning to their 
expressions . . . The difference among men is there oftener found to lie 
in generals than in particulars; and to be less in reality than in 
appearance. 
So how can t h i s i d e a l man o f t a s t e j u s t i f i a b l y draw 
u n i v e r s a l c o n c l u s i o n s and a e s t h e t i c judgements from these 
p a r t i c u l a r s ? For Hume the e m p i r i c a l meaning o f a word i s 
r e l a t e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r idea and the c o n t e n t of t h i s idea i s 
d e r i v e d from e x p e r i e n c e . Without such experience the word has 
no meaning. T h i s c a u s a t i o n can o n l y be understood i n terms of 
necessary c o n n e c t i o n s o f events i n the i m a g i n a t i o n which are 
based upon past e x p e r i e n c e . He argues t h a t : 
I t is evident that none of the rules of composition are fixed by reasoning 
a prLorL, or can be esteemed abstract conclusions of the 
understanding, from comparing those habitudes and relations of 
ideas, which are eternal and immutable. Their foundation is the same with 
that of a l l the practical sciences, experience; nor are they any thing but 
general observations, concerning^ what has been universally found to please 
in a l l countries and in al l ages. 
T h i s i n t u r n i s r e l a t e d t o Hume's emphasis upon ' p r a c t i c e ' 
and c o m p a r a t i v e a n a l y s i s . Simply by examining the appearance 
of an a r t o b j e c t we cannot immediately r e c o g n i s e the 'cause' of 
i t s a e s t h e t i c ' e f f e c t ' . T h i s must be i n f e r r e d through 
accumulated e x p e r i e n c e or ' p r a c t i c e ' , r a t h e r than through some 
a p r i o r i axiom. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , Hume's i d e a l man of t a s t e 
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j u s t i f i e s h i s ' o b j e c t i v e ' c r i t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s and e x p e c t a t i o n s 
by ' s u b j e c t i v e l y ' drawing from h i s past experiences: 
But though there be naturally a wide difference in point of delicacy 
between one person and another, nothing tends fmlher to increase and 
improve this talent, than practice in a particular art,^ 
Hume goes oh t o suggests t h a t t h e r e i s a u s e f u l analogy t o 
be made here between the t a s t e e x e r c i s e d i n our mental 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o f a r t and our b o d i l y a p p r e c i a t i o n o f food and 
d r i n k . The u s e f u l n e s s o f t h i s comparison i s l i m i t e d . As I read 
him, t he p o i n t Hume i s making here i s t h a t i f a degree of 
o b j e c t i v i t y i s p o s s i b l e i n such a paradigm o f s u b j e c t i v i t y as 
wine t a s t i n g then i t must s u r e l y be p o s s i b l e i n a r t 
a p p r e c i a t i o n . . . But, our a p p r e c i a t i o n o f wine i s c o n t i n g e n t 
upon the ' n o r m a l i t y ' o f our metabolism. We may disagree w i t h 
th e wine c o n n o i s s e u r s judgement because we are p h y s i c a l l y 
a l l e r g i c t o t h a t p a r t i c u l a r wine. I n such a c o n t e x t the p r o o f 
of t he pudding must s u r e l y be i n the e a t i n g , and one man's meat 
can be another man's p o i s o n . There i s no r e a l e q u i v a l e n t t o 
t h i s i n a r t a p p r e c i a t i o n . Even i f I do not l i k e a p a i n t i n g f o r 
some s u b j e c t i v e reason - l i k e i t f e l l on my head when I was a 
baby - I can s t i l l a p p r e c i a t e why o t h e r s c o n s i d e r i t t o be 
'good'. By 'good', though, I do not n e c e s s a r i l y mean 
' b e a u t i f u l ' . I s h a l l d i s c u s s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n Chapter Four, 
b u t , i n s o f a r as i t r e l a t e s t o Hume, I t h i n k i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
a v o i d the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t beauty is i n the eye of the beholder. 
A c c o r d i n g t o Hume: 
Beauty is no quality in things themselves: I t exists merely in the mind 
which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. 
For Hume t h e n , t h i s q u a l i t y o f beauty i s not i n the a r t 
o b j e c t b u t i n the sentiment of the s u b j e c t p e r c e i v i n g i t . Yet 
Hume seems t o c o n t r a d i c t h i m s e l f by comparing such beauty i n 
b e a u t i f u l a r t , t o the 'goodness' i n good wine. He a l l u d e s t o 
the s t o r y i n Don Quixote about the two wine connoisseurs who by 
t u r n s d e t e c t the t a s t e of l e a t h e r and i r o n i n a hogshead of 
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wine. When a key w i t h a l e a t h e r thong t i e d t o i t i s found a t 
the b o t t o m , t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e d e l i c a c y o f t a s t e i s confirmed. 
From t h i s Hume concludes t h a t ; 
. .. i t must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in objects, which 
are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.^-'-
What q u a l i t i e s does Hume have i n mind? Presumably he i s 
n o t r e f e r r i n g t o q u a l i t i e s o f 'beauty' because he has alr e a d y 
concluded t h a t they are i n the mind. Perhaps he has i n mind the 
' g e n e r a l ' terms r e f e r r e d t o above - such as q u a l i t i e s of 
' p r o p r i e t y ' , ' s i m p l i c i t y ' , ' v e r a c i t y ' and 'elegance'. For the 
i d e a l man o f t a s t e t o apply these terms a p p r o p r i a t e l y he must 
have sound judgement. According t o Hume everyone has two 
s t a t e s : one sound and one d e f e c t i v e . I t i s the u n i f o r m i t y of 
the sound s t a t e t h a t a f f o r d s us a standa r d of t a s t e : 
Amidst alL the variety and caprice of taste, there are certain general 
principles of approbation or blama, whose iriluence a careful eye may 
trace in a l l operations of the mind.^ 
Conversely, i t i s the d e f e c t i v e s t a t e t h a t makes f o r 
'bad' t a s t e . H u m e : 
Where men vary in their judgements, some defect or perversion in the 
faculties may commonly be remarked; and there is just reason for 
approving one taste, and condemning another.-'•^ 
As a l r e a d y mentioned however, t h i s 'bad' t a s t e may a l s o be 
e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f a person's l a c k of ' p r a c t i c e ' : 
A man, who has had no opportunity of comparing the different kinds of 
beauty, is indeed totally unqualified to pronounce an opiraon with regard 
to any object presented to him.-*-^  
A l t h o u g h a t t r a c t i v e , Hume's argument - t h a t t a s t e i s the 
same i n a l l men, y e t n o t a l l men are q u a l i f i e d t o a c t upon i t -
seems p a r a d o x i c a l . I t r e l i e s on too many p s y c h o l o g i s t i c 
assumptions t h a t are d i f f i c u l t t o prove or d i s p r o v e . I t i s t o 
Kant we must l o o k i n an att e m p t t o r e s o l v e t h i s paradox . . . 
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There a r e , however, c e r t a i n aspects o f Hume's argument 
t h a t a r e w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g i n r e l a t i o n t o the p r o b l e m a t i c issue 
o f t a s t e i n , say. Modern A r t . F i r s t , 'beauty' seems an 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e term t o apply t o c e r t a i n A b s t r a c t E x p r e s s i o n i s t 
p a i n t i n g s , so, l i k e Hume, we should perhaps consider 
s u b s t i t u t e terms - Beardsley's i n t e n s i t y , c o m p l e x i t i t y and 
u n i t y , f o r i n s t a n c e . Second, many modern t h e o r i s t s would take 
i s s u e w i t h Hume's n o t i o n t h a t a r t has an u l t e r i o r f u n c t i o n : 
namely, t h a t t h r o u g h t h e e x e r c i s e o f i m a g i n a t i o n r e q u i r e d t o 
a p p r e c i a t e a r t we become b e t t e r equipped t o a p p r e c i a t e n a t u r e . 
They would argue, i n s t e a d , t h a t a l l a r t i s autonomous (as 
Croce and Co l l i n g w o o d do, f o r i n s t a n c e ) . But t h e r e are some 
t h e o r i s t s who would agree w i t h Hume's sug g e s t i o n t h a t a r t has a 
f u n c t i o n (George O r w e l l ' s argument t h a t a l l a r t i s propaganda, 
f o r i n s t a n c e ) . T h i r d , ' i m a g i n a t i o n ' has an i m p o r t a n t r o l e t o 
p l a y i n the a p p r e c i a t i o n o f a b s t r a c t a r t . People imagine they 
see faces i n a r b i t r a r y arrangements o f c o l o u r , f o r i n s t a n c e . 
F o u r t h , Hume's c o n c e p t i o n o f e x p e r t i s e i s s t i l l r e l e v a n t : 
u n l e s s a person i s f a m i l i a r w i t h the b a s i c t e n e t s of Modernism; 
i s aware o f the t r a d i t i o n s and i n n o v a t i o n s which Modernist 
p a i n t i n g s r e p r e s e n t ; and has some 'Modern' frames o f r e f e r e n c e 
w i t h w h i c h t o compare and c o n t r a s t a g i v e n p a i n t i n g ; the 
p a i n t i n g w i l l be i n a c c e s s i b l e t o him or her.-^^ 
The B r i t i s h e m p i r i c a l a e s t h e t i c i a n s of the Seventeenth and 
E i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s can a l s o be s a i d t o have c o n t r i b u t e d t o 
our u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the importance o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l p e r c e p t i o n 
and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n a r t e v a l u a t i o n . For i n s t a n c e , Locke's 
s u g g e s t i o n t h a t s e n s a t i o n i s the main source o f ple a s u r e and 
p a i n , and hence o f a e s t h e t i c v a l u e ; o r , Joseph Addison's theory 
t h a t our response t o the a e s t h e t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f a gi v e n a r t 
o b j e c t i s an imagined p l e a s u r e ; o r Hume's a s s o c i a t i o n i s t 
t h e o r y , t h a t i s , t h e e m o t i o n a l q u a l i t i e s t h a t we a s s o c i a t e w i t h 
c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s o f an a r t o b j e c t ; or Burke's t h e o r y t h a t we 
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ex p e r i e n c e t he b e a u t i f u l and the sublime a c c o r d i n g t o d i f f e r e n t 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c u l t i e s . . . 
Burke's Essay on Taste-*-^ of 1759 can perhaps be seen as a 
t h e o r e t i c a l d e p a r t u r e from Hume's p o s i t i o n and an a n t i c i p a t i o n 
o f Kant's. I t concerns the a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n and judgement 
o f 'works o f i m a g i n a t i o n ' . L i k e o t h e r E i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y 
e m p i r i c i s t a e s t h e t i c i a n s , Burke asks whether a e s t h e t i c 
p e r c e p t i o n can be u n i v e r s a l i n the way t h a t d i s c u r s i v e 
knowledge i s , and, i f so, whether i t i s l e a r n e d or innate? 
Burke's answer t o these q u e s t i o n s seems t o l i e somewhere 
between Hume's p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t judgements o f t a s t e can be 
u n i v e r s a l b u t not because t h e r e i s a separate f a c u l t y o f the 
mind r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n , and Hutcheson's view 
t h a t t h e r e i_s such a separate f a c u l t y , or 'i n n e r eye'. Burke 
c o n s i d e r s t h a t our a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n s can be u n i v e r s a l 
because they i n v o l v e the f a c u l t y o f reason - through which 
c o n c e p t u a l , d i s c u r s i v e knowledge can be s a i d t o be u n i v e r s a l -
as w e l l as the f a c u l t y o f i m a g i n a t i o n . 
From t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n Burke then asks i f t h e r e are any 
p r i n c i p l e s - g o v e r n i n g the f a c u l t y o f the i m a g i n a t i o n - which 
c o u l d i n f o r m a s t a n d a r d o f t a s t e and, c o n v e r s e l y , i f t h e r e are 
p r i n c i p l e s o f t a s t e which c o u l d d e f i n e the f a c u l t y of the 
i m a g i n a t i o n ? He concludes t h a t t h e r e a r e : 
. . . weather there are any principles, on which the imagination is 
affected, so common to aH, so grounded and certain, as to supply the 
means of reasoning satisfactorily about them. And such principles of Taste, 
I fancy there are.^^ 
Burke a l s o suggests t h a t t a s t e can be considered i n 
L o c k i a n terms, t h a t i s , as an i n t e r p l a y o f v a r i o u s o t h e r 
f a c u l t i e s - such as p l e a s u r e , p a s s i o n , r e c e p t i o n , c r e a t i o n , 
s e n s a t i o n and judgement - r a t h e r than j u s t t h a t o f reason and 
i m a g i n a t i o n : 
. . . made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the 
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secondary pleasures of imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning 
faculty . . . 
This c a p a c i t y f o r u n i f y i n g and r e c r e a t i n g r e a l i t y and 
r e n d e r i n g i t m e a n i n g f u l seems i n some re s p e c t s t o be an 
a n t i c i p a t i o n o f G e s t a l t psychology [as discussed i n Chapter 
E l e v e n ] . Because sensual p e r c e p t i o n i s u n i v e r s a l ( t h e 
i m a g i n a t i o n b e i n g the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the senses); and 
because e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p e r c e p t i o n ( t h e f a c u l t y o f reason) i s 
u n i v e r s a l ; so. Burke concludes, a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n ( b e i n g a 
c o m b i n a t i o n o f the two) must a l s o be u n i v e r s a l : 
91 
. . . there must be just as close an agreement as in the senses of men.^ -^  
I n t h i s r e s p e c t the f a c u l t y o f i m a g i n a t i o n - and thus of 
t a s t e - i n v o l v e s the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r e c r e a t i o n and i m i t a t i o n 
o f sensual p e r c e p t i o n s o f an a r t o b j e c t . Burke's next problem 
i s t o determine the c r i t e r i o n by which these ' i m i t a t i o n s ' of 
the a r t o b j e c t can be s a i d t o be c o r r e c t , t h a t i s , t o e s t a b l i s h 
an o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n by which the i m i t a t i n g p e r c e p t i o n can be 
s a i d t o correspond t o the i m i t a t e d a r t o b j e c t . This he proposes 
t o do by r e f e r r i n g t o the f a c u l t y o f judgement or 'reason'. For 
Burke, t h e n , a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n i m p l i e s a e s t h e t i c judgement. 
The p l e a s u r e d e r i v e d from a t r u e i m i t a t i o n of an a r t o b j e c t 
( t h a t i s , a t r u e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f i t r e c r e a t e d i n the 
i m a g i n a t i o n ) i s u n i v e r s a l because i t i s based on experience. I n 
o t h e r words he a p p l i e s the t r a d i t i o n a l e m p i r i c a l c r i t e r i o n -
f o r making e x p e r i e n t i a l judgements as t o the t r u t h of 
d i s c u r s i v e knowledge - t o a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n . According t o 
Burke, t h e n , t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n s depends 
upon a c o r r e c t visage o f concepts and upon f a c t u a l ( e x p e r i e n c e -
based) knowledge o f the o b j e c t . The i m a g i n a t i o n i n v o l v e s the 
i n t e r p l a y o f sensual p e r c e p t i o n and c o n c e p t u a l knowledge. The 
p r i n c i p l e s o f t a s t e can t h u s , f o r Burke, be d e f i n e d i n terms of 
t h i s i n t e r p l a y o f the senses, the i m a g i n a t i o n , and the f a c u l t y 
o f judgement. 
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For a response t o the t h e o r i e s o f Hume and Burke and the 
o t h e r B r i t i s h e m p i r i c i s t s , one must t u r n t o Kant, Kant p a r t l y 
agrees w i t h Hume t h a t t h e r e are no i n n a t e ideas - meaning 
t h i n g s known p r i o r t o sense experience - b u t , l i k e Burke, he i s 
no t prepared t o accept t h a t t h i s a p p l i e s t o a l l forms of 
knowledge. Kant b e l i e v e s i n a p r i o r i concepts (which Hume does 
n o t ) which are sometimes confused w i t h i n n a t e i d e a s . They make 
p o s s i b l e knowledge which i s independent o f experience. L i k e 
Burke, Kant l o c a t e s a e s t h e t i c judgement i n the f a c u l t y o f the 
i m a g i n a t i o n and makes a ( p a r t i a l ) c o n n e c t i o n between the 
u n i v e r s a l i t y o f a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n and conc e p t u a l knowledge. 
Our knowledge o f the p r o p e r t i e s o f c e r t a i n o b j e c t s may, Kant 
c l a i m s , be r e l a t e d t o the 'n a t u r e ' o f the o b j e c t , r a t h e r than 
t o the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , F urthermore, Kant suggests t h a t our 
knowledge o f the o b j e c t i s as much dependent on the apparatus 
we have f o r knowing, as on what t h e r e a c t u a l l y i ^ t o know about 
the o b j e c t , Kant makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between p r o d u c t i v e 
i m a g i n a t i o n ( a s y n t h e s i s o f c o n c e p t u a l and i n t u i t i v e knowledge 
of the o b j e c t ) and r e p r o d u c t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n (merely an 
i m i t a t i o n o f the o b j e c t , i n Burke's sense). I t i s i n the former 
t h a t Kant l o c a t e s a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n . Kant t h e r e f o r e r e f e r s 
t o ' r e f l e c t i v e ' judgements o f t a s t e i n terms of an i m i t a t i o n of 
the form o f c o n c e p t u a l knowledge; t h a t i s , i n terms of the 
f r e e - p l a y o f the f a c u l t i e s o f ( p r o d u c t i v e ) i m a g i n a t i o n and 
judgement. A c c o r d i n g t o Kant, the i m a g i n a t i o n works on sensual 
i n t u i t i o n s which a f f o r d a p r e c o n c e p t u a l understanding of the 
work o f a r t . I n o t h e r words, i t a f f o r d s an a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n 
of i t which i s u n i v e r s a l i n v i r t u e o f i t s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . 
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A S u b j e c t i v i s t ° s V i e w s 
K a n t ° s C r i t i q u e o f J u d g e m e n t 
W h i l s t Hume b e l i e v e s t h a t a l l m e a n i n g f u l p r o p o s i t i o n s must 
be e i t h e r a n a l y t i c a p r i o r i o r s y n t h e t i c a p o s t e r i o r i , Kant 
proposes a t h i r d term, t h a t o f s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i . To a degree 
t h e n , Kant's C r i t i q u e o f Judgement can be seen as a s y n t h e s i s 
o f e m p i r i c i s m and r a t i o n a l i s m . I n i t , he o f f e r s a p r o f o u n d l y 
a m b i t i o u s argument f o r the u n i v e r s a l s u b j e c t i v i t y of a e s t h e t i c 
judgements o f t a s t e . 
Kant b e l i e v e s we have t h r e e c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s : reason, 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , and s e n s i b i l i t y . I t i s i n the second f a c u l t y , of 
judgement, t h a t Kant l o c a t e s the a e s t h e t i c i n t e r e s t . Judgement, 
f o r Kant, e n t a i l s t h i n k i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r c a t e g o r y as i t i s 
i n c l u d e d i n a u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e . I f t h i s u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e 
i s g i v e n , t he judgement, which i n c l u d e s the p a r t i c u l a r , i s 
d e t e r m i n a n t . I f o n l y t he p a r t i c u l a r i s g i v e n , w i t h o u t the 
u n i v e r s a l , t h e judgement i s r e f l e c t i v e . W h i l s t the det e r m i n a n t 
judgement i s e m p i r i c a l , the r e f l e c t i v e judgement i s autonimous 
and t h e r e f o r e a e s t h e t i c , as, f o r i n s t a n c e , when i t concerns 
non-dependent beauty. For Kant t h e r e are no degrees of beauty -
something e i t h e r i s or i s n o t b e a u t i f u l , I doubt t h i s , but i f 
i t i s t r u e and beauty i s t o be our one and o n l y c r i t e r i o n f o r 
j u d g i n g a r t , i t i s goi n g t o be an extremely l i m i t i n g one. We 
are a b l e , s u r e l y , t o make v a l i d comparative judgements w i t h i n a 
g i v e n canon. A l s o , even i f a comparative judgement i s only 
b e i n g made between t h a t which i s b e a u t i f u l and t h a t which i s 
n o t b e a u t i f u l , s u r e l y such a judgement admits of degrees of 
beauty. The o b j e c t t h a t i s b e a u t i f u l , f o r i n s t a n c e , i s more 
b e a u t i f u l than the o b j e c t which i s u g l y . Also, the 
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c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f one b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t may be more p l e a s u r a b l e 
than t h e c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f another and so the one might be 
c o n s i d e r e d t o be more b e a u t i f u l than the o t h e r . 
For Kant, t h e non-dependent beauty of the o b j e c t i s 
s e p a r a t e d from the p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s and s c i e n t i f i c 
concerns o f the s u b j e c t . The o b j e c t i s not a means t o an end 
and so the s u b j e c t ought t o be ' d i s i n t e r e s t e d ' . I t i s t o t h i s 
e x p e r i e n c e t h a t Kant addresses h i s argument. 
The f i r s t p a r t of C r i t i q u e of Judgement, e n t i t l e d A n a l y t i c 
o f the B e a u t i f u l , ^ i s d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r 'moments': r e l a t i o n , 
q u a n t i t y , q u a l i t y and m o d a l i t y . These are i n t e r d e p e n d e n t -
s a t i s f y i n g one c r i t e r i o n assumes t h a t the o t h e r t h r e e c r i t e r i a 
w i l l a l s o , n e c e s s a r i l y , be s a t i s f i e d . Kant summarises these 
'moments' as f o l l o w s : 
i ) Taste is the faculty of judging of an object or a method of representing 
i t by an entirely disinterested satisfaction or dissatisfaction. The object of 
such satisfaction is called beautifuL 
i l ) The l>eautLful is that which pleases universally without [requiring] a 
concept.-^ 
iLL) Beauty is the form of the purposlveness of an object, so far as this is 
perceived in i t without any representation of a purpose.^ 
iv) The beautiful is that which idthout any concept is cognized as the 
object of a necessary satisfaction. 
I t i s w o r t h examining each of these moments i n t u r n : 
i ) A c c o r d i n g t o Kant, the p l e a s u r e t o be had from 
c o n t e m p l a t i n g a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f beauty i s l o c a t e d i n the 
f r e e - p l a y of the c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s of i m a g i n a t i o n and 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ^ Kant o f f e r s no adequate e x p l a n a t i o n , however, 
f o r t h e a e s t h e t i c p l e a s u r e t o be had from g a i n i n g knowledge, 
and from pure u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as, f o r i n s t a n c e , i s the case i n 
t h e c o n t e m p l a t i o n of mathematical f o r r a u l i . (Presumably he 
would argue t h a t such p l e a s u r e would n o t be a e s t h e t i c , because, 
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f o r him, the b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t cannot be a means t o an end.) 
Kant m a i n t a i n s , t h e n , t h a t a non-conceptual r e l a t i o n i s s t a t e d 
between t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and a d i s i n t e r e s t e d s a t i s f a c t i o n : 
The judgement of taste is therefore not a judgement of cognition, and is 
consequently not logical but aesthetical^ by which we jjnderstand that 
whose determining ground can be no other than subjective,' 
Whereas a d e t e r m i n a n t judgement o f an o b j e c t i s e m p i r i c a l , 
and t h e r e f o r e l o g i c a l , a r e f l e c t i v e ( i n t u i t i v e ) judgement of a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of beauty i s , f o r Kant, p e r c e p t u a l , 
c o n t e m p l a t i v e , r e f l e c t i v e , d i s c e r n i n g , and t h e r e f o r e a e s t h e t i c . 
Kant o f f e r s no adequate e x p l a n a t i o n o f how such a judgement 
would be d i f f e r e n t from a judgement of non-beauty ( u g l i n e s s ) 
except t o say t h a t such a judgement would be n o n - a e s t h e t i c . 
Kant goes on t o c l a i m t h a t the ' s a t i s f a c t i o n ' which determines 
the a e s t h e t i c judgement of t a s t e must be ' d i s i n t e r e s t e d ' . 
However, as Mary McCloskey argues,^ t h e r e i s no reason to 
b e l i e v e t h a t t h a t which g i v e s us d i s i n t e r e s t e d p l e a s ure i s any 
l e s s i d i o s y n c r a t i c than t h a t which g i v e s us i n t e r e s t e d 
p l e a s u r e . F u r t h e r m o r e , as McCloskey argues elsewhere, 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d p l e a s u r e o n l y t e l l s us what a e s t h e t i c pleasure i s 
n o t , n o t what i t i s . F o l l o w i n g from t h i s I propose an 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o Kant's view, namely t h a t we might l e a r n what 
a e s t h e t i c p l e a s u r e i s by r e f e r r i n g t o the o b j e c t s i n which i t 
i s t a k e n . I n o t h e r words, we might d e f i n e a r t by example 
a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n concepts, [See Chapter S i x ] 
I t s h ould be noted t h a t by ' t a s t e ' ( i n the above 
q u o t a t i o n ) Kant i s r e f e r r i n g t o 'the b e a u t i f u l ' as opposed t o 
'the p l e a s a n t ' and 'the good', b o t h of which, f o r him, are 
' i n t e r e s t e d ' , and b o t h of which belong t o the o t h e r f a c u l t i e s 
( s e n s i b i l i t y and r e a s o n ) , Kant d e f i n e s 'the p l e a s a n t ' as being 
t h a t which pleases the senses i n s e n s a t i o n ; and 'the good' as 
b e i n g t h a t which pleases i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and c o n c e p t u a l l y 
t h r o u g h i t s p u r p o s i v e n e s s , This p l e a s u r e may be mediate or 
immediate, depending on whether an o b j e c t i s u s e f u l or good i n 
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i t s e l f . 'The b e a u t i f u l ' and 'the p l e a s a n t ' always please 
i m m e d i a t e l y . Both p l e a s u r e i n 'the good' and i n 'the b e a u t i f u l ' 
are u n i v e r s a l , communicable, and necessary, u n l i k e i n 'the 
p l e a s a n t ' ( w h i c h i s p r i v a t e ) . 'The good' communicates pleasure 
t h r o u g h a concept whereas 'the b e a u t i f u l ' communicates pleasure 
t h r o u g h 'The Form of F i n a l i t y ' . However, Kant argues t h a t o n ly 
'the b e a u t i f u l ' i s a c o n c e p t u a l , t h a t i s , f r e e from i n t e r e s t s o f 
sense or reason, and i s t h e r e f o r e the o n l y one which can be 
t r u l y u n p r e j u d i c e d . ^ For reasons I s h a l l e x p l a i n i n Chapter 
S i x , I b e l i e v e our c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s of a r t can a l s o be 
u n d e r s t o o d i n terms o f Kant's f o r m u l a t i o n of 'the good' as 
oppose t o b e i n g e x c l u s i v e l y understood i n terms of h i s 
f o r m u l a t i o n o f 'the b e a u t i f u l ' . . 
i i ) I f i n d Kant's account of the second moment more 
p e r s u a s i v e l y argued. I n t h i s , Kant c l a i m s t h a t the s a t i s f a c t i o n 
d e r i v e d from c o n t e m p l a t i o n of 'the b e a u t i f u l ' i s , u n l i k e 
s e nsual p l e a s u r e , u n i v e r s a l ( a l t h o u g h i t must a l s o be s i n g u l a r 
i n l o g i c a l f o r m , as i n ' t h i s rose i s b e a u t i f u l ' ) . I t f o l l o w s 
from h i s argument i n the f i r s t moment t h a t because t h i s 
s a t i s f a c t i o n i s d i s i n t e r e s t e d i t must meet w i t h u n i v e r s a l 
a s s e n t . Because, f o r Kant, the d i s i n t e r e s t e d judgement of 'the 
b e a u t i f u l ' i s n o t p e c u l i a r t o the i n d i v i d u a l , the i n d i v i d u a l 
w i l l presuppose t h a t everyone shares h i s judgement. So f a r so 
good. At t h i s p o i n t , however, Kant denies the obvious 
c o n c l u s i o n t o be drawn from t h i s : namely, t h a t concepts are 
i n v o l v e d . He argues i n s t e a d t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l assume 
t h a t t he 'beauty' he or she i s j u d g i n g i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
the o b j e c t , and t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l w i l l t h i n k h i s or her 
' c o n c e p t u a l ' judgement of i t i s d e t e r m i n a n t and l o g i c a l (when 
i n a c t u a l f a c t , a c c o r d i n g t o Kant, i t i s r e f e r e n t i a l and 
a e s t h e t i c ) . I f h i s or her judgement were c o n c e p t u a l , Kant 
argues, t h e r e would be no t r a n s i t i o n t o the f e e l i n g of 
p l e a s u r e and p a i n . But why not? Kant o f f e r s an e x p l a n a t i o n : 
. . . the judgement of taste, accompanied with the consciousness of 
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separation from a l l interest, must claim validity for every man, without 
this univeEsality depending on objects, ^ a t is, there must be bound up 
with i t a t i t l e to subjective universality. 
For a l l i t s p a r t i a l success i n a v o i d i n g the q u e s t i o n , 
Kant's answer has i n a d v e r t e n t l y opened up a Pandora's box of 
p o l e m i c s , v i z . ' s u b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l i t y ' . T h i s i s the phrase 
w i t h which Kant a t t e m p t s t o r e s o l v e the antinomy of t a s t e . He 
d e a l s w i t h t h i s problem more t h o r o u g h l y i n a l a t e r c h a p t e r , b u t 
i n s o f a r as the problem r e l a t e s t o the second moment, he 
suggests t h a t everyone may have t h e i r own t a s t e o f sense (as i n 
'the p l e a s a n t ' ) or o f reason (as i n 'the good'), but t h a t these 
are n o t a e s t h e t i c t a s t e s : 
. . . i t is not open to men to say: Every one has his own taste. This 
would be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing at a l l as taste, 
that is, no aesthetic judgement capable of making a rightful claim upon 
the assent of al l men.^ *^  
Now, the t h r e e forms of p l e a s u r e - i n the s e n s a t i o n , i n 
t h e b e a u t i f u l , and i n the good - l o c a t e t h e i r p l e a s u r e i n 
s e n s a t i o n ; r e f l e c t i o n on p e r c e p t u a l form; and concepts, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . Only t a s t e t h a t i s u n i v e r s a l , as i n 'the 
b e a u t i f u l ' , can c l a i m t o be a e s t h e t i c . Having proposed t h i s 
Kant then goes on t o c l a i m t h a t i f a person were t o q u a l i f y a 
judgement o f beauty, as i n , ' t h i s o b j e c t i s b e a u t i f u l f o r me' , 
then i t cannot be beauty he or she i s r e f e r r i n g t o - b u t , 
r a t h e r , p l e a s a n t n e s s or goodness. This i s because a judgement 
o f beauty, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant, does n o t need q u a l i f y i n g . I f i n d 
Kant's i n t e r e s t i n g account u n s a t i s f a c t o r y on two counts: F i r s t , 
d e s p i t e h i s c l a i m [ i n the f o u r t h moment, s e c t i o n two] t h a t 
a e s t h e t i c f e e l i n g s are ' u n i v e r s a l l y communicable' I f a i l t o see 
how t h i s i s p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n . I f I c l a i m t h a t my 
judgement 'This is_ b e a u t i f u l ' i s u n i v e r s a l l y communicable I do 
so, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant, on the grounds t h a t o t h e r s ought to 
agree w i t h my judgement because i t i s d i s i n t e r e s t e d . The 
'because' here i s a q u a l i f i c a t i o n . ^ ^ Second, b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t s 
need not always g i v e p l e a s u r e and, c o n v e r s e l y , u g l y o b j e c t s can 
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sometimes g i v e p l e a s u r e . As McCloskey p o i n t s o u t , Kant's 
r e a s o n i n g would seem t o im p l y t h a t the o p p o s i t e of t h i s i s a l s o 
t r u e , t h a t i s ; t h a t a judgement of a n o n - b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t must 
needs express a communicable and u n i v e r s a l l y necessary 
d i s p l e a s u r e t h a t i s s i m i l a r l y non-conceptual but i n the absence 
o f t h e Form o f F i n a l i t y . 
I t i s w o r t h p o i n t i n g out here j u s t how f o r c i b l y Kant 
i t e r a t e s h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between c o n c e p t u a l 'good' and non-
c o n c e p t u a l 'beauty'. He r e f e r s t o t h r e e v a r i a n t s o f 'the good': 
( I ) good i n terms o f the u s e f u l n e s s o f the o b j e c t (good f o r ) ; 
( I I ) good i n and of i t s e l f ( f o r i n s t a n c e , moral good); and 
( I I I ) good 'as' a g i v e n k i n d . Each i s c o n c e p t u a l . McCloskey 
a g a i n : 
That we can demand universal assent and say that anyone ought to assent 
to our judgement turns upon their applying the same concepts to the 
objects in question and upon their bringing the same rules to bear upon 
the objects as we do. I t is by way of the concept and the rules that we 
'extort approval'.-'•^ 
But Kant wants t o have h i s cake and eat i t too because, by 
c o n t r a s t , 'the b e a u t i f u l ' i s s t i l l u n i v e r s a l , but non-
c o n c e p t u a l - t h a t i s , i t commands a non-governable 'ought'. 
U n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y i s n ot the same t h i n g as l o g i c a l 
u n i v e r s a l i t y . I f I say t h a t ' l f i n d the c o l o u r s i n t h i s 
p a i n t i n g p l e a s i n g ' then t h a t statement i s u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d 
i n s o f a r as everyone must accept t h a t i t i s t r u e f o r me. 
However, the statement 'the c o l o u r s i n t h i s p a i n t i n g are 
p l e a s i n g ' , would be v a l i d i f and o n l y i f i t were a c t u a l l y , 
phenomenally, t r u e - a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n ' u n i v e r s a l ' c r i t e r i a 
f o r p l e a s u r e . Does i t n o t f o l l o w from t h i s t h a t Kant i s r e a l l y 
a r g u i n g t h a t an o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y i s a l s o 
s u b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d , t o the e x t e n t t h a t everyone shares the same 
'concept'? I suspect t h a t i t does. T h i s s a i d , however, i t does 
no t f o l l o w t h a t a s u b j e c t i v e l y u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y w i l l 
n e c e s s a r i l y be o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d . T h i s i s because, a c c o r d i n g t o 
Nigel Famdale Page 31 of 192 
Chapter Three A Subjectivist's View 
Kant's f o r m u l a t i o n , t h e r e are no concepts a v a i l a b l e t o share. 
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s i m p o r t a n t f o r Kant because: 
. . . the aesthetical uraversaUty which is ascribed to a judgement must be 
of a particular kind, because i t does not unite the pce^c^te of beauty 
with the concept of the object, considered in its whol^ logical sphere, and 
yet extends i t to the whole sphere of judging persons. 
As a l r e a d y s t a t e d , Kant b e l i e v e s t h a t the s u b j e c t i v e 
f e e l i n g o f p l e a s u r e and p a i n i s f r e e from concepts; and i s a l s o 
s i n g u l a r . But s u r e l y , i f t h i s s i n g u l a r judgement i s transformed 
by comparison i n t o a concept, i t may then become a l o g i c a l l y 
u n i v e r s a l judgement - as i n 'the good'. Kant seems prepared t o 
concede t h i s p o i n t , a l b e i t w i t h q u a l i f i c a t i o n : 
I describe by a judgement of taste the rose that I see as beautifuL But 
the judgement which results from the comparison of several singular 
judgments, 'Roses in general are beautiful,' is no longer descri±>ed simply 
as aesthetical, but as a logical judgement based on an aesthetical one.^° 
Kant seems q u i t e j u s t i f i e d i n making t h i s assumption about 
judgements o f beauty i n n a t u r e , however, the cross-over o f t h i s 
assumption i n t o the realm o f f i n e a r t i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a 
smooth one. A c r i t i c i s m o f t e n l e v i e d a t h i s assumption i s t h a t 
judgements such as those c o n c e r n i n g roses are p e r i f e r a l and 
secondary t o those c o n c e r n i n g f i n e art.-*"^ I t h i n k what i s meant 
by t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t judgements o f s p e c i f i c works of a r t 
can be i n f o r m e d by an appeal t o o t h e r examples of t h e i r k i n d , 
b u t t h a t t h e r e i s no c o r r e s p o n d i n g appeal t o o b j e c t s i n n a t u r e 
( e x c e p t i n g t he e x t e n t t o which b o t h r e f e r t o p e r c e p t u a l f o r m ) . 
I t h i n k i t i s m i s l e a d i n g t o assume, as Kant does, t h a t t h e r e 
i s l i t t l e o r no d i s t i n c t i o n between beauty i n n a t u r e and beauty 
i n a r t . One i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n i s t h a t u n l i k e , say, a r o s e , 
an a r t o b j e c t i s produced, t h e r e f o r e we need some s o r t of 
concept as t o what i t i s a p r o d u c t i o n o f (what i t i s int e n d e d 
t o be) f o r example, a p a i n t i n g as a work of a r t r a t h e r than a 
doormat: 
I f . . . the object is presented as a product of art, and is as such to be 
declared beautiful, then, seeing that art always presupposes an end in the 
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cause (and its causality), a concept of what the thing is intended to be 
must first be laid at its basis. 
Kant seems t o be c l a i m i n g here t h a t we should a t t e n d t o 
beauty i n a r t i n the same way t h a t we a t t e n d t o beauty i n 
n a t u r e . But how can beauty i n f i n e a r t a v o i d b e i n g , a t l e a s t 
p a r t i a l l y , c o n c e p t u a l and dependent? S u r e l y i n the above 
q u o t a t i o n Kant i s a c t u a l l y c l a i m i n g t h a t a r t i m i t a t e s n a t u r e 
and so i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l and so, by i m p l i c a t i o n , does i n v o l v e 
concepts? There i s a l s o another o b j e c t i o n which Kant i n v i t e s by 
h i s s i n g u l a r judgement as t o the beauty o f the ros e : How can 
beauty ever be a n y t h i n g o t h e r than dependent, unless i t i s 
r e f e r r i n g t o an a b s t r a c t i o n - which p l a i n l y the 'concrete' rose 
I h o l d i n my hand i s not? or unless i t i s r e f e r r i n g t o some 
P l a t o n i c I d e a l ( c o n c e p t u a l ) Form of b e a u t i f u l r o s e s , i n which 
case i t would n o t be a s i n g u l a r judgement, but r a t h e r a 
judgement o f a rose i n r e l a t i o n t o the I d e a l c l a s s of roses? 
A c c o r d i n g t o Kant, a rose i s b e a u t i f u l i n v i r t u e of i t s 
a b s t r a c t f o r m , n o t i n v i r t u e o f i t s b e i n g a r o s e . But what i f , 
as McCloskey s p e c u l a t e s , a dependent beauty i s taken as a 
paradigm? The u n i v e r s a l i t y o f such a beauty w i l l be c o n c e p t u a l , 
t h a t i s , i n r e f e r e n c e t o an o b j e c t which i s judged as_ an 
example o f i t s k i n d , and n o t , t h e r e f o r e , as an o b j e c t which i s 
autonomous. The problem here i s t h a t , i f not a c t u a l l y 
ambiguous, Kant's t h e o r y does le n d i t s e l f t o m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
Beauty i s non-dependent i n t h a t i t depends on the ( a b s t r a c t ) 
form o f the o b j e c t , and n o t on what k i n d o f a t h i n g i t i s . Thus 
a r o s e , f o r Kant, i s n o t b e a u t i f u l qua rose b u t qua the s p a t i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f i t s p a r t s t o one another. A d m i t t e d l y , t h i s 
does n o t i m p l y t h a t t h e r e i s no such t h i n g as pure beauty, but 
i t does i m p l y t h a t i f a p a r t i c u l a r rose i s taken as a paradigm 
then we are i n the realm o f dependent beauty . . . 
i i i ) L e t us l o o k a t Kant's t h i r d moment. T h i s i s concerned 
w i t h t he purposiveness o f the form of an o b j e c t . Beauty, f o r 
Kant, does n o t have a purpose. He e x p l a i n s t h a t 'purpose' i s 
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t h e o b j e c t o f a concept; t h e concept i s the cause o f the 
o b j e c t ; and the cause o f the o b j e c t of the concept i s i t s 
p u r p o s i v e n e s s . I n s h o r t , the judgement of t a s t e cannot be 
d e t e r m i n e d by the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of an o b j e c t i v e purpose: 
Every purpose, i f i t be regarded as a ground of satisfaction, always carries 
with i t an interest - as tiie determining ground of the judgement - about 
the object of pleasure. Therefoi^ no subjective purpose can lie at the 
basis of the judgement of taste.^^ 
A u n i v e r s a l l y communicable judgement of t a s t e can, f o r 
Kant, o n l y be determined by the s u b j e c t i v e purposiveness i n 
the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an o b j e c t , which, p a r a d o x i c a l l y , has no 
purpose or concept. However, as Eva Schaper argues: 
No concepts of any kind . . . are thinkable without the logix^lly prior 
'pure concepts of the understanding', the categories. So i f judging is an 
operation of the understanding, then subjectively valid judgements cannot 
be exceptions on that score. I f aesthetic judgements of taste 'unify 
representations' as a l l judgements do, then concepts cannot be totally 
absent.^^ 
I f t h i s i s t r u e - t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements are not 
s t r i c t l y autonomous and s u b j e c t i v e , b u t r a t h e r t h a t they r e f e r 
t o c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a and t h e r e f o r e , o f n e c e s s i t y , imply the use 
o f c e r t a i n concepts - then t h e r e i s a s e r i o u s weakness i n 
Kant's argument^^. T h i s i s n o t t o say, however, t h a t the beauty 
o f a r t can be judged by concepts a l o n e . On the c o n t r a r y , as I 
have a l r e a d y suggested, beauty i s a phenomenal r a t h e r than a 
noumenal or d e o n t o l o g i c a l p r o p e r t y . As K a r l Araeriks puts i t : 
The remark that aesthetic pfropei±ifis are not found in the concepts of 
things ... is s t i l l compatible (in Kant's worid) with judgements of beauty 
functioning .^^just as objectively as ordinary particular empirical 
judge ments.'^ '^  
But i ^ Kant a r g u i n g t h a t t h e r e i s complete autonomy? Not 
n e c e s s a r i l y . That i s , he may be a r g u i n g t h a t t h e r e i s some 
degree o f autonomy, b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y g i v i n g l i c e n c e t o a 
f u l l - b l o w n t h e o r y o f a r t f o r a r t ' s sake. Rather, as McCloskey 
argues, i t i s more a case o f beauty f o r beauty's sake: 
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Kant does not deny that works of art have 'meaning' nor that their 
subject matter is relevant to an aesthetic understanding of them. Nor does 
he think that their 'meaning' or subject matter contributes nothing to 
their aesthetic value. He thinks that works of art express aesthetic ideas 
and that aesthetic ideas are what geraus contributes to a work of art, and 
hence that of which in addition to considering beauty we must take note 
in making an estimate of them."^ -^  
Kant a l s o c l a i m s t h a t t a s t e cannot be a c q u i r e d through 
i m i t a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r must be experienced f i r s t - h a n d . The pr o o f 
o f t h e pudding must be i n the e a t i n g . As he puts i t : 
. . . the archetype of taste, is a mere idea, which everyone must produce 
in himself and according to which he must judge every object of taste, 
every example of judgement by taste, and even the taste of everyone. 
I n t h i s sense Kant r e f e r s t o an i d e a l , or archetype of 
beau t y . He d e f i n e s t he i d e a l as b e i n g the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of an 
i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g , regarded as adequate t o an idea or r a t i o n a l 
c oncept. Because t h i s i d e a l , or norm, of beauty i s a 
p r e s e n t a t i o n r a t h e r than a concept i t must come from the 
f a c u l t y o f the i m a g i n a t i o n . For Kant, i m a g i n a t i o n i s not 
a s s o c i a t i v e , as i t i s f o r Hume, but r a t h e r i s c o n s t i t u t i v e , 
meaning t h a t i t i s a p a r t o f the n a t u r e o f the experience t h a t 
expresses i t . 
I f we wish to discern whether anything is beautiful or not, we do not 
refer the representation of i t to the Object by means of understanding 
with a view to cogniticn, but by means of the imaginatijon (acting perhaps 
in conjunction wiih understanding) we refer the representation to the 
Subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. 
A c c o r d i n g t o Kant the i m a g i n a t i o n s y n t h e s i s e s the s e n s i b l e 
i n t u i t i o n o f an o b j e c t and the concept o f t h a t o b j e c t , i n order 
t h a t we might have an a e s t h e t i c experience o f the o b j e c t , which 
i s f r e e from concepts. T h i s need n o t mean, however, t h a t j u s t 
because the o b j e c t i s p e r c e i v e d by a s u b j e c t then the judgement 
o f t h a t s u b j e c t w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be s u b j e c t i v e , any more than 
i t s h o u l d n e c e s s a r i l y be o b j e c t i v e . Ameriks a g a i n : 
I t is a fundamental of Kant's general philDsophy that whenever we 
determine qualities a posteriori we must do so via intuition and thus via 
some sensation which is subjective at least in the sense that i t exists in 
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us. Thus even when a tree is perceived as being really t a l l and green 
there occur sensations that exist merely subjectively. So, the fact that the 
kind of taste Kant is discussing requires discriraination by something 
subjective ^ ^oes not entail that what is discriminated shoi33 be called 
subjective."^" 
S u r e l y t h e n , an i d e a l o f beauty must be f i x e d by i t s 
o b j e c t i v e r a t h e r than s u b j e c t i v e p u r p o s i v e n e s s , a purposiveness 
by means o f which any judgement o f t a s t e d e r i v e d from i t w i l l 
be, t o some e x t e n t , i n t e l l e c t u a l ? Consider Kant's p o s i t i o n on 
t h i s : 
... in whatever grounds of judgement an ideal is to be found, an idea of 
reason in accordance with defixdte concepts must lie as its basis, which 
determines a priori, the purpose on which the intemal possLhUity of the 
object rests. 
When Kant t a l k s o f ' o b j e c t i v e purposiveness' he has i n 
mind o b j e c t s t h a t have i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e (good f o r something) 
b u t what, he seems t o be a s k i n g , i s pure beauty good f o r , 
o t h e r than f o r the 'purpose' o f c o n t e m p l a t i o n , namely, being 
p e r c e i v e d as b e a u t i f u l ? . . . W e l l , j u s t t h a t . Beauty i s good 
f o r s a t i s f y i n g t h e a e s t h e t i c i n t e r e s t . I may be accused of 
p u t t i n g t h e c a r t b e f o r e the horse here b u t t h i s seems t o be an 
u n a v o i d a b l e c o n c l u s i o n t o draw from Kant's t h e o r y of 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y ( i n which ' s u b j e c t i v e ' judgements o f t a s t e , 
a r e equated w i t h ' o b j e c t i v e ' judgements o f e x p e r i e n c e ) . L e t us 
r e c o n s i d e r t h i s t h e o r y . I f i n d i v i d u a l judgements o f 
e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t i s , e m p i r i c a l judgements, are o b j e c t i v e 
because they d e a l w i t h o b j e c t i v e c o r r e l a t i v e s or ' f a c t s ' , then 
i f such a judgement based on ' f a c t s ' x, y and z i s t r u e f o r 
one j u d g i n g s u b j e c t i t must be t r u e f o r a l l j u d g i n g s u b j e c t s . 
T h i s need n o t be a necessary or u n i v e r s a l t r u t h , b u t , i n i t s 
p a r t i c u l a r i t y and c o n t i n g e n c y , i t does n e c e s s a r i l y c l a i m the 
assent o f everyone. The same argument can be a p p l i e d t o 
i n d i v i d u a l judgements o f t a s t e i n s o f a r as such judgements may 
be t r u e o r f a l s e a c c o r d i n g t o the c r i t e r i a by which they were 
made, and, as such, t r u e or f a l s e f o r everyone. Yet these 
judgements, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant, are s u b j e c t i v e w h i l s t the former 
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are o b j e c t i v e . Wherein l i e s the d i f f e r e n c e ? I f t h e r e i s no 
d i f f e r e n c e ( w h i c h would be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a theory of 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y ) then why does Kant seem t o be c l a i m i n g t h a t 
judgements of e x p e r i e n c e are o b j e c t i v e because they are e i t h e r 
t r u e o r f a l s e , whereas judgements of t a s t e are s u b j e c t i v e 
because they are n e i t h e r t r u e nor f a l s e ( a l t h o u g h we do c l a i m 
t h a t they ought t o accepted)? S u r e l y t h i s i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
h i s argument t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements o f t a s t e are not items 
o f knowledge i n a way t h a t e m p i r i c a l judgements of experience 
might be. I f a l l t h a t he means by t h i s i s t h a t t o say 
e m p i r i c a l l y t h a t a s c u l p t u r e i s curved i s d i f f e r e n t from saying 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y t h a t i t i s ' b e a u t i f u l ' then I would agree w i t h 
him ( a l t h o u g h I would add t h a t t h e former o b j e c t i v e c l a i m may 
w e l l i n f o r m the l a t t e r s u b j e c t i v e c l a i m ) . But i s t h a t a l l he i s 
saying? The argument here seems t o p i v o t on whether Kant 
b e l i e v e s a work o f a r t i s ' s u b j e c t i v e l y ' b e a u t i f u l because i t 
g i v e s a e s t h e t i c p l e a s u r e , or whether i t i s a e s t h e t i c a l l y 
p l e a s u r a b l e because i t i s ' o b j e c t i v e l y ' b e a u t i f u l ? To determine 
an answer t o t h i s we must l o o k t o Kant's f o u r t h moment. 
i v ) I n t h i s moment Kant argues t h a t 'the b e a u t i f u l ' has a 
necessary r e f e r e n c e t o a e s t h e t i c s a t i s f a c t i o n . T his i s not a 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y o b j e c t i v e n e c e s s i t y , nor i s i t a p r a c t i c a l one, 
b u t r a t h e r i t i s exemplary, i n s o f a r as o t h e r s ought t o take 
s a t i s f a c t i o n i n 'the b e a u t i f u l ' : 
The judgement of taste requires the agreement of everyone, and he who 
describes anything as beautiful claims that everyone ought to give his 
approval to the object in question and also describe i t as beautifuL The 
ought in the aesthetical judgement is therefore pronounced in accordance 
with a l l the data which are required for judging, and yet is only 
conditioned. 
A judgement of t a s t e , t h e n , a s s e r t s a c o n d i t i o n e d 
s u b j e c t i v e n e c e s s i t y which i n t u r n i s the idea of a common 
sense. T h i s common sense i s d i f f e r e n t from common 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i n s o f a r as i t judges by f e e l i n g s r a t h e r than 
c o n c e p t s . F o l l o w i n g from t h i s Kant concludes t h a t : 
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The necessity of the universal agreement that is thought in a judgement 
of taste is a subjective necessity, whkJi is represented as objective under 
the presupposition of a common sense.-^ ^ 
I n o t h e r words, t h r o u g h common sense the ' n e c e s s i t y ' 
s h i f t s from b e i n g s u b j e c t i v e t o i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e . This sounds 
r e a s o n a b l e . A c c o r d i n g t o Kant, i t does t h i s because t h e r e i s a 
d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made here between s e n s a t i o n and f e e l i n g , i n 
r e s p e c t o f p l e a s u r e : 
The green colour of the meadow belongs to objective sensation, as the 
perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness [belongs] to 
subjective sensation, by which no object is represented: Le. to feeling, 
through which the object is reganied as an object of delight (which 
involves no cognition of the object).-^^ 
What Kant i s sayi n g here i s t h a t p l e a s u r e though not 
i t s e l f a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n n e v e r t h e l e s s presupposes t h a t i t s 
o b j e c t has c e r t a i n t e r t i a r y p r o p e r t i e s (greenness, f o r 
i n s t a n c e ) which are p l e a s u r a b l e [See Chapter Nine f o r an 
e x p l a n a t i o n o f p r i m a r y and t e r t i a r y p r o p e r t i e s ] . McCloskey 
a g a i n : 
The perceived green colour of the meadow pleases. The green colour as 
perceived can represent, but whether or not i t does, the green colour is 
what is found pleasing. Pleasure in the perceived green colour cannot 
represent the jBeadow; and Kant adds, i t cannot represent the perceiving 
subject either. 
Our judgements o f beauty, t h e n , are u n i v e r s a l i n v i r t u e of 
t h e i r c l a i m t o common sense, o r , more p r e c i s e l y , t o common 
f e e l i n g . We need n o t assume t h a t everyone w i l l agree w i t h 
these judgements, o n l y t h a t they ought t o . Common sense i s an 
i d e a l norm on which a r u l e may be based. On t h i s p o i n t Kant 
seems t o be i n accord w i t h Hume. As Kant puts i t : 
The principle which concerns the agreement of different judging persons, 
although only subjective, is yet assumed as subjectively univeasal (an ideal 
necessary for everyone), and thus can claim universal assent (as i f i t were 
objective) provided K£ are sure that we have correctly subsumed [the 
particulacs] under it.-^'^ 
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between s u b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l i t y and 
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o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l i t y i s c r u c i a l t o Kant's argument. A 
s u b j e c t i v e judgement as t o the beauty o f an i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t 
may be u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d t o a l l s u b j e c t s b u t not n e c e s s a r i l y t o 
a l l o b j e c t s - t h a t i s , i t does n o t mean t h a t the same judgement 
w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l y t o s i m i l a r o b j e c t s o f t h a t t y p e . As 
Stephen Korner p u t s i t : 
First, an objective empirical judgement refers to an object and not merely 
to the subjective impression. Second, an objective empirical judgement is, 
i f true, true for everybody. I t is not qualified by some such clause as 'in 
ray consciousness' or 'as i t seems to me' but is generally valid, Le. for 
everybodv in every consciousness or, in Kantian terms 'in consciousness in 
general'.-^-^ 
For Kant, t h e n , a judgement t h a t has s u b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y 
need n o t have o b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y , b u t an o b j e c t i v e l y 
v a l i d judgement must a l s o have s u b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y . T h i s i s 
because o b j e c t i v e judgements are u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d b o t h f o r the 
whole c l a s s o f o b j e c t s b e i n g judged and f o r a l l the s u b j e c t s 
d o i n g the j u d g i n g ; whereas s u b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d judgements are 
always s i n g u l a r , t h a t i s , v a l i d f o r the j u d g i n g s u b j e c t s o n l y , 
and n o t f o r the whole c l a s s o f o b j e c t s being judged. The 
s u b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f a s y n t h e t i c a p r i o r i judgement of 
t a s t e i s , moreover, v a l i d a t e d t h r o u g h a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l 
d e d u c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o Kant, t h i s d e d u c t i o n i s a r r i v e d a t 
a l o n g t h e f o l l o w i n g l i n e s : Because d e t e r m i n a t e judgements b r i n g 
t o g e t h e r p a r t i c u l a r sense i n t u i t i o n s o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
( t h r o u g h the i m a g i n a t i o n ) and g e n e r a l concepts ( t h r o u g h 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o have e m p i r i c a l knowledge. The 
f o r m a l purposiveness o f a b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t can provoke the 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d f r e e - p l a y o f the i m a g i n a t i o n which does not 
depend upon p a r t i c u l a r knowledge b u t r a t h e r on an awareness of 
t h i s b r i n g i n g t o g e t h e r o f the two c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s of 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and i m a g i n a t i o n . This harmony of the two 
c o n s t i t u t e s a e s t h e t i c p l e a s u r e . Since we assume t h a t everyone 
shares t h i s consciousness o f the c o - o p e r a t i o n between 
i m a g i n a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g then we can, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant, 
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l e g i t i m a t e l y c l a i m our s u b j e c t i v e judgements of t a s t e t o be 
u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d . 
Now, Kant m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n can 
a c h i e v e i t s u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y t hrough r e f e r e n c e t o 'form' 
a l o n e . I n o t h e r words i t does so w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o e i t h e r 
the s e n s a t i o n o f , or t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f , 'matter'. For Kant, i t 
i s n o t enough t o assume u n i v e r s a l i t y t h r o u g h an appeal t o the 
' m a t t e r ' o f s e n s a t i o n ( t h a t i s , 'sense d a t a ' ) as t h i s i s 
p r i v a t e and r e l a t i v e . Only the p u b l i c 'form' can l e g i t i m a t e l y 
be r e f e r r e d t o . T h i s d e d u c t i o n need n o t j u s t i f y the o b j e c t i v e 
r e a l i t y o f any concept, i t merely presumes t h a t the s u b j e c t i v e 
c o n d i t i o n s o f the judgement w i l l be u n i v e r s a l . Furthermore, 
t h i s judgement must be made by the i n d i v i d u a l a p r i o r i , because 
t a s t e c l a i m s autonomy. Yet these judgements are not autonomous, 
as becomes apparent when Kant makes a t h i n l y - d i s g u i s e d appeal 
t o t h e t e s t - o f - t i m e p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i f y i n g t a s t e ( s i m i l a r t o 
t h a t a l r e a d y encountered w i t h Hume): 
. . . taste, because its judgement is not determinable by concepts and 
precepts, is just the one which most needs examples .of what has in the 
progress of culture received the longest approval ... 
Kant i s here i n d u l g i n g i n a s o r t of p h i l o s o p h i c a l s l e i g h t -
o f-hand. A f t e r a l l , what are 'examples' i f not ' c o n c e p t s ' W e 
need examples or concepts of a r t b e f o r e we can determine 
whether or n o t t h e o b j e c t we are j u d g i n g i s , i n f a c t , an a r t 
o b j e c t . I f P pretends t o agree w i t h a u n i v e r s a l judgement 
about an 'example' of a 'good' work of a r t - when a c t u a l l y he 
does n o t l i k e i t - he p r o b a b l y does so i n o r d e r t o appear more 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d . ^ ^ He has p r o b a b l y assumed t h a t the ' f a u l t ' i s i n 
him, n o t i n the a r t w o r k . He may assume t h a t h i s ' f a u l t ' i s t h a t 
he i s n o t knowledgeable enough about - f a m i l i a r w i t h enough 
examples o f - t h e a r t form i n q u e s t i o n . Kant would, of course, 
take i s s u e w i t h t h i s . He would argue t h a t a judgement of beauty 
has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h knowledge, and t h a t you cannot prove 
t h a t an o b j e c t i s b e a u t i f u l . As he puts i t : 
Page 40 of 192 Nigel Famdale 
A SubjectLvist's View Chapter Three 
. . . the agreement of others gives no valid proof of the judgement about 
beauty. Others might perhaps see and observe for him; and what many 
have seen in one way, although he believes that he has seen i t differently, 
might serve him as an adequate ground of proof of a theoretical and 
consequently logical judgement . . . There is ... no empirical ground of 
proof which would force a judgement of taste upon anyone.-^' 
I f t h i s i s t r u e , which I doubt, then we are unable to 
j u s t i f y our a e s t h e t i c judgements. I n c l a i m i n g t h a t judgements 
of t a s t e a re s y n t h e t i c a l ( i n t h a t they are more than a concept 
or i n t u i t i o n o f an o b j e c t ) and are determined o n l y by a 
f e e l i n g o f p l e a s u r e and p a i n ( r a t h e r than an e m p i r i c a l 
c o g n i t i o n ) Kant has weakened h i s c l a i m t o u n i v e r s a l i t y . As 
Schaper argues: 
The problem of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement is to provide a 
justification of the claim to universal validity that yet preserves this 
essential distinction between judgements of taste and objective knowledge 
claims. The justification must be in non-empirical terms appealing to 
something like laws or prescriptions. Judgements claiming to hold good for 
everyone need not themselves be a priori judgements - few in fact are; 
but they niust be based on principles that can show what they claim to be 
justifiable.-^^ 
Kant o f f e r s no such p r i n c i p l e s . His antinomy of t a s t e , 
t h e r e f o r e , cannot be r e s o l v e d through an appeal t o 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f judgement i n the way t h a t Schaper suggests. 
I f , as Kant argues, we f e e l p l e a s u r e or p a i n i n the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an o b j e c t , we must a l s o f e e l compelled t o 
make an immediate judgement about i t , i n v i r t u e of our 
r a t i o n a l i t y . S u r e l y though, such ' r a t i o n a l ' judgements, or 
c h o i c e s , i n v o l v e an e x e r c i s e o f reason, and such reasoning 
i n v o l v e s concepts? Again, Kant has worked a ' g e t - o u t ' clause 
i n t o h i s t h e o r y . He argues t h a t we do not 'reason' our way t o 
judgements o f beauty, r a t h e r , we j u s t ' r e c o g n i s e ' beauty when 
we come across i t or when we observe something i n the r i g h t 
s o r t o f way. Must we, t h e n , s t i l l accept t h a t t h e r e i s no 
a c c o u n t i n g f o r t a s t e ? With g r e a t e q u a n i m i t y Kant discusses 
t h i s antinomy i n terms o f a t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s . E i t h e r : 
1) The judgement of taste is not based upon concepts, for otherwise i t 
Nigel Famdale Page 41 of 192 
Chapter Three A Subjectivist's View 
would admit of controversy [would be determinable by proofs.] 
Or: 
2) The judgement of taste is based on concepts, for otherwise, despite its 
diversity, we could quarrel abouLAt [we could not claim for our judgement 
the necessary assent of others].-^^ 
Kant suggests a middle course, namely t h a t ' t h e r e may be a 
q u a r r e l about t a s t e ' . His d i s t i n c t i o n depends upon how he 
d e f i n e s t h e term 'concept'. Kant i s f o r c e d t o concede t h a t our 
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l judgement o f t a s t e must r e f e r t o 'some' concept, 
i n s o f a r as i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y u n i v e r s a l . T h i s concept, however, 
does n o t o f f e r ' p r o o f o f the judgement of t a s t e - as i t would 
of a judgement of reason or sense - and cannot be determined 
t h r o u g h i n t u i t i o n . I t i s the pure r a t i o n a l concept of the 
s u p e r s e n s i b l e which r e f e r s t o the s e n s i b l e o b j e c t . Kant 
a t t e m p t s t o a v o i d t h i s apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n by s t a t i n g t h a t : 
. . . the judgement of taste is based on a concept . . . from which, 
however, notMng can be known and proved in respect of the object, 
because i t is in itself undeterminable and useless for knowledge. Yet . . . 
has validity for everyone . . . because its determining ground Hes perhaps 
in the concept of that which may be regarded as the supersensible 
substrate of huraanity.^^ 
A c c o r d i n g t o Kant, t h e n , the c o n t r a d i c t i o n between the 
t h e s i s and the a n t i t h e s i s , l i e s i n the f a l s e assumption t h a t 
the 'concept' - which i n each case determines the u n i v e r s a l 
v a l i d i t y o f the judgement - i s the same f o r b o t h . And i f 
t h e s i s and a n t i t h e s i s may b o t h be t r u e then they cannot be 
( l i t e r a l l y ) c o n t r a d i c t o r y . The judgement o f t a s t e i n the t h e s i s 
i s n o t based on a d e t e r m i n a t e concept, whereas t h a t of the 
a n t i t h e s i s i s based on £ concept, o n l y i t i s an i n d e t e r m i n a t e 
one. The c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h e n , i s r e s o l v e d t o the e x t e n t t h a t 
b o t h can be t r u e , and so t h e r e may be a q u a r r e l concerning 
t a s t e . But, i t f o l l o w s a l s o t h a t i f two c o n t r a d i c t o r y 
s t a t e m e n t s can b o t h be t r u e , they can a l s o b o t h be f a l s e . . . 
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So where does t h i s l e a v e us? To what e x t e n t has Kant's 
t h e o r y o f the a e s t h e t i c judgement o f t a s t e r e s o l v e d the 
paradoxes t h a t were e v i d e n t i n Hume's theory? Perhaps i t 
h a s n ' t . Perhaps one must accept t he p a r a d o x i c a l n a t u r e of the 
antinomy o f t a s t e as an i n e v i t a b l e consequence of the s e l f -
c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n h e r e n t i n t h e e x p r e s s i o n ' a e s t h e t i c judgement' 
- namely, t h a t the s u b j e c t i v e ' s e n s a t i o n ' i m p l i e d by the 
f i r s t term i s negated by the i n t e l l e c t u a l , reasoned 'concept' 
i t r e f e r s t o i n the second. Then a g a i n , perhaps one should 
s i m p l y e r r on the s i d e o f optimism and o v e r l o o k t h i s 
i n c o n v e n i e n t paradox. 
A l t h o u g h , on the whole, kant o f f e r s an a p p e a l i n g argument 
f o r t h e s u b j e c t i v e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f a d i s i n t e r e s t e d judgement of 
t a s t e , t h e r e are c e r t a i n passages which l e n d themselves t o 
a c c u s a t i o n s o f ob s c u r a n t i s m . I , f o r i n s t a n c e , remain confused 
as t o how I might be a b l e t o make an immediate, d i s i n t e r e s t e d , 
s u b j e c t i v e judgement o f beauty ( t h a t has necessary, u n i v e r s a l 
v a l i d i t y ) w i t h o u t r e f e r r i n g t o any o b j e c t i v e concepts ( n o t 
even o f t h e form o r c o n t e n t o f the o b j e c t ) . Perhaps Kant means 
by t h i s t h a t we must p e r c e i v e the thing-as-a-whole ( t h a t i s , as 
an o b j e c t ) b u t not as an o b j e c t o f any p a r t i c u l a r k i n d , t h a t 
i s , n o t as an i d e a l of_ something. For Kant, t o judge a work of 
a r t a_s a work o f a r t i s n o t t o make a pure judgement o f t a s t e , 
because t h e beauty ( o r u g l i n e s s ) t h a t i s contemplated i s 
dependent. I f t h i s i s the case then I am a t a l o s s t o know j u s t 
how I am supposed t o come i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h the a r t o b j e c t i n 
t h e f i r s t p l a c e . How do we d i s t i n g u i s h between ' n a t u r a l ' 
o b j e c t s , man-made o b j e c t s , and man-made a r t o b j e c t s ? According 
t o Kant we cannot. I t f o l l o w s t h a t Duchamp's Fountain i s as 
worthy o f our a e s t h e t i c a t t e n t i o n as i s a p a i n t i n g by 
Rembrandt, j u s t because someone, anyone, has s a i d i t i s . The 
p a i n t i n g may embody o t h e r n o n - a e s t h e t i c ( i n s t r u m e n t a l ) v a l u e s , 
as may the u r i n a l , b u t these, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant, are i r r e l e v a n t 
t o our a e s t h e t i c judgement o f i t . I n s h o r t , I f a i l t o see how 
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such non-conceptual a e s t h e t i c judgements can be u n i v e r s a l l y 
communicated. As Kant h i m s e l f might suggest, t h i s f a i l u r e may 
l i e i n my r e a s o n i n g and not i n h i s argument. But of t h i s much 
I f e e l s u r e : non-conceptual a e s t h e t i c judgements can never mean 
o t h e r than ' I l i k e t h i s ' o And ' I l i k e t h i s ' does not mean 'This 
i s good'. 
I s h a l l be r e t u r n i n g t o Kant's t h e o r y i n subsequent 
c h a p t e r s . I n Chapters S i x , Seven and Ten, f o r i n s t a n c e , I r e -
e v a l u a t e Kant's antinomy o f t a s t e ; i n Chapter Six I discuss 
concepts i n terms o f 'examples'; and i n Chapter Eleven I 
suggest ways i n which judgement i s concerned w i t h m a tter as 
w e l l as ' K a n t i a n ' form. I n the n e x t chapter though, I s h a l l , 
i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f Kant, suggest c e r t a i n c o n c e p t - c r i t e r i a 
a c c o r d i n g t o which we might a t t e m p t t o j u s t i f y our a e s t h e t i c 
judgements. 
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g a l l e r y and d e r i v e p l e a s u r e from l o o k i n g a t a p a i n t i n g . I would 
n o t take i s s u e w i t h t h i s . I would q u e s t i o n , however, what k i n d 
of p l e a s u r e i s b e i n g d e r i v e d , and I would analyse the form i n 
which t he response i s a r t i c u l a t e d . 
Again a r g u a b l y , i f such an 'uninformed' person, P, were 
t o c l a i m t h a t because a g i v e n p a i n t i n g occasioned him pleasure 
i t was t h e r e f o r e 'good', we sh o u l d , perhaps, r e s p e c t h i s 
s u b j e c t i v e judgement. However, we should a l s o q u a l i f y our 
r e s p e c t by a s k i n g him c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n s : F i r s t , i s the p a i n t i n g 
good because i t g i v e s him p l e a s u r e or does i t g i v e him pleasure 
because i t i s good? Second, i s he ab l e t o j u s t i f y h i s judgement 
or e x p l a i n wherein h i s p l e a s u r e c o n s i s t s ? T h i r d , i s h i s 
judgement u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d ? And, i f so, ac c o r d i n g t o what 
r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i a has he made h i s judgement? 
To be on the safe s i d e P's answer t o the f i r s t q u e s t i o n 
s h o u l d be ' b o t h ' . I f , however, P answers i n the n e g a t i v e t o 
the second q u e s t i o n , then I would assume t h a t the answer to 
the t h i r d q u e s t i o n w i l l be s i m i l a r l y n e g a t i v e . I n which case P 
c o u l d n e i t h e r l e g i t i m a t e l y c l a i m t h a t h i s t a s t e i s d i s c e r n i n g , 
nor t h a t he i s a worthy c a n d i d a t e f o r the t i t l e ' a r b i t e r of 
t a s t e ' . Yet we a l l know a P and we a l l know t h a t these are 
p r e c i s e l y t h e s o r t o f c l a i m s he i s prone t o make. A f t e r a l l , 
P can appeal t o the r e l a t i v i s m of s u b j e c t i v i t y which holds 
t h a t ( i ) a l l judgements are s u b j e c t i v e ( i i ) a l l s u b j e c t i v i t i e s 
a re e q u a l , and t h e r e f o r e ( i i i ) a l l judgements are equal. 
However, as I.C. Jarvie-'- p o i n t s o u t , because, a c c o r d i n g t o 
s u b j e c t i v i s m , any judgement made by anyone a t any stage of 
t h e i r l i f e i s equal t o any o t h e r judgement, the comments of an 
' u n t r a i n e d ' c h i l d s hould be taken j u s t as s e r i o u s l y as the 
comments o f a ' t r a i n e d ' e x p e r t . Furthermore, because we cannot 
improve our judgement t h r o u g h l e a r n i n g , and because we cannot 
c o n s i d e r one work t o be b e t t e r than another - o t h e r than t h a t 
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' I ' p e r s o n a l l y happen t o p r e f e r i t - t h e r e can be no r a t i o n a l 
argument about judgement. 
T h i s , i n a n u t s h e l l , i s the s u b j e c t i v i s t f a l l a c y . 
T h i s f a l l a c y seems t o c o n s i s t n o t so much i n P's 
'democratic r i g h t ' t o make judgements about a r t , so much as i n 
the d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e ' v a l u e ' s u b j e c t i v i s t s would have us place 
upon h i s i l l - c o n s i d e r e d judgements. I n o t h e r words, what i t 
does n o t a l l o w f o r i s the ' O r w e l l i a n ' p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t : ( i v ) 
A l l judgements are e q u a l , b u t some are more equal"than o t h e r s . 
S c i e n t i s t s a re n o t so accommodating. They do not e n t e r t a i n 
t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . Even the most hardened s u b j e c t i v i s t would 
h e s i t a t e t o q u e s t i o n s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y . Consequently, most 
la y - p e r s o n s would n o t presume t o h o l d f o r t h on the s u b j e c t of 
i n v a r i a b l e p h y s i c a l laws under a space c o - o r d i n a t e 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f u n i f o r m v e l o c i t y , or whatever. At l e a s t l e t 
us hope n o t . Yet a r t ' e x p e r t s ' have an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e t r y i n g 
t o persuade s a i d lay-persons n o t t o f u r n i s h them w i t h t h e i r 
o p i n i o n on the m e r i t s o r shortcomings o f , say, I t a l i a n 
F u t u r i s t p a i n t i n g . A d m i t t e d l y , t he v o c a b u l a r y employed i n a 
d i s c u s s i o n o f quantum mechanics (a t h e o r y w i t h i n which the 
c o n s t i t u e n t concepts have a p r e c i s e l y d e f i n e d sense) i s going 
t o be more s p e c i a l i s e d and i n a c c e s s i b l e than t h a t employed i n a 
d i s c u s s i o n o f F u t u r i s m , b u t , even so, the f a c t remains t h a t the 
v o c a b u l a r y o f F u t u r i s m i ^ s p e c i a l i s e d and i n a c c e s s i b l e ( t a k e 
t h e concepts o f ' s i m u l t a n e i t y ' and 'dynamism' f o r i n s t a n c e ) . 
Before p u r s u i n g t h i s analogy w i t h science though, we 
sho u l d perhaps r e t u r n t o t h e f o u r t h q u e s t i o n asked of P: 
A c c o r d i n g t o what r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i a has he made h i s judgement? 
I s i t s t a t i n g the obvious t o say t h a t P should judge 
I t a l i a n F u t u r i s t p a i n t i n g s a c c o r d i n g t o the c r i t e r i a of I t a l i a n 
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F u t u r i s m ? ^ As Theodore A. Gracyk puts i t , t o a p p r e c i a t e a work, 
as opposed t o merely h a v i n g a r e a c t i o n , one needs t o know about 
i t s t r a d i t i o n . ^ There are c e r t a i n t h e o r i e s t h a t h e l p us t o 
b e t t e r understand and t h e r e f o r e b e t t e r j u d g e , I t a l i a n F u t u r i s m . 
How f a r w i l l P's ' I don't know much about a r t , but I know i t 
when I see i t ' l i n e o f argument take him?^ My p o i n t i s t h a t , 
t o t h e above e x t e n t , P's e v a l u a t i o n s and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
s h o u l d be c a t e g o r y - r e l a t i v e and c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c . I n o t h e r 
words, t h e r e may be a c o r r e c t and i n c o r r e c t way f o r him t o 
a t t e n d t o a r t - i n t h a t he should no more judge B o c c i o n i to 
be a bad Rococo p a i n t e r , than he should judge Boucher t o be a 
bad F u t u r i s t . 
An amusing example o f what can happen when t h i s p r i n c i p l e 
o f j u d g i n g 'as' i s taken too f a r , though, i s the n o t o r i o u s 
r e v i e w of Lady C h a t t e r l e y ' s Lover t h a t appeared i n the American 
magazine F i e l d and Stream; 
Although written many years ago. Lady Chatterlgy's Lover has 
just been re-issued by Grove Press, and this BcBBnal account 
of the day-to-day lif e of an English gamekeeper is stiH of 
considerable interest to outdoor-minded readers, as i t 
contains many passages on pheasant-raising, the apprehending 
of poachers, ways to control vermin, and other chores and 
duties of the professional gamekeeper . . . Unfortunately, one 
is obliged to wade through many pages of extraneous material 
in order to discover and savour these side-lights on the 
management of a Midland shooting estate, and in this 
reviewer's opunon the bqpk cannot take the place of J.R. 
Miller's Practical Gamekeeping.-^ 
Doubtless ' t h i s r e v i e w e r ' would a l s o c o n s i d e r t h a t Lady 
C h a t t e r l y ' s Lover cannot take the p l a c e of The Joy of Sex as a 
p r a c t i c a l g u i d e t o s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e ! . . . He i s making a 
v a l i d judgement - t h a t the book i s b a r e l y w o r t h r e a d i n g - but 
f o r i n v a l i d reasons, or a t l e a s t e x t r e m e l y t r i v i a l reasons i n a 
l i t e r a r y sense. T h i s s a i d , however, the reasons t h a t ' t h i s 
r e v i e w e r ' g i v e s are d e s c r i p t i v e l y t r u e . I t i s h i s standards f o r 
j u d g i n g t h a t are a t f a u l t . A f t e r a l l , the r e l e v a n c e of a reason 
i s p a r t l y c o n s t i t u t e d by i t s c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h a r e l e v a n t norm. 
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I n o t h e r words, i f ' t h i s r e v i e w e r ' were t o pursue h i s c r i t i c i s m 
t h a t Lawrence's w r i t i n g i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by 'pages of 
extraneous m a t e r i a l ' ; i f he were t o compound h i s c r i t i c i s m 
w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o o t h e r examples o f Lawrence's t o r t u o u s l y 
p u r p l e p r o s e - s t y l e , or perhaps t o Lawrence's heavy-handed 
symbolism; and i f he were t o p l a c e h i s c r i t i c i s m s i n the 
c o n t e x t o f the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y E n g l i s h n o v e l , by, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , comparing Lawrence's p r o s e - s t y l e u n f a v o u r a b l y t o the 
c o n t r o l l e d and l u c i d p r o s e - s t y l e o f O r w e l l or K o e s t l e r , then 
h i s ' l i t e r a r y ' c r i t i c i s m s would be more o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d . 
Another o b j e c t i o n t h a t i s sometimes l e v e l l e d a t t h i s s o r t 
o f genre c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t i t does n o t a l l o w f o r those works 
which do n o t f i t n e a t l y i n t o any p a r t i c u l a r genre, i n o t h e r 
words, f o r uniqueness. I f , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e r e was o n l y one 
I t a l i a n F u t u r i s t p a i n t i n g t h a t had s u r v i v e d the l a s t war (so 
t h a t i t c o u l d n o t be compared t o any o t h e r examples of I t a l i a n 
F u t u r i s m ) i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o assess i t s m e r i t s and, 
c o n s e q u e n t l y , our a p p r e c i a t i o n o f i t would be impoverished. 
Perhaps, t h e n , genre may o n l y be one r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i o n out of 
many p o s s i b l e c r i t e r i a w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g . . . 
A l e s s o b v i o u s l y answerable q u e s t i o n should be asked: 
What i s i t about t he p a i n t i n g or n o v e l t h a t makes i t worthy of 
' a r t ' s t a t u s ? t h a t i s , what are the p r o p e r t i e s we are l o o k i n g 
f o r when we l o o k a t a work o f a r t a^ a work of a r t ? Perhaps, 
u l t i m a t e l y , t h e reason t h i s s u b j e c t i s such a pr e o c c u p a t i o n f o r 
a e s t h e t i c i a n s i s t h a t i t o f f e r s a means by which we can attempt 
t o answer the c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f a r t : v i z . 
what is_ a r t ? Or, r a t h e r , what are the o b j e c t s of a e s t h e t i c 
experience? Perhaps one way of answering t h i s q u e s t i o n i s to 
ask a n o t h e r : v i z . what i s a r t not? Only when we have 
s u f f i c i e n t l y c h a r a c t e r i s e d what the a e s t h e t i c experience is_ can 
we go on t o d e l i m i t t h e c l a s s o f a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t s . But who i s 
q u a l i f i e d t o judge t he n a t u r e o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n , and 
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a c c o r d i n g t o what c r i t e r i a ? Perhaps, as P r o f e s s o r D i f f e y 
s u g g e s t s , something i s a r t i f the r i g h t people say i t i s a r t . 
A r g u a b l y , t h e r i g h t people are those who o f f e r reasoned 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s i n s u p p o r t o f t h e i r judgements. So how do these 
' r i g h t p e o p l e ' go about j u s t i f y i n g t h e i r c l a i m s , t h a t i s , 
a c c o r d i n g t o what r e l e v a n t c r i t e r i a do they make t h e i r claims? 
The t r a d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i o n f o r judgement i s , o f course, 
b e a u t y . I t c o u l d be t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y o f beauty ( i n one form or 
a n o t h e r , f o r i n s t a n c e ' g r a c e f u l n e s s ' , ' b r i g h t n e s s ' and so 
f o r t h ) i s p r e s e n t t o some degree i n a l l 'good' a r t . 
Fu r t h e r m o r e , i t c o u l d be t h a t the degree t o which t h i s p r o p e r t y 
i s p r e s e n t determines t he degree t o which the a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t 
can be s a i d t o have a e s t h e t i c v a l u e . So, i t might be t h a t P 
i s making an a e s t h e t i c judgement as t o the beauty of the 
p a i n t i n g . I n which case, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant, he would n o t judge 
a c c o r d i n g t o any c r i t e r i a a t a l l , because he cannot have 
knowledge o f beauty. Kant argues t h a t beauty i s i n the eye of 
the b e h o l d e r , and t h a t i n j u d g i n g beauty we must make a 
' s i n g u l a r ' judgement o f the 'form' (and n o t the c o n t e n t ) of the 
t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , r a t h e r than o f the o b j e c t as something: t h a t 
i s , a c c o r d i n g t o a concept o f i t . 
As I suggested i n the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , I do not doubt 
t h a t t h e K a n t i a n approach can be r e l e v a n t l y a p p l i e d t o our 
a e s t h e t i c judgements o f beauty i n n a t u r e , b u t I do take issue 
w i t h i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o our a e s t h e t i c judgement o f a r t . As 
A r t h u r C h i l d has argued: 
The mere fact that the term 'beauty' has such common use and 
that people undeistand each other in using the terra, even i f 
they do not agree with each other's judgements, appears to 
indicate that the phenomena to which the terra refers are 
simply not altogether disparate and unique." 
Consider a l s o , C. E. M. Joad's d e f i n i t i o n o f beauty: 
. . . beauty is an epdphenomenon that supervenes upon the 
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a r t , and c l a i m e d t o be the v i t a l i n g r e d i e n t s of a e s t h e t i c 
v a l u e ? Could i t be t h a t whenever t h i s p r o p e r t y or set of 
p r o p e r t i e s i s p r e s e n t the work o f a r t w i l l be a good one, or a t 
l e a s t b e t t e r than i t would be w i t h o u t i t ? 
The p r o p e r t y 'beauty' has a l r e a d y been di s c u s s e d , but what 
o f o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s ? I n h i s essay The Meaning of 'Good' i n 
A e s t h e t i c Judgement,^ Hans Eichner suggests some a l t e r n a t i v e 
c r i t e r i a - b u t f i n d s each c r i t e r i o n l a c k i n g : 
I f we praise a Cezanne for its brightness and a Rembrandt for 
its chiaroscuro, a Degas for its naturalism and a Russian icon 
for i t s styiization, then neither brightness nor chiaroscuro, 
neither naturalism nor stylLzatLon, are criteria. Sraallness is a 
crLterion of merit in a lap-dog because bigness is incompatible 
with being a lap-dog, tut i f a painting can be good without 
being bright, brightness is not a crLterLon of goodness in 
painting; and there is no property (other than 'goodness', i f 
goodness is a property) which is common to a l l good paintings. 
S u r e l y t h i s o b j e c t i o n can be met along l i n e s s i m i l a r t o 
those proposed by B eardsley; namely t h a t ' b r i g h t n e s s ' might be 
a s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i o n r a t h e r than a g e n e r a l one. I t c o u l d be a 
c r i t e r i o n f o r a Cezanne w i t h o u t b e i n g a c r i t e r i o n f o r a 
Rembrandt. The meaning of 'good' c o u l d t h e r e f o r e be s a i d t o be 
d e t e r m i n e d i n every s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t i n which i t i s used by the 
s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a which are a p p l i e d . But what of more ge n e r a l 
c r i t e r i a ? B a r i n g i n mind t h a t c r i t e r i a o f f e r r e l i a b l y 
c o n t i n g e n t grounds f o r j u d g i n g , r a t h e r than l o g i c a l l y necessary 
and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s , I again r a i s e the q u e s t i o n : Should 
our judgements as t o the v a l u e o f a r t w o r k s always be concerned 
w i t h one and o n l y one c r i t e r i o n of judgement, namely beauty? 
What about i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e , f o r i n s t a n c e ? Examples of o t h e r 
c o n c e p t - c r i t e r i a are as numerous as they are v a r i e d . Consider, 
f o r example, the f o l l o w i n g l i s t ( i n no p a r t i c u l a r o r d e r ) : 
1 . Degrees of ' c o n c r e t i o n s ' ( I n g a r d e n ) . 
2. C o m r a u n i c a b i l i t y o f emotion ( T o l s t o y ) . 
3. Under and o v e r - d i s t a n c i n g ( B u l l o u g h ) . 
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4. P e r f e c t harmony ( A l b e r t i ) . . . t h a t which cannot be 
improved upon, t h a t i s , i f a n y t h i n g i s added t o the 
a r t w o r k , or taken away from i t , or a l t e r e d i n i t , i t would 
d i m i n i s h i t . 
5. I n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ( B e a r d s l e y ) . . . as i n propaganda or 
e n t e r t a i n m e n t or e d u c a t i o n . According t o Beardsley the 
statement 'This i s a good X' means 'This i s an X, and 
t h e r e i s a f u n c t i o n of X's t h a t i t s u c c e s s f u l l y f u l f i l s ' . 
6. I n t e n t i o n a l i t y (Goethe) . . . The c r i t e r i a o f judgement 
here b e i n g : what was the a r t i s t t r y i n g t o do? d i d he do 
i t ? and was i t w o r t h doing? 
7. C a p a c i t y t o produce an a e s t h e t i c response (Dewey). 
8. Perhaps the v a l u e o f a p i e c e o f music c o u l d be measured 
a c c o r d i n g t o whether or not i t bears repeated l i s t e n i n g ; 
i f i t improves w i t h f u r t h e r acquaintance i t i s good, but 
i f i t becomes i r r i t a t i n g i t i s bad. 
9. S i g n i f i c a n t form ( B e l l ) . 
10. C o g n i t i v e e f f i c i e n c y (Goodman) . . . How w e l l an a r t 
work s i g n i f i e s what i t s i g n i f i e s ? 
11. E x p r e s s i o n i s m ( C r o c e ) . 
12. Symbolism ( L a n g e r ) . 
13. O r i g i n a l i t y . 
14. V e r i s i m i l i t u d e ( V a s a r i ) . 
15. T e c h n i c a l v i r t u o s i t y . 
16. The P l a t o n i c Idea o f beauty. 
17. Beauty as u n i t y i n c o m p l e x i t y or d i v e r s i t y ( P l a t o and 
A r i s t o t l e ) . 
T h i s l i s t i s by no means e x h a u s t i v e . However, i f t h e r e are 
c e r t a i n ' i n g r e d i e n t s ' which c o n s t i t u t e the 'essence' of a l l 
'good' a r t then t h i s l i s t p r o b a b l y c o n t a i n s some of them. Some 
or a l l o f these c r i t e r i a may be r e l e v a n t i n j u d g i n g a work of 
a r t . Perhaps we s h o u l d e c l e c t i c a l l y c o n s i d e r them a l l and then 
d e c i d e whether or n o t the c r i t e r i o n i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o the 
s p e c i f i c a r t w o r k i n q u e s t i o n . H y p o t h e t i c a l l y , a panel of 
' e x p e r t s ' c o u l d compare two p a i n t i n g s by awarding a score out 
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o f 100 f o r each o f the above, so t h a t , f o r i n s t a n c e , Picasso's 
Guernica might score 80 out o f 100 f o r c o m m u n i c a b i l i t y of 
emotion, b u t o n l y 40 f o r t e c h n i c a l v i r t u o s i t y ; whereas D a l i ' s 
more academic Swans R e f l e c t i n g Elephants might score 20 f o r 
c o m m u n i c a b i l i t y o f emotion b u t 90 f o r t e c h n i c a l achievement, 
and so on, w i t h a maximum p o s s i b l e score of 1800 (perhaps w i t h 
some c r i t e r i a c a r r y i n g more ' p o i n t s ' than o t h e r s ) . This 
procedure may seem t r i v i a l i s i n g , b u t we p r o b a b l y do something 
s i m i l a r t o i t on a sub-conscious l e v e l anyway [see c o n c l u s i o n 
t o Chapter E l e v e n ] . . . For my money, though, the most 
p l a u s i b l e and comprehensive c r i t e r i a o f judgement are those 
proposed by B e a r d s l e y , namely: 
18. U n i t y , c o m p l e x i t y and i n t e n s i t y . 
Let us examine these t h r e e f o r a moment. Beardsley 
c o n s i d e r s these t o be i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n the a r t w o r k 
i t s e l f , and t h e r e f o r e t o be o b j e c t i v e q u a l i t i e s . 
Where either descriptive statements or interpretive 
statements appear as reasons i n critical arguments, they are 
to be considered as objective reasons.^ 
Perhaps, t h e n , Beardsley i s l e s s e n i n g the gap i n t r o d u c e d 
by Kant between d e s c r i p t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n ; between the 
n o r m a t i v e and the f a c t u a l . Beardsley admits t h a t these 
q u a l i t i e s need n o t be necessary or s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s of the 
'goodness' o f an a r t w o r k , but c o n s i d e r s t h a t , a l l t h i n g s being 
e q u a l , t h e i r presence or absence might make the a r t w o r k b e t t e r 
or worse. 
One problem which a r i s e s from these types o f d e s c r i p t i v e 
s t a t e m e n t i s t h a t they tend t o be g e n e r a l i s e d and may t h e r e f o r e 
f a i l t o take i n t o account d e l i b e r a t e , i n n o v a t i v e negations of 
accepted forms o f , say, u n i t y . The o v e r a l l s t r u c t u r e of a 
' l i t e r a r y ' n o v e l such as Joyce's Ulysses may not be u n i f i e d i n 
the c o n v e n t i o n a l sense of the word, y e t i t i s s t i l l c onsidered 
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t o be a more s i g n i f i c a n t and ' l i t e r a r y ' n o v e l than say, one of 
J e f f r e y Archer's ' w e l l - o r g a n i s e d * n o v e l s . As a l r e a d y 
mentioned, Beardsley answers t h i s o b j e c t i o n by i n t r o d u c i n g the 
i d e a of S p e c i f i c Canons and General Canons: 
The objective features of pJays, poems, paintings, and musical 
compositLons referred to in tiie Special Canons can, at least 
most of them, be conditionally justified as standards because 
they are, so to speak, unifying, complexifying, or intensifying 
features of the works in which they occur, either alone or in 
combination with other features. 
These t h r e e g e n e r a l c r i t i c a l standards then, can, 
a c c o r d i n g t o B e a r d s l e y , be m e a n i n g f u l l y appealed t o i n the 
judgement of a e s t h e t i c ' o b j e c t s ' (whether l i n g u i s t i c / i d e o -
sensory, v i s u a l or a u d i t o r y ) . Furthermore, they are c o n s t a n t l y 
b e i n g appealed t o by r e p u t a b l e c r i t i c s , whether d i r e c t l y or 
i n d i r e c t l y , and, c o n s e q u e n t l y , they a f f o r d the c l o s e s t 
a p p r o x i m a t i o n t o ' l o g i c a l r e l e v a n c e ' t h a t we can hope f o r . 
Be t h i s as i t may, two l i n e s of q u e s t i o n i n g are l e f t 
b e g g i n g : F i r s t , can a l l c a t e g o r i e s of judgement be m e a n i n g f u l l y 
subsumed w i t h i n these three? Consider a b e a u t i f u l p a i n t i n g , f o r 
i n s t a n c e . I f t h e K a n t i a n n o t i o n of beauty comes under the 
c a t e g o r y o f ' i n t e n s i t y ' , what about Kant's n o t i o n of harmony? 
Would t h i s come under ' u n i t y ' perhaps? W e l l , yes and no. Kant 
makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between noumenal r e a l i t y and e m p i r i c a l 
r e a l i t y . From t h e noumenal p o i n t of view, a l l the u n i t y t h a t i s 
observed i n t h e w o r l d i s mind-dependent. N e v e r t h e l e s s , from an 
e m p i r i c a l p o i n t o f view u n i t y i s an e x p e r i e n c e a b l e r e a l i t y and 
so o b j e c t i v e . As I argued i n the l a s t c h a p t e r , such a 
d i s t i n c t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t t o r e c o n c i l e w i t h h i s t h e o r y of 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . I f u n i t y or harmony i s n o t a p r o p e r t y of 
the a r t o b j e c t i t s e l f , b u t r a t h e r , as Kant argues, something we 
p r o j e c t i n t o the a r t o b j e c t , i t i s t h e r e f o r e s u b j e c t i v e , and 
s i n g u l a r . But s u r e l y i f the i n d i v i d u a l presupposes t h a t h i s or 
her r e c o g n i t i o n o f harmony i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e , then harmony 
must be b o t h a p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t y of the o b j e c t and an 
Page 56 of 192 Nigel Famdale 
Relevant Criteria Chapter Four 
e x p e r i e n t i a l p r o j e c t i o n o f the s u b j e c t ? [ l e l a b o r a t e on t h i s 
G e s t a l t / K a n t i a n r e c o g n i t i o n o f harmony i n Chapter Eleven.] So 
much f o r b e a u t i f u l p a i n t i n g s , but what about a r t forms which 
have a l e s s c l e a r l y determined o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s ? Do such 
c o n c e p t i o n s o f harmony a l s o apply t o the 'pure form' o f music, 
f o r i n s t a n c e ? Beardsley assumes t h a t h i s c a t e g o r i e s apply i n 
equal measure t o a l l a r t forms. However, i f an animal 
o b j e c t i v e l y 'hears' a l l t he m u s i c a l sounds of a Mahler symphony 
can i t a l s o 'hear' and consequently a p p r e c i a t e the t o n a l 
harmonies? Are the harmonious p a t t e r n s and forms o b j e c t i v e l y 
t h e r e , or are we s u b j e c t i v e l y p r o j e c t i n g them? The answer again 
i s ' b o t h ' . B u t , because we are unable t o o b j e c t i v e l y v e r i f y the 
l a t t e r , we must concern o u r s e l v e s w i t h the former. That i s , 
concern o u r s e l v e s w i t h t he c a p a c i t y o f t h e o b j e c t t o produce 
a e s t h e t i c v a l u e , r a t h e r than w i t h t he c a p a c i t y o f the s u b j e c t 
1 9 
to r e c e i v e i t . The a e s t h e t i c v a l u e o f a work of a r t can 
t h e r e f o r e be judged a c c o r d i n g t o i t s e f f e c t i v e c a p a c i t y as an 
i n s t r u m e n t f o r t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f an a e s t h e t i c response. So f a r 
so good. 
The second q u e s t i o n i s : How can Beardsley's c a t e g o r i e s be 
p r a c t i c a l l y a p p l i e d ? One method would be t o p r o j e c t them on t o 
an i d e a l s c a l e , a continuum by which t o measure a e s t h e t i c m e r i t 
( s i m i l a r t o the A l b e r t i model suggested above). This method 
would i n v o l v e a comparison o f the a r t w o r k w i t h i t s e l f , t h a t i s 
w i t h i t s u n r e a l i s e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s and a l t e r n a t i v e s . I f an 
a r t w o r k i s unimprovable then i t i s a 'good' a r t w o r k . This 
method has been proposed by the I s r a e l i a e s t h e t i c i a n , Tomas 
Kulk a . The ideas I am a t t r i b u t i n g t o him i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n are 
my sense o f remarks he made i n an i n f o r m a l d i s c u s s i o n a t the XI 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Congress i n A e s t h e t i c s a t Nottingham U n i v e r s i t y 
i n 1988. On t h a t occasion Kulka suggested these ' a l t e r n a t i v e s ' 
c o u l d i n v o l v e l o c a l adjustments or o v e r a l l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t o 
t h e a r t w o r k . A e s t h e t i c v a l u e judgements c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d o r , 
r a t h e r , t e s t e d a c c o r d i n g t o whether the a l t e r n a t i v e s were 
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a e s t h e t i c a l l y s u p e r i o r or i n f e r i o r . At f i r s t glance t h i s seems 
t o be a c i r c u l a r argument: we need t o make judgements i n order 
t o j u s t i f y our comparative judgements; however, we can perhaps 
say t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e A i s s u p e r i o r t o a l t e r n a t i v e B, w i t h o u t 
b e i n g committed t o the v a l u e o f A and B, by seeing how 
i n d i v i d u a l f e a t u r e s o f the a r t w o r k f i t i n w i t h the whole, 
a c c o r d i n g t o G e s t a l t . By o f f e r i n g n e g a t i v e ( o r p o s i t i v e ) 
a l t e r n a t i v e s we can c l a i m t h a t our judgements t h a t an a r t w o r k 
i s good ( o r bad) are j u s t i f i e d . We might a l s o assume t h a t 
a e s t h e t i c v a l u e i s a p r o p e r t y which admits o f g r a d a t i o n ; thus 
i t m ight be p o s s i b l e t o compare o b j e c t s w i t h r e g a r d t o the 
degree o f c o m p l e x i t y , i n t e n s i t y and u n i t y o f a g i v e n v a l u e . The 
s c a l e o f v a l u e s a g a i n s t which these a l t e r n a t i v e s might be 
measured can, a c c o r d i n g t o Kulka, be shown i n a l g e b r a i c form: 
I f a = the number of b e n e f i c i a l a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
and b = the number of damaging a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
and c = the number o f i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
and i f X = the degree of i n t e n s i t y , 
and Y = t h e degree o f c o m p l e x i t y , 
and Z = the degree of u n i t y . 
And i f K were t o equal the t o t a l number of a l t e r n a t i v e s 
(a+b+c) t o which the work of a r t (W) c o u l d be s u b j e c t e d ; and i f 
V were t o equa l a e s t h e t i c v a l u e ; and i f M were equal t o the 
combined degrees o f i n t e n s i t y , c o m p l e x i t y , and u n i t y (X+Y+Z); 
then t h e g r e a t e r a i s , and the s m a l l e r b i s , the g r e a t e r w i l l 
be V(W). 
So, V(W) = ( a - b ) = Z 
and i f K = (a+b+c) = Y 
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and i f (a+b) = X 
c 
t h e n , V(W) = (a-b) . (a+b+c) . (a+b) = M 
c 
A r g u a b l y , t h i s s t r u c t u r e would r e p r e s e n t a c r i t i c a l 
c o n t e x t i n which t o make judgements. 
W i t h Beardsley's c r i t e r i a (and Kulka's method o f a p p l y i n g 
them) i n mind, l e t us now r e t u r n t o P. I t i s not t h a t I am 
begru d g i n g P h i s p l e a s u r e , I am merely drawing a t t e n t i o n t o 
the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t h i s p l e a s u r e may be u n r e f l e c t i v e and 
s u p e r f i c i a l and t h e r e f o r e o f l i t t l e consequence. A l b e r t Tsugawa 
[ i n h i s essay The O b j e c t i v i t y of A e s t h e t i c Judgements] argues 
t h a t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s i n the c r i t i c a l and n o n c r i t i c a l 
c o n t e x t s i n which p l e a s u r e i s t a k e n . He argues t h a t i n a 
c r i t i c a l c o n t e x t a person i s l o g i c a l l y , or r a t i o n a l l y , 
committed t o g i v i n g reasons. S i m i l a r l y , S t e f a n Morawski argues: 
A primary aesthetic judgement is objective so far as i t is 
relevant to a legitimate artistic value. The proposition 'x is 
aesthetically valuable' is an elliptical form of the judgement 
'x is valuable for such and such- a reason', with appropriate 
value performing the role of 'reasons'.-*-
I n t h e case of P, i f h i s r e p l y t o the q u e s t i o n 'Why do 
you l i k e M o d i g l i a n i ? ' was ' I don't know, I j u s t do, t h a t ' s 
a l l ' , then we can assume h i s p l e a s u r e i s taken i n a non-
c r i t i c a l c o n t e x t , cannot t h e r e f o r e be o b j e c t i v e l y c o nsidered or 
u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d , and i s , by i m p l i c a t i o n , t r i v i a l . 
P, however, might take e x c e p t i o n t o ha v i n g h i s pl e a s u r e 
d i s m i s s e d as t r i v i a l . I f he were a b l e t o , he might suggest t h a t 
h i s i n a r t i c u l a t e n e s s should n o t p r e c l u d e him from the t a k i n g 
of p l e a s u r e . W e l l , f a i r enough. His p l e a s u r e may be pr o f o u n d , 
e l e v a t i n g and so f o r t h t o him, b u t f o r no b e t t e r reason t h a t 
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t h a t , say, M o d i g l i a n i ' s p a i n t i n g happens t o remind P of h i s 
long-necked mother = because i f he has had no p r e v i o u s 
e x p e r i e n c e o f I t a l i a n p a i n t i n g or o f a r t t h e o r y , then why 
s h o u l d we take h i s o p i n i o n s e r i o u s l y ? Do we n o t assume h i s 
p l e a s u r e i s p e r s o n a l t o him, b u t i r r e l e v a n t t o everyone else? 
I f we are a b l e t o c l a i m t h a t the 'greatness' of 
Caravaggio's Supper a t Eramaus ( c o l 5 9 8 ) i s ' t i m e l e s s ' or 
' u n i v e r s a l ' t h e n we a r e a b l e t o do so o n l y t h r o u g h an appeal t o 
r e a s o n i n g t h a t h o l d s good f o r everyone i n l i k e c ircumstances. 
These reasons may be o f two s o r t s : ( 1 ) p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e s and 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s possessed by the work. These might be: c l a r i t y , 
d e t a i l e d e x e c u t i o n and f i n i s h , s t r o n g c h i a r o s c u r a , dramatic 
l i g h t i n g , harmony o f c o m p o s i t i o n , and the d r a m a t i c i n t e n s i t y of 
the n a r r a t i v e ( i n which the luminous and androgynous f i g u r e of 
C h r i s t b l e s s i n g t h e f r u g a l supper comes as a r e v e l a t i o n t o the 
d i s c i p l e s . » . and so f o r t h ) ; or ( 2 ) g e n e r a l r u l e s and 
p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t i s , norms and canons of i n s t i t u t i o n s as 
e x e m p l i f i e d by the work under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . These might 
i n c l u d e the p a i n t i n g ' s ' r e a l i s m ' ; i t s t r e a t m e n t of a 
t r a d i t i o n a l genre o f r e l i g i o u s p a i n t i n g ; or i t s use of symbolic 
a t t r i b u t e s , such as St Peter's c o c k l e s h e l l . 
I n o t h e r words, i f P were t o d e s c r i b e the use of c o l o u r , 
the h a n d l i n g of t h e p a i n t , the u n i v e r s a l symbolism of the 
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r and so f o r t h , then we c o u l d a s c e r t a i n f o r 
o u r s e l v e s whether or n o t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s were c o r r e c t and h i s 
judgement a p p r o p r i a t e . To t h i s e x t e n t h i s s u b j e c t i v e judgements 
would be r e l e v a n t i f and o n l y i f they were i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e . 
Even s u b j e c t i v e or e m o t i o n a l responses can have an 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e or q u a s i - o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y t o the e x t e n t t h a t 
t h e r e i s a common c u r r e n c y f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of d e s c r i p t i v e 
terms. [See Chapter Eleven f o r examples o f t h i s . ] 
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As d i s c u s s e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , i f P were t o p o i n t t o 
an area o f a p a i n t i n g and say 'the orange c o l o u r s i n t h i s area 
here make me f e e l depressed, because they seem t o me t o be 
c o l d ' then h i s a n a l y s i s would n o t be open f o r r e - a n a l y s i s , 
because s u b j e c t i v e l y , f o r him, i t i s a c o r r e c t a n a l y s i s . I f , 
however, he were t o say 'the orange c o l o u r s here are depressing 
because they are c o l d ' then we c o u l d t r e a t h i s a n a l y s i s as an 
o b j e c t i v e s tatement and take i s s u e w i t h i t a c c o r d i n g l y . We 
presuppose t h a t agreement and disagreement i s p o s s i b l e i n 
v i r t u e o f t h e f a c t t h a t such o b j e c t i v e r e a s o n i n g i s c o r r i g i b l e 
and capable o f reassessment. 
Tsugawa suggests t h a t t h e r e i s an o b j e c t i v e component t o 
the e x e r c i s e o f p o i n t i n g , i n t h a t the p o i n t i n g g e s t u r e ( t h e 
s i g n ) i s c o g n i t i v e l y m e a n i n g f u l because i t has a r e f e r e n c e (an 
o b j e c t ) t h a t i s a s c e r t a i n a b l e . I n P's case he can p o i n t t o an 
area o f c o l o u r on the canvas and say ' t h i s area i s orange' and, 
upon i n s p e c t i o n , we can e i t h e r agree w i t h , or r e j e c t , h i s 
a n a l y s i s . I n t h e n e x t c h a p t e r I s h a l l d i s c u s s the re l e v a n c y o f 
these c o n c e p t - c r i t e r i a i n r e l a t i o n t o , and i n the c o n t e x t o f , 
c r i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
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I n the l a s t c h a p t e r I suggested t h a t P can p o i n t t o 
c e r t a i n shapes and c o l o u r s i n a p a i n t i n g i n o r d e r t o i n d i c a t e 
t h a t they are o b j e c t i v e l y t h e r e . I n t h i s way he can support h i s 
p r e f e r e n c e f o r them by r e f e r r i n g t o an a p p r o p r i a t e a s s o c i a t i o n 
or ' f e e l i n g t o n e ' t h a t the c o l o u r s and shapes evoke i n him. 
O b v i o u s l y t h e r e w i l l be o t h e r ' f a c t s ' or ' t r u t h s ' about the 
p a i n t i n g which are e i t h e r c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t ; such as i t s 
d a t e and s i z e . But these would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y count as reasons 
f o r h i s l i k i n g or d i s l i k i n g the p a i n t i n g . New C r i t i c s argue 
t h a t we should o n l y pay a t t e n t i o n t o the words on the page or 
t o t h e p a i n t on the canvas, and t h a t we should i g n o r e a l l o t h e r 
b i o g r a p h i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n as i r r e l e v a n t . However, 
such c o n t e x t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n may be r e l e v a n t t o our 
a p p r e c i a t i o n , e v a l u a t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a book or 
p a i n t i n g and t h i s i s why c r i t i c s need t o be d i s c e r n i n g i n t h e i r 
judgement and j u s t i f i e d i n t h e i r r e a s o n i n g . I t i s p o s s i b l e f o r 
someone t o be p r o f o u n d l y moved by a work of a r t f o r 
' a p p r o p r i a t e ' reasons w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e t o a r t i c u l a t e those 
reasons, b u t t h i s , i n my o p i n i o n , c o n s t i t u t e s a response 
r a t h e r than a c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n (a dog can respond but only a 
human can c r i t i c a l l y e v a l u a t e ) . George Dickie-'- argues t h a t i t 
i s a c o n f u s i o n t o take c o r a p a t a b i l i t y w i t h d i s i n t e r e s t e d 
a t t e n t i o n as a c r i t e r i o n of r e l e v a n c e . He argues t h a t a 
r e l e v a n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n must be 'congruous' w i t h the meaning of 
the work of a r t , r a t h e r than ' d i s i n t e r e s t e d ' . To dismiss 
c o g n i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n ( h i s t o r i c a l , and so f o r t h ) as i r r e l e v a n t 
i s t o deny the p o s s i b i l i t y of o b j e c t i v e a e s t h e t i c judgement. A 
r e l e v a n t reason may t h e r e f o r e be s a i d t o be one based upon 
c o g n i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n . T h i s would c o n s t i t u t e a 'good' reason. 
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Tsugawa a g a i n : 
Alleged reasons are either good reasons or bad reasons. Good 
reasons are relevant reasons which are also true, A reason 
may be bad either, because i t is false or because, although 
true, i t is icrelevanto'^ 
T h i s need n o t mean, however, t h a t reasons adduced i n 
su p p o r t o f an a e s t h e t i c judgement need be c o n c l u s i v e . There may 
be disagreement about a g i v e n judgement because p r o o f as t o the 
v a l u e o f a work o f a r t i s d i f f i c u l t t o a s c e r t a i n . Even though 
T o l s t o y ' s judgement t h a t King Lear was a 'bad' p l a y was 
sup p o r t e d by reasons, t he ' s u b j e c t i v e " reasons he gave were not 
n e c e s s a r i l y r e l e v a n t / g o o d ones. T h i s i s why a reasoned 
judgement must a l s o be c o n s i d e r e d i n r e l a t i o n t o the reasoned 
judgements o f o t h e r c r i t i c s over a g i v e n p e r i o d o f ti m e . But 
t h i s begs t he q u e s t i o n : Who i s t o decide what i s and i s not 
r e l e v a n t ? An ex p e r t ? I f so, then who i s an expert? Someone w i t h 
whom o t h e r e x p e r t s agree? 
When an 'i n f o r m e d ' c r i t i c makes a va l u e judgement he or 
she c o n s i d e r s t h a t i t ought t o meet w i t h u n i v e r s a l assent. He 
or she w i l l s u p p o r t h i s or her judgement w i t h a reasoned 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . He or she might p o i n t t o , and d e s c r i b e , c e r t a i n 
r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s which ought t o provoke a c e r t a i n emotional 
response. I f they do t h i s s u c c e s s f u l l y then the p a i n t i n g ought 
t o be c o n s i d e r e d a 'good' example o f i t s k i n d . 
The c r i t i c might p o i n t t o Velazquez C h r i s t C r u c i f i e d ( o f 
1630) and reason ' d e d u c t i v e l y ' t h a t , f o r i n s t a n c e : i ) 
Seventeenth c e n t u r y c r u c i f i x i o n p a i n t i n g s e l i m i n a t e d a l l 
extraneous and a n e c d o t a l d e t a i l , i i ) Seventeenth c e n t u r y 
c r u c i f i x i o n p a i n t i n g s d e p i c t e d C h r i s t a g a i n s t a darkened sky 
as oppose t o the c l e a r azure s k i e s which predominated i n the 
p a i n t i n g s o f the F i f t e e n t h and S i x t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s , i i i ) 
Because t h i s i s a 'good' example o f the economic t r e a t m e n t and 
d r a m a t i c l i g h t i n g o f Seventeenth c e n t u r y c r u c i f i x i o n p a i n t i n g . 
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i t i s t h e r e f o r e 'good' of i t s k i n d . An a d d i t i o n a l premise 
migh t be t o say t h a t a p a i n t i n g i s t h e r e f o r e 'good' i f i t 
conforms t o t y p e . 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y the c r i t i c might q u a l i f y h i s judgement by 
' i n d u c t i v e ' r e a s o n i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e : i ) T h i s i s a p o w e r f u l 
image o f the i s o l a t e d f i g u r e of C h r i s t emerging from the 
b r o o d i n g darkness, i i ) P o w e r f u l images of i s o l a t e d C h r i s t -
f i g u r e s emerging from b r o o d i n g darkness ought t o provoke 
f e e l i n g s o f f i n a l i t y , a l i e n a t i o n and c a t h a r s i s i n the s p e c t a t o r 
i i i ) Such f e e l i n g s are s p i r i t u a l l y e l e v a t i n g and 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y r e w a r d i n g , and, t h e r e f o r e i v ) the p a i n t i n g 
s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d 'good'. The second premise would depend on 
t h e i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t such works i n 
g e n e r a l do provoke these f e e l i n g s . 
C e r t a i n o b j e c t i o n s may be l e v e l l e d a t these somewhat 
unorthodox v a r i a t i o n s on t h e d e d u c t i v e and i n d u c t i v e methods of 
r e a s o n i n g . A f t e r a l l , i t c o u l d be argued t h a t i n a G e s t a l t 
sense t h e a e s t h e t i c whole of a work o f a r t i s f a r g r e a t e r than 
t h e sum o f i t s component p a r t s , and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , a work of 
a r t i s unique and not s i m p l y an arrangement of c e r t a i n a r t i s t i c 
i n g r e d i e n t s . (Hume's Standard of Taste i s o f t e n c r i t i c i s e d 
a l o n g s i m i l a r l i n e s . ) However, w i t h o u t c e r t a i n r e l e v a n t 
c r i t e r i a w i t h which t o judge a work of a r t as a work of a r t , 
a l l we are l e f t w i t h i s the h a l f - b a k e d s u b j e c t i v i t y of P's 
approach, namely: ' l don't know why I l i k e i t , I j u s t do, 
t h a t ' s a l l . ' A e s t h e t i c judgements, however, have more i n common 
w i t h the procedures o f law c o u r t s than the i n d u c t i v e and 
d e d u c t i v e methods o f s c i e n c e . As Dr Margaret Mcdonald argues"^ 
'This i s good' has the c h a r a c t e r of an impersonal v e r d i c t l i k e 
'he i s g u i l t y ' . I t does n o t d e s c r i b e the accused or the 
f e e l i n g s of the j u r y , i t a f f i r m s a d e c i s i o n reached by a 
d e f i n i t e p r o c e d u r e . C r i t i c i s m i s an i n d e f i n i t e s e r i e s of 
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methods f o r ' p r e s e n t i n g ' , r a t h e r than p r o v i n g , the value of an 
a r t w o r k o 
But t h i s i s not t o submit t o the s o l i p s i s m of 
s u b j e c t i v i t y o We can s t i l l achieve p a r t i a l o b j e c t i v i t y o I n the 
case o f t h e Velazquez p a i n t i n g we should l o o k a t as many 
examples of Seventeenth c e n t u r y c r u c i f i x i o n p a i n t i n g as 
p o s s i b l e , compare them w i t h those of the F i f t e e n t h and 
S i x t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s and see what they do, or do n o t , have i n 
common. An a c c u m u l a t i o n of such evidence should s u b s t a n t i a t e 
t h e judgement (assuming, f o r the sake of argument, t h a t the 
p a r t i c u l a r p r o p e r t i e s are not p e c u l i a r t o t h a t work of a r t , 
b u t r a t h e r are ' u n i v e r s a l l y ' a p p l i c a b l e t o t h a t g e n r e ) . I n 
o t h e r words, as Tsugawa pu t s i t : 
The logical feature of a l l reasons is that a reason that is 
good for one context must be good in any other like i t , ^ 
Greek t r a g e d y p r e s e n t s an i n t e r e s t i n g case, A r i s t o t l e 
o f f e r s a s y s t e m a t i c t h e o r y by means of which we can analyse the 
f u n c t i o n o f t r a g e d y . A l t h o u g h A r i s t o t l e was more o f a f o r m a l i s t 
t han an i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t - because the purpose ( o r t e l o s ) of 
t r a g e d y was, f o r him, a w e l l c o n s t r u c t e d p l o t - we can, 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , conclude from The P o e t i c s t h a t Greek tragedy had 
a f u n c t i o n . I f i t s f u n c t i o n i s t o a f f o r d p l e a s u r e then by 
d e t e r m i n i n g the n a t u r e o f t h i s p l e a s u r e ( c a t h a r s i s ) we can 
d e t e r m i n e t h e c r i t e r i a a c c o r d i n g t o which i t i s p o s s i b l e to 
j u d g e one t r a g e d y t o be b e t t e r than another. Thus we can say 
t h a t a g i v e n Greek tr a g e d y i s 'good' i f and o n l y i f i t 
s a t i s f i e s A r i s t o t l e ' s d e f i n i t i o n i n The P o e t i c s . The t r a g i c 
h e r o , f o r i n s t a n c e , must bes 
, , . a man not pre-eminently virtuous and just, whose 
misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice and 
depravity but by some error of judgement , . . the change in 
the hero's fortunes must be . . . ftxjm happiness to misery; and 
the cause of i t must lie not in any depravity, but in some 
great error on his part; ... 
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I t might be t h a t A r i s t o t l e decided t h a t Oedipus Rex was 
t h e b e s t example of Tragedy b e f o r e proceeding t o analyse what 
made i t so ( w h i c h might suggest t h a t the p r o o f of the pudding 
i s i n the e a t i n g ) . However, because t h e r e are such s t r i k i n g 
s i m i l a r i t i e s between examples o f Greek tragedy I t h i n k i t i s 
f a i r t o say t h a t the Greek t r a g e d i e s were w r i t t e n a c c o r d i n g to 
a f o r m u l a o f some s o r t - which A r i s t o t l e i d e n t i f i e d . T h e r e f o r e , 
i f an example of a tragedy i s found which d e p a r t s from t h i s 
f o r m u l a , A r t h u r M i l l e r ' s Death of a Salesman, say, then i t may 
s t i l l be a 'good' t r a g e d y , b u t i t cannot be an example of 
'good' Greek t r a g e d y . Such g e n e r a l p r o p e r t i e s are r e p e a t a b l e , 
they are not u n i q u e , i t i s the arrangement of the p r o p e r t i e s 
t h a t makes f o r t h e i r d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s and 'uniqueness'. I n o t h e r 
words what I am a r g u i n g i s t h a t we should judge a work of a r t 
a c c o r d i n g t o i t s i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e w i t h i n a g e n e r i c c o n t e x t . 
I f X i s a good Greek t r a g e d y , then any o t h e r p l a y t h a t i s 
r e l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r t o X w i l l a l s o be a good Greek tragedy. 
A r i s t o t l e ' s c r i t e r i a are u n i v e r s a l i s a b l e i n s o f a r as c r i t e r i a 
a re f o r j u d g i n g c l a s s e s o f p a r t i c u l a r s r a t h e r t h a n , as i t were, 
one p a r t i c u l a r i n p a r t i c u l a r . ^ Although one i n d i v i d u a l c o u l d 
n o t hope t o g i v e a l l the r e l e v a n t or 'good' reasons t h a t might 
s u p p o r t h i s or her judgement, the more he or she can g i v e , the 
b e t t e r - t h a t i s , the more a u t h o r i t a t i v e and competent h i s or 
her judgement w i l l be. 
M i c h a e l S c r i v e n ^ argues t h a t reasons are o n l y good reasons 
i f they are connected w i t h the c o n c l u s i o n ( e v a l u a t i o n ) . 
However, S c r i v e n a l s o m a i n t a i n s t h a t these reasons can be 
o b j e c t i v e i n v i r t u e of t h e i r independence from the c o n c l u s i o n . 
I take t h i s t o mean t h a t we are able t o know reasons f o r a 
c o n c l u s i o n w i t h o u t f i r s t h a v i n g t o know the c o n c l u s i o n -
o t h e r w i s e we would n o t be a b l e t o use the reasons t o a r r i v e a t 
the c o n c l u s i o n . I n my example (above) the p a r t i c u l a r reasons 
( t h a t Velazquez i s economic i n h i s t r e a t m e n t of the theme, and 
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so f o r t h ) c o u l d be s a i d t o d e d u c t i v e l y d e f i n e the g e n e r a l 
c o n c l u s i o n ( t h a t t h i s i s a good example of Seventeenth c e n t u r y 
c r u c i f i x i o n p a i n t i n g ) . I t may or may n o t be t h a t we can know 
such a s p e c i f i c c l a i m or p a r t i c u l a r reason w i t h o u t f i r s t 
knowing the g e n e r a l c o n c l u s i o n . S c r i v e n argues t h a t such a 
c l a i m i n v o l v e s an 'independence c r i t e r i o n * , which avoids 
c i r c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n s (such as weak b e i n g the o p p o s i t e of 
s t r o n g ) . However, he adds, i f the reason i s too independent of 
the c o n c l u s i o n then b o t h become i r r e l e v a n t . Reason and 
c o n c l u s i o n must t h e r e f o r e be independent and connected. 
F u r t h e r m o r e , f o r a c o n c l u s i o n t o be r e l e v a n t and v a l i d the 
reasons l e a d i n g up t o i t must be demonstrably t r u e . A reason i s 
a good reason i f i t can be o b j e c t i v e l y proved or demonstrated 
t o be t r u e w i t h o u t f i r s t h a v i n g t o make a judgement or 
c o n c l u s i o n as t o t h e a e s t h e t i c v a l u e o f the p a i n t i n g . Moreover, 
the reasons which i n f o r m t h e c o n c l u s i o n s must be c o n s i s t e n t l y 
used w i t h i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t or genre ( f o r example, the 
presence o f c h a r a c t e r s whose a c t i o n s c o n s i s t e n t l y make you 
l a u g h might be a r e l e v a n t reason f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t a g i v e n 
p l a y i s a good comedy; b u t a s i m i l a r presence i n a tragedy 
would n o t be a r e l e v a n t or 'good' reason f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t 
i t was a good t r a g e d y ) . Curt Ducasse, however, argues t h a t 
a l t h o u g h t h i s may be t r u e of i n s t r u m e n t a l goodness, i t t e l l s us 
n o t h i n g about the a e s t h e t i c goodness: 
The instrumental goodness of an object can be proved or 
disproved, i f there is agreement as to the end, being a means 
to or condition of that which constitutes the object's 
goodness; for i t is then only a matter of showing whether or 
not the object does not under the sort of conditions in view, 
cause gOr make possible in other objects effects of the sort 
desired. 
T h i s i s a moot p o i n t b u t I t h i n k i t can be met i f we 
suggest t h a t t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e of an a r t w o r k may a c t u a l l y 
c o n s t i t u t e i t s a e s t h e t i c v a l u e . As i n the idea t h a t : This i s a 
work of a r t and t h e r e i s a f u n c t i o n o f works of a r t which t h i s 
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s u c c e s s f u l l y f u l f i l s . Another o b j e c t i o n may be r a i s e d a t t h i s 
j u n c t u r e : I n what does the r e l e v a n c e o f these good reasons and 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s c o n s i s t ? 
What i f , f o r i n s t a n c e , a t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y a r t i s t were t o 
p a i n t a f o r g e r y o f Velazquez C h r i s t C r u c i f i e d which was 
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from the o r i g i n a l ? Or what i f a person (who 
c o u l d n o t p l a y music) were t o r e c o r d him or h e r s e l f s l o w l y 
p l a y i n g Chopin's Polonaises one note a t a t i m e , u s i n g one 
f i n g e r , and then speed the r e c o r d i n g up ( u s i n g h i - t e c d i g i t a l 
r e c o r d i n g equipment) so t h a t the f i n i s h e d r e c o r d i n g was 
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m , say, A r t h u r R u b i n s t e i n ' s r e n d i t i o n ? . . 
. W e l l , I would argue t h a t the r e l e v a n c e o f reasons and 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n s c o n s i s t s i n whatever the 'accepted' d e f i n i t i o n 
o f ' a r t ' i s over an ( u n s p e c i f i e d ) p e r i o d of t i m e , t h a t i s , 
a c c o r d i n g t o the c r i t i c a l c o n t e x t promoted by the i n s t i t u t i o n s 
over t i m e . I n my examples t h e i r ' a u t h e n t i c i t y ' should not make 
the s l i g h t e s t d i f f e r e n c e t o our o b j e c t i v e a p p r e c i a t i o n of them 
as 'good' works of a r t . The C u l t o f the Genius and the 
r o m a n t i c i s i n g of t h e 'Work of Genius' as some s o r t of unique 
and h o l y r e l i c , are j u s t a d i s t r a c t i o n from the r e a l i s s u e , 
which i s how we ought t o , and do, (and how we d i d ) respond t o 
the a c t u a l o b j e c t b e f o r e us i n the here and now (and the t h e r e 
and t h e n ) . I f t h e r e i s some m y s t i c a l q u a l i t y t o the o r i g i o n a l 
C h r i s t C r u c i f i e d which the copy does not have, then t h i s can be 
i d e n t i f i e d and c i t e d as a r e l e v a n t reason f o r p r e f e r r i n g i t . 
S c r i v e n argues t h a t : 
. . . reasons do not have to be generalizable, except in the 
sense that they must be applied consistently - and they are 
only consistently appUed when they are used to draw different 
conclusions between two works of art which cannot be said to 
differ in ^any respects that are relevant to critical 
categorization.^ 
T h i s argument may be one means by which we can counter the 
f a m i l i a r o b j e c t i o n t h a t we would have no standards a g a i n s t 
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which t o judge i n n o v a t i v e or e x p e r i m e n t a l a r t . I t i s o f t e n 
argued t h a t a work of a r t i s unique and autonomous and must be 
judged a c c o r d i n g t o i t s own s t a n d a r d s . This o b j e c t i o n i s , 
however, m i s l e a d i n g . The a c t u a l c o m b i n a t i o n of p r o p e r t i e s 
p r e s e n t i n a g i v e n work of a r t may be unique, but the 
p r o p e r t i e s themselves may be o f or p e r t a i n i n g t o a standard -
as i n the case o f Greek Tragedy mentioned above. Again, i t 
a l l depends on what we judge i t as, we must i d e n t i f y what i t i s 
t h a t causes us t o respond as we do; and how our response t o the 
new i n n o v a t i v e ' a r t ' o b j e c t corresponds w i t h our responses to 
those o b j e c t s we a l r e a d y c o n s i d e r t o be works of a r t . I f our 
response t o i t i s q u i t e u n l i k e a n y t h i n g we have experienced 
b e f o r e ; and i f i t has no a r t i s t i c p o i n t s o f r e f e r e n c e , t h a t i s , 
i f i t has a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g i n common w i t h a n y t h i n g we 
a s s o c i a t e w i t h t he terra ' a r t ' ; o r w i t h any concept we have of 
a r t i s t i c f u n c t i o n - t h e n , however i n t e r e s t i n g the o b j e c t might 
be, i t p r o b a b l y i s n ' t a r t . At l e a s t n o t y e t . I t would seem 
t h a t , as i n the B r i t i s h e m p i r i c a l t r a d i t i o n of the E i g h t e e n t h 
c e n t u r y , we must compare and c o n t r a s t from experience. Put 
c r u d e l y , a t the v e r y l e a s t a p a i n t i n g must i n v o l v e p a i n t ; a 
work o f l i t e r a t u r e must i n v o l v e words on a page ( t h e o r a l 
t r a d i t i o n e x c e p t i n g ) ; and a s c u l p t u r e must i n v o l v e a t h r e e -
d i m e n s i o n a l f o r m , and so on. I n o t h e r words, we cannot show an 
u n l i m i t e d t o l e r a n c e toward the use and abuse of such g e n e r a l 
d e f i n i t i o n s and of the p a r t i c u l a r types w i t h i n them (sonnet, 
n o v e l , p l a y , poem and so o n ) . There may be some disagreement 
among c r i t i c s as t o the a p p l i c a t i o n o f such terms; and indeed 
o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f g e n e r i c terms w i t h i n these types (such 
as t r a g i - c o m e d y ) ; and the movements and p e r i o d s t o which these 
forms and types belong . . . But a r g u a b l y these disagreements 
can be i r o n e d - o u t by an appeal t o standards (as w i t h the 
example of A r i s t o t l e ' s Greek Tragedy suggested above). 
Here I agree w i t h W i l l i a m Righter-*-^ when he suggests t h a t 
we do n o t need t o d e s c r i b e how, i f a t a l l , a reason supports an 
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a e s t h e t i c judgement, i t i s enough t o know t h a t i t e x p l a i n s i t : 
When we argue about aesthetic matters we are moving from 
hypothesis to conclusion or in any other formally logical way, 
b i t we show, point, compare, draw attention to, and generally 
try to make others see whiat i t is that we mean by offering 
alternative descriptions or suggesting different ways of 
looking at a particular work. 
What i s perhaps more p r o b l e m a t i c i s disagreement over the 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c terms such as ' g r a c e f u l ' , ' s e n s i t i v e ' 
and so on [see Chapter E i g h t ] . I f we are asked t o say whether 
or n o t we t h i n k a p a i n t i n g i s 'good' the a p p r o p r i a t e response 
sh o u l d be ' i t depends what you mean by good'. Agreement over 
th e a p p l i c a t i o n o f these terms may not e s t a b l i s h t r u t h , b u t , 
then a g a i n , disagreement over t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n does n o t prove 
t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s are f a l s e e i t h e r . Perhaps the best we can 
say i s t h a t once agreement i s reached over g e n e r a l c r i t e r i a 
t h en i t i s p o s s i b l e t o b r i n g t o bear more s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a . 
There i s no a b s o l u t e answer t o the above problem. But, i n the 
case o f i n n o v a t i v e a r t we can perhaps say t h a t a l t h o u g h a r t i s 
i n a c o n t i n u a l s t a t e o f f l u x , c e r t a i n a r t o b j e c t s do seem t o 
have ' w i t h s t o o d the t e s t o f t i m e ' , or a t l e a s t s u r v i v e d 
p r o t r a c t e d d i s p u t e s as t o the v a l i d i t y o f cla i m s f o r t h e i r 
a e s t h e t i c v a l u e . 'Good' a r t can be d e f i n e d by the s t a b i l i t y 
over time o f e x p e r t s ' agreement as t o i t s v a l u e . Thus t r u l y 
i n n o v a t i v e ' a r t ' such as t h a t of Richard Long or G i l b e r t and 
George can o n l y be good r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y , and the f i r s t c r i t i c 
t o acknowledge i t s goodness i s o n l y proved c o r r e c t i n s o f a r as 
f u t u r e c r i t i c s w i l l agree w i t h him! A l s o , i f t h e r e i s 
disagreement as t o i t s a p p l i c a t i o n then perhaps 'good' i s being 
used w i t h d i f f e r e n t meanings. •'•^  A l though ' a r t ' i s c o n t i n u a l l y 
b e i n g r e d e f i n e d t o accommodate i n n o v a t i o n s t h a t the a r t 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t c o n s i d e r s worthy o f accommodation, t h i s should 
n o t mean t h a t , as the sa y i n g goes, ' i f you can't j u s t i f y i t , 
c a l l i t a r t ' . An o b j e c t can be c a l l e d a r t o n l y t o the e x t e n t 
t h a t i t can be r e l e v a n t l y j u s t i f i e d as art t o and by the 
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c r i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s o f the day. I n n o v a t i v e a r t can o n l y be 
p r o v i s i o n a l l y accorded the s t a t u s o f 'good' a r t by exper t 
c r i t i c s who c l a i m t o r e c o g n i s e i t s p o t e n t i a l . The burden of 
p r o o f , however, i s on these c r i t i c s . They must persuade any 
d i s s e n t i n g f e l l o w c r i t i c s t h a t the judgements they have made 
are w e l l - f o u n d e d because they are supported by 'good', r e l e v a n t 
reasons. I f a f t e r a g i v e n number of years - say, one hundred -
c r i t i c s s t i l l r e c o g n i s e t h i s p o t e n t i a l , then perhaps the 
i n n o v a t i v e a r t can be s a i d t o deserve the s t a t u s of 'good' 
a r t . 
Another o b j e c t i o n suggests i t s e l f h e r e . I f i t i s an a r t 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t (comprised o f e x p e r t c r i t i c s ) t h a t d e f i n e s a r t -
as oppose t o a r t autonomously d e f i n i n g i t s e l f , as i n a r t f o r 
a r t s sake - c o u l d i t n o t be argued t h a t an infor m e d c r i t i c a l 
judgement c o u l d be t r a n s m i s s i b l e 'second-hand', as i t were, t o 
the uninformed P's of t h i s world? To the e x t e n t t h a t , 
r a t i o n a l l y , P ought t o adopt such a judgement, then I would 
suggest t h a t , yes, perhaps i t c o u l d . T h i s c o u l d be reasoned as 
f o l l o w s : i ) The c r i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n (comprised of expe r t 
c r i t i c s ) judges Velazquez C h r i s t C r u c i f i e d t o be a good example 
o f Seventeenth c e n t u r y c r u c i f i x i o n p a i n t i n g i i ) P ought t o 
agree w i t h t h i s judgement, as an a c t of f a i t h i n the competence 
and a u t h o r i t y o f t h e c r i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n . T h i s i s n o t t o say, 
however, t h a t a) P w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y have an a e s t h e t i c emotion 
when v i e w i n g t he p a i n t i n g (though he might l e a r n t o , g i v e n the 
r i g h t e x p e r i e n c e and t r a i n i n g ) b) Nor does t h i s mean t h a t P 
can n e c e s s a r i l y agree w i t h the c r i t i c s w i t h o u t f i r s t coming 
i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h t he p a i n t i n g f o r h i m s e l f ( t h a t i s , not by 
si m p l y h a v i n g i t d e s c r i b e d t o h i m ) . We c o u l d t h e r e f o r e say t h a t 
a p a i n t i n g ought t o seem 'good' f o r a c e r t a i n person w i t h a 
c e r t a i n e d u c a t i o n a l background and c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t s x, y and 
z, o n l y i n a c e r t a i n c o n t e x t . 
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I n h i s essay C r i t i c a l Judgements Alan Tormey argues t h a t 
c r i t i c a l judgements are formed, n o t found, and t h a t though the 
f o r m i n g process may be p r i v a t e t he o b j e c t t h a t i s being judged 
i s p u b l i c . From t h i s premise Tormey argues t h a t c r i t i c a l 
judgements are ' c l a i m s ' t h a t are t e s t a b l e . Furthermore, the 
r e l e v a n t t e s t s are 1) phenomenally d i r e c t t e s t s - such as the 
appearance of a p a i n t i n g - as oppose t o 2) t e s t s o f claims 
c o n c e r n i n g the way something appears under s t i p u l a t e d 
c o n d i t i o n s - such as t h e way the p a i n t i n g appears i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r g a l l e r y [examples m i n e ] . According t o Tormey, the 
f i r s t t e s t has t o be experienced f i r s t - h a n d , w h i l s t the second 
t e s t c o u l d be i n d i r e c t l y o b t a i n a b l e and l o g i c a l l y t r a n s m i s s i b l e 
from a q u a l i f i e d o b s e r v e r . However, I would argue t h a t t h i s i s 
an a r t i f i c i a l d i s t i n c t i o n , because a l t h o u g h P should be 
a c t u a l l y s t a n d i n g i n f r o n t o f the p a i n t i n g w h i l s t ' t e s t i n g ' the 
v a l i d i t y o f the c l a i m s , he would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have the 
c r i t i c a l v o c a b u l a r y t o take i s s u e w i t h t he c l a i m s , the c r i t i c a l 
judgement he t h e r e f o r e a r r i v e d a t would n o t be independent. I n 
o t h e r words, he might agree w i t h the reasons g i v e n by the 
c r i t i c s , b u t he would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be q u a l i f i e d t o d i s agree 
w i t h them. T h i s p o i n t e x c e p t i n g , I would go along w i t h 
Tormey's d e f i n i t i o n o f c r i t i c a l judgements: 
Critical judgements are not 'subjective' i f that is meant to 
denote such things as first-person sensation reports, 
expressions of occurrent feelings, affirmations of preference, 
and exclamatory effusions of appreciation. Critical judgements 
are claims about, and purport to be claims about, public 
objects. Hence they must- i e testable in principle i f they are 
to be sustained . . . L l ^ J . , . Thus, the relevant tests of 
critical judgements are corroborative tests rather than 
confirmative tests, and the case for a critical judgement 
rests on the extent of its acceptance a mong^ independent 
judgers and not on something like 'degree of confirmation'. ^ 
I t may w e l l be t h a t a g i v e n c l a i m i s p e c u l i a r t o a g i v e n 
age, and t h a t a hundred years a f t e r i t i s made i t becomes 
i r r e l e v a n t . I would argue t h a t t h i s should n o t m a t t e r , so long 
as t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l l y wise agree on the 'greatness' of a 
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p a i n t i n g and c o n t i n u e t o deem i t r e l e v a n t a c c o r d i n g t o the 
c o n v e n t i o n a l ( t h a t i s , i n s t i t u t i o n a l ) wisdom o f the here and 
now ( o r t h e r e and t h e n ) . As the sayin g goes: the good a r t i s t i s 
s l o w l y d i s c o v e r e d , t h e bad a r t i s t i s s l o w l y found o u t . This 
s i t u a t i o n may n o t be i d e a l b u t i t i s s u r e l y p r e f e r a b l e t o the 
s u b j e c t i v e view which h o l d s t h a t , because a l l judgements are 
e q u a l , i t need o n l y take one uninformed d i s s e n t i n g v o i c e t o 
l e g i t i m a t e l y make a nonsense o f the seemingly u n i v e r s a l 
judgement t h a t , say. Supper a t Emmaus i s a ' g r e a t ' p a i n t i n g . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , i t need n o t be p a r a d o x i c a l t o argue t h a t i f Supper 
a t Emmaus i s agreed t o be a g r e a t p a i n t i n g by successive 
g e n e r a t i o n s o f c r i t i c s , b u t each g e n e r a t i o n g i v e s d i f f e r e n t 
s e t s o f reasons i n support o f i t s judgements, then t h i s means 
t h a t a t each age i t must be con s i d e r e d good i n a d i f f e r e n t 
sense. The judgements may be ' r e l a t i v e l y o b j e c t i v e ' [see 
Chapter N i n e ] . 
However, i f two c o n v e n t i o n a l l y wise c r i t i c s from the same 
age d i s a g r e e about the r e l e v a n c e and v a l i d i t y o f the claims 
then t h a t i s a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r . . . 
Tsugawa suggests t h a t the s t r o n g e s t argument i n support of 
the s u b j e c t i v i t y o f a e s t h e t i c a s s e r t i o n s i s t h a t t h e r e is_ 
disagreement among c r i t i c s . Judgements are considered t o be 
r e l a t i v i s t i c because two c r i t i c s can g i v e the same d e s c r i p t i o n 
of an o b j e c t b u t emerge w i t h d i f f e r e n t e v a l u a t i o n s o f i t . 
However: 
The very process of our re-examining the grounds of the value 
assertion reveals our inclination to assume that the 
difference of opinion is based on a discoverable difference in 
fact. But our temptation to reassess assessments shows that 
we are ipclined to expect a fairly close uniformity of 
perception. 
These ' d i s c o v e r a b l e ' d i f f e r e n c e s might be over genre 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , or the r e l e v a n c e o f a c e r t a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
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and, as such, are r e s o l v a b l e t o the e x t e n t t h a t c r i t i c s are 
a b l e t o agree ( o r a t l e a s t compromise) over such issues 
a c c o r d i n g t o the s t r e n g t h , or o t h e r w i s e , o f the j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
w i t h which they s u p p o r t t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e judgements. As 
B e r n s t e i n has argued i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t : 
. . . plurality does not mean that we are limited to being 
separate individuals with icredudble subjective interests. 
Rather i t means that we seek to discover some common ground 
to recorpile differences through debate, conversation, and 
dialogue.-^" 
I n o t h e r words, d i f f e r e n c e s are r e s o l v a b l e through 
r a t i o n a l debate. I t might be t h a t i n the case of Supper a t 
Emmaus we are making an e l l i p t i c p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t p a i n t i n g A 
(Supper a t Emmaus) i s b e t t e r than p a i n t i n g B ( C a r a c c i o l o ' s 
C h r i s t washing t he D i s c i p l e s * Feet, of c.1622), because of 
reasons x, y and z. A e s t h e t i c judgements as t o the a e s t h e t i c 
v a l u e o f Supper a t Emmaus c o u l d t h e r e f o r e be s a i d t o be 
o b j e c t i v e i n s o f a r as they were r e l e v a n t t o the degree of 
c e r t a i n a e s t h e t i c v a l u e s . A judgement of t h i s s o r t c o u l d be 
d e s c r i b e d as c o m p a r a t i v e , r e g u l a t i v e , n o r mative and canonic. 
The more ' t e s t a b l e * a judgement i s , the more c r e d i b l e and v a l i d 
i t w i l l be, and t h e more competent w i l l be the c r i t i c who made 
i t . F u r t h e r m o r e , as Tsugawa pu t s i t : 
. . . the whole of the logic of criticism presupposes that the 
reasons proffered for an aesthetic judgement are mutually 
condgibLe and re-assessabLe. I t is because these 
presuppositions are made that people can even begin to say 
that there is . . . an element of taste in critical judgements; 
and i t is revealing that this rock bed of objectivity should 
underlie the dictum of subjectivity.-'-' 
Perhaps, t h e n , we can say t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements are 
o b j e c t i v e i n c h a r a c t e r i f t h e r e i s p o t e n t i a l or a c t u a l 
agreement between many c r i t i c s w i t h i n a s t r i c t l y d e l i m i t e d 
c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t . I t i s a l s o i m p o r t a n t t o bear i n mind t h a t 
when two c r i t i c s d i s a g r e e about a work of a r t they may not be 
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t a l k i n g about the same t h i n g . As C a r o l l C. P r a t t puts i t : 
The physical picture on the waU is one and the same, and the 
auditory frequencies from the stage are the same. But for 
those whose eyes and ears are in contact with such events, 
the correlative perceptions may be organized in quite 
different ways, - in fact often so different tiiat agreement 
rather than disagreement would have to be accounted for. 
Tsugawa p e r s u a s i v e l y argues the case f o r the o b j e c t i v i t y 
o f a e s t h e t i c judgements by means of a three-pronged a t t a c k on 
the s u b j e c t i v e approach. As I read him, these are as f o l l o w s : 
i ) judgements are n o t r e l a t i v e t o the e x t e n t t h a t c r i t i c s have 
a s i m i l a r c o g n i t i o n o f a work o f a r t , even i f t h e i r judgements 
are i n c o m p a t i b l e . i i ) Because we presuppose t h a t our 
e x p e r i e n c e s o f works of a r t are s i m i l a r we should a l s o 
presuppose t h a t our comprehensions of them are m u t u a l l y 
c o r r i g i b l e , and t h e r e f o r e o b j e c t i v e . And i i i ) The r e l e v a n c e of 
t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n s which the c r i t i c g i v e s i n support of h i s 
judgement are p u b l i c l y i n s p e c t a b l e - because they r e f e r t o 
f e a t u r e s of the work of a r t - and p u b l i c l y assessable, and are 
t h e r e f o r e o b j e c t i v e . Tormey argues along s i m i l a r l i n e s : 
Corroboration . . . though logically weaker than confirmation is 
stronger than contingent agreement, and for that reason 
recommends itself as an appropriate characterization of the 
manner in which critical judgements, even though autonomous 
and non-transmissible, may be mutually supportive.-'-^ 
The concept of a phenomenon r e q u i r e s as a c o r r e l a t i v e 
concept the i d e a o f the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , as i t e x i s t s a p a r t 
from t h e way i t appears t o the p e r c i p i e n t . Both these t h e o r i e s 
presuppose t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a r r i v e a t a c o n c l u s i o n , t h a t 
i s , a judgement, th r o u g h 'balanced' r a t i o n a l argument. 
A l t h o u g h t h e r e are no hard and f a s t ' r u l e s ' t h r o u g h which t h i s 
can be a c h i e v e d , t h i s s hould n o t p r e v e n t us from making a 
judgement a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d s . A f t e r a l l , a j u r y can 
never have a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y as t o the g u i l t or innocence of 
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a d e f e n d a n t , y e t i t i s s t i l l a b l e t o a r r i v e a t a c o n c l u s i o n , 
t h a t i s , a m a j o r i t y v e r d i c t , a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n standards. 
I t m ight be, t h e n , t h a t i n sayi n g t h a t an a e s t h e t i c judgement 
i s o b j e c t i v e ' t o some e x t e n t * I am merely saying t h a t i t meets 
w i t h i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e agreement. I s h a l l r e t u r n t o t h i s i n my 
c o n c l u s i o n , f o r now though i t should be noted t h a t j u s t as 
s c i e n t i f i c s tatements are e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e a c c o r d i n g t o 
o b j e c t i v e l y t e s t a b l e c r i t e r i a so we are able t o p r e d i c a t e the 
p r o p e r t i e s o f t r u t h or f a l s i t y t o c e r t a i n statements about a r t 
(even though t h e r e i s no e q u i v a l e n t o b j e c t i v e c o r r e l a t i v e i n 
the a r t s ) . T h i s does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y t h a t , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
the s tatement * i t i s t r u e t h a t Supper a t Emmaus i s a g r e a t work 
of a r t ' i s as o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d as the statement ' E i n s t e i n ' s 
Theory o f R e l a t i v i t y i s t r u e ' , b u t , by the same token, i t does 
not d i s c o u n t t he p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t might be o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d 
t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t i s c o r r i g i b l e . 
J a r v i e suggests t h a t we can a v o i d s u b j e c t i v i t y by s h i f t i n g 
t he c r i t i c a l emphasis away from the detachment of the 
i n d i v i d u a l c r i t i c and r e l o c a t i n g i t i n the t r a d i t i o n of 
r a t i o n a l argument, and the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f c r i t i c i s m which 
c a r r y t h i s t r a d i t i o n : 
. . . from the discussions between the many individuals manning 
the critical institutions there emerg^ a set of broad 
agreement, and . . . this constitutes a tradition. 
J a r v i e a l s o suggests t h a t s c i e n t i s t s have j u s t as many 
a n t i c i p a t i o n s - or e x p e c t a t i o n s and biases - t h a t precede t h e i r 
s c i e n t i f i c o b s e r v a t i o n s i n the ord e r o f time and l o g i c as do 
a r t c r i t i c s ; and t h a t they l e g i t i m a t e l y overcome t h i s 
i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t i v i t y t h r o u g h an appeal t o the o b j e c t i v i t y 
o f t r a d i t i o n s which are e s t a b l i s h e d over a long p e r i o d o f time 
on a f o u n d a t i o n o f p r o t r a c t e d d i s p u t e s . The i m p l i c a t i o n b eing 
t h a t a r t c r i t i c s can do l i k e w i s e . However, what i f - as some 
s u b j e c t i v i s t s would have i t - our a e s t h e t i c judgement i s 
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n o t h i n g more than the a r t i c u l a t i o n of an em o t i o n a l a t t i t u d e or 
response, w i t h a l l emotions b e i n g equal and t h e r e f o r e r e l a t i v e ? 
As J a r v i e p o i n t s o u t , t h i s assumption i s m i s t a k e n l y based on 
the e q u a t i n g o f responses w i t h e v a l u a t i o n s . As p r e v i o u s l y 
d i s c u s s e d , when P's response i s ' I l i k e M o d i g l i a n i ' s C e l l i s t ' , 
i t i s n o t the same as h i s e v a l u a t i o n ' M o d i g l i a n i ' s C e l l i s t i s a 
good p a i n t i n g ' . I t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e r e would be no c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
i n P s a y i n g : ' M o d i g l i a n i ' s C e l l i s t i s a good p a i n t i n g , but _ I 
don't l i k e i t ' . 
O - I 
S t u a r t Hampshire''-^ argues t h a t unless we recog n i s e g e n e r a l 
methods o f r e s o l v i n g d i s p u t e s t h e r e can be no grounds f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a v a l i d argument from an i n v a l i d one. To have no 
reasons f o r p r e f e r r i n g one s o l u t i o n t o another, or t o g i v e 
d i f f e r e n t reasons i n d i f f e r e n t cases of the same t y p e , i s t o be 
i r r a t i o n a l . Such r e a s o n - g i v i n g might o f t e n amount t o subsuming 
p a r t i c u l a r cases under a g e n e r a l r u l e ; o r t o i d e n t i f y i n g how a 
p a r t i c u l a r arrangement o f p r o p e r t i e s c o n s t i t u t e s an o r i g i o n a l 
v a r i a t i o n on a g e n e r a l theme. But s u r e l y t h e r e i s n o t h i n g wrong 
w i t h t h i s so l o n g as the arguments are c o n s i s t e n t ? I n o t h e r 
words, t h r o u g h r a t i o n a l debate, t h e r e may be o b j e c t i v e 
agreement over e v a l u a t i o n , even though p e r s o n a l responses 
remain l e g i t i m a t e l y s u b j e c t i v e . As a l r e a d y discussed, 
disagreement over i n t e r p r e t a t i o n can u s u a l l y be s e t t l e d or 
compromised t h r o u g h an appeal t o the p r e v a i l i n g wisdom of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n s - o r , i n the case of the f e a t u r e s of a p a i n t i n g , 
t h r o u g h p h y s i c a l i n s p e c t i o n . And, a r g u a b l y , we are o n l y able t o 
a p p r e c i a t e a p a i n t i n g once we have s a t i s f i e d these f i r s t two 
c r i t e r i a . I t i s my c o n t e n t i o n t h e n , t h a t because a e s t h e t i c 
judgements are concerned w i t h p e r c e p t i o n , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and 
e v a l u a t i o n , they t h e r e f o r e i n v o l v e more than mere s u b j e c t i v e 
response. 
As I mentioned e a r l i e r I do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t a r t e x i s t s 
f o r i t s own sake, r a t h e r , I b e l i e v e i t has meaning and 
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i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e . From t h i s b e l i e f I would argue t h a t i t 
i s p o s s i b l e f o r a e s t h e t i c judgements t o be e i t h e r v a l i d or 
i n v a l i d - i n which case disagreements concer n i n g them would 
be, a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y , r e s o l v a b l e . S i m i l a r l y , i t might be 
t h a t a g i v e n a r t o b j e c t has one and o n l y one d e t e r m i n a t e , 
r e l e v a n t meaning. A r g u a b l y , people w i l l always f i n d t h i s same 
meaning i f and o n l y i f they understand and i n t e r p r e t the o b j e c t 
i n t h e same way, t h a t i s , i f they judge i t a c c o r d i n g t o the 
same c r i t e r i a . To t h i s e x t e n t s u b j e c t i v i s t s must e n t e r t a i n the 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t everyone might i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y agree about a 
g i v e n judgement, which would then become a q u a s i - o b j e c t i v e 
judgement - the r e v e r s e , however, does not n e c e s s a r i l y apply 
( t h a t i s , i f everyone s u b j e c t i v e l y d i s a g r e e d ) because t h i s , t o 
an o b j e c t i v i s t , would n o t be a r e l e v a n t judgement. Furthermore, 
as J a r v i e p o i n t s o u t , t h e r e i ^ c o n s i d e r a b l e agreement over 
e v a l u a t i o n , and t h i s agreement i s n o t randomly d i s t r i b u t e d , but 
r a t h e r i s c l u s t e r e d around c e r t a i n c e n t r e s . A s u b j e c t i v i s t 
c o u l d argue t h a t t h i s i s because our e v a l u a t i o n s are the 
pr o d u c t o f our e d u c a t i o n and t h a t we are c o n d i t i o n e d t o d i r e c t 
our e v a l u a t i o n s i n a g i v e n d i r e c t i o n . But t h i s does not solve 
the problem which was not 'how do we come t o l i k e what we 
l i k e ? ' b u t r a t h e r , 'how come we l i k e a l i k e ? ' . J a r v i e puts t h i s 
problem s c h e m a t i c a l l y : a) We l i k e a l i k e ; b) We l i k e what we are 
c o n d i t i o n e d t o l i k e ; and c ) We are c o n d i t i o n e d a l i k e . He 
contends t h a t we cannot d e r i v e a) from b ) , a l t h o u g h i t may be 
t h a t we l i k e a l i k e because we l i k e what we are c o n d i t i o n e d t o 
l i k e . But we can d e r i v e a) from b) t o g e t h e r w i t h c ) . ^ ^ 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , J a r v i e regards o b j e c t i v i t y as being a s o r t 
o f democracy o f o p i n i o n and c r i t i c i s m , w i t h i n which the t r u t h 
may be pursued. The i n s t i t u t i o n s have a b u i l t - i n s e l f - c r i t i c i s m 
w h ich compensates f o r the b i a s o f the i n d i v i d u a l c r i t i c s who 
ru n them. The i n s t i t u t i o n s are more i m p a r t i a l than the 
i n d i v i d u a l s because they are governed by t r a d i t i o n s of 
judgement which are c o n t i n u a l l y being r e a s s e s s e d . T h i s 
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r e a s o n i n g leads J a r v i e t o conclude t h a t : 
We can say that an individual evaluation is open to criticism, 
traditional evaluatijons are also open to criticism, and the 
institutions of art criticism are themselves open to criticism 
of their objectivity. The standards (traditions) emerge from 
the process of criticism of the aria and yet they remain 
criticizable - not established beyond dispute. 
I n o t h e r words, w i t h o u t o b j e c t i v e standards of c r i t i c i s m , 
t h e c r i t i c a l e n t e r p r i s e i s a waste of time and consequently 
the term ' a e s t h e t i c judgement' i s rendered o b s o l e t e . We l e a r n 
t o a e s t h e t i c a l l y respond t o ( t h a t i s , a c q u i r e a t a s t e f o r ) 
a r t w o r k s t h r o u g h the reasoned judgement and e v a l u a t i o n of 
c r i t i c s w o r k i n g w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n s of the c r i t i c a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
As a w o r k i n g d e f i n i t i o n , t h e n , I would say t h a t an 
a e s t h e t i c judgement i s the a r t i c u l a t i o n of a reasoned 
e v a l u a t i o n of an a r t o b j e c t . I t can be c onsidered r e l e v a n t 
o n l y t o the e x t e n t t h a t i t i s adequately j u s t i f i e d - s u b j e c t t o 
l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s - and q u a s i - o b j e c t i v e t o the e x t e n t t h a t i t 
i s c o r r o b o r a t e d by the c r i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s over a g i v e n 
p e r i o d of t i m e . I n the n e x t c h a p t e r I s h a l l argue t h a t such 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n can be achieved t h r o u g h d e f i n i n g 'good* a r t by 
example. 
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T h e E x e m p l i f i c a t i o n o f ' G o o d * A r t 
I n t h i s c h a p t e r I s h a l l c o n s i d e r f o u r p r o p o s i t i o n s : ( 1) 
That t h e r e may be c o n s i d e r a b l e agreement about how a given 
work o f a r t should be i n t e r p r e t e d , and t h a t t h i s i n t u r n may 
dete r m i n e whether or n o t we c o n s i d e r i t t o be 'good'. ( 2 ) That 
a 'good' work o f a r t a r t can be d e f i n e d by example. ( 3 ) That 
we c o n s i d e r an a r t w o r k t o be 'good' because i t i s granted 
c a n o n i c a l s t a t u s and, t a u t o l o g i c a l l y , we g r a n t i t t h i s s t a t u s 
because i t 'good'. ( 4 ) That a d i s t i n c t i o n can be made between 
'good' and 'bad' a r t ( f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t which does or does not 
appear i n an a r t g a l l e r y , or i n a l i t e r a r y canon) and t h a t each 
term d e f i n e s t h e o t h e r by comparison. 
But what do we mean by 'good'? Good as what? Good f o r 
what? Good f o r whom? . . . 
I f 'good' i s an a b s o l u t e term then a work of a r t t h a t i s 
'good' i n one c u l t u r e cannot suddenly become 'bad' i f removed 
from t h a t c u l t u r e and c o n s i d e r e d i n another c u l t u r e . But i s an 
a b s o l u t e term? 'Goodness' depends upon the c r i t e r i a of 
'goodness' b e i n g employed. The s t a t u s of 'goodness' i s 
c o n f e r r e d upon an a r t w o r k by a c u l t u r e ; i t i s c u l t u r a l l y -
dependent. 'Goodness', t h e r e f o r e , i s the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e 
e x p e r i e n c e o f o b j e c t i v e l y 'good-making' p r o p e r t i e s . However, 
because a r t does n o t d e a l w i t h f a c t u a l c e r t a i n t i e s - i n a way 
t h a t s c i e n c e might c l a i m t o - i t would seem t h a t any 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o r e v a l u a t i o n o f i t can o n l y ever be p a r t i a l . 
I f such i s t h e case, then i t would seem s e n s i b l e t o adopt an 
e c l e c t i c c r i t i c a l approach. A M a r x i s t c r i t i c f o r i n s t a n c e , 
w i l l c o n s i d e r an a r t w o r k t o be 'good' o n l y t o the degree t h a t 
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i t f u n c t i o n s as e f f e c t i v e propaganda i n the the c l a s s 
s t r u g g l e , and so on. A f e m i n i s t c r i t i c , on the o t h e r hand, w i l l 
c o n s i d e r an a r t w o r k t o be 'good' i f and o n l y i f i t advocates 
t h e e m a n c i p a t i o n o f women. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , a s t r u c t u r a l i s t 
c r i t i c w i l l base h i s or her v a l u e judgement upon f o r m a l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; w h i l s t a p s y c h o - a n a l y t i c a l c r i t i c w i l l base h i s 
or her judgement upon p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and so on. 
Which approach i s c o r r e c t ? C e r t a i n l y the most 'democratic' 
approach would be t o s y s t e m a t i c a l l y apply each th e o r y i n t u r n 
and then d e c i d e which i s and i s not ' r e l e v a n t ' t o the g i v e n 
a r t w o r k . Such a d e c i s i o n would n o t n e c e s s a r i l y depend upon 
whether the c r i t i c s were themselves M a r x i s t or f e m i n i s t , or 
whatever, b u t r a t h e r upon whether the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n based upon 
a M a r x i s t or f e m i n i s t r e a d i n g was i n s i g h t f u l and a p p r o p r i a t e . 
Thus i t might be t h a t a M a r x i s t r e a d i n g w i l l i n t e r e s t a non-
M a r x i s t a t t h e l e v e l of ' p o s s i b l e ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i f i t leads 
t o a f u l l e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g and a p p r e c i a t i o n . I n terms of 
' r e l e v a n c e ' , a f e m i n i s t r e a d i n g of Jane Eyre would, p r o b a b l y , 
be more r e w a r d i n g than a M a r x i s t one; a M a r x i s t r e a d i n g of 
Crime and Punishment, on t h e o t h e r hand, would p r o b a b l y be more 
r e w a r d i n g than a f e m i n i s t one. 
L i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m seems t o f a l l i n t o two camps. There are 
those c r i t i c s who take an o b j e c t i v e t r a j e c t o r y (as w i t h : (1) 
Anglo-American New C r i t i c i s m and Russian Formalism which 
contends t h a t a c r i t i c should e m p i r i c a l l y concern him or 
h e r s e l f o n l y w i t h the form of an autonomous o b j e c t , t h a t i s , 
t h e words on the page r a t h e r than b i o g r a p h i c a l or h i s t o r i c a l 
background; and ( 2 ) M a r x i s t C r i t i c i s m which assumes the 
h i s t o r i c a l d e t e r m i n a n t s o f the c o n t e n t t o be o b j e c t i v e ) . And 
t h e r e are those who take a s u b j e c t i v e t r a j e c t o r y (as w i t h : i ) 
R e c e p t i o n or reader-response c r i t i c i s m , which i g n o r e s the 
h i s t o r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s o f a l i t e r a r y t e x t ; and i i ) some aspects 
o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m , d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s r a and p s y c h o - a n a l y s i s ) . The 
l a t t e r two d i f f e r from the former two i n t h a t they l o c a t e the 
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c r i t i c a l e n t e r p r i s e i n the a c t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r a t h e r than i n 
th e o b j e c t o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t h i n k b o t h approaches can be 
u s e f u l , depending upon whether or not they are r e l e v a n t t o a 
g i v e n c o n t e x t . As Stephen C. Pepper argues: 
[The] object of criticism [is] the totality of relevant material 
based on the perceptions stimulated by an aestiietic vehicle. 
Thus t h e r e are not as many d i f f e r e n t works o f a r t as t h e r e 
a r e p e r c e p t i o n s because some p e r c e p t i o n s may not be r e l e v a n t . 
S i m i l a r l y , r e c e n t t r e n d s i n l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m have p o i n t e d t o 
th e phenomenon o f r e a d e r - a s - a u t h o r , r e c r e a t i n g a t e x t a c c o r d i n g 
t o h i s or her own e x p e r i e n c e . According t o t h i s t h e o r y , a t e x t 
cannot be d e s c r i b e d w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o a rea d e r . Assuming, 
f o r the moment, t h a t t h e r e i s v i r t u e i n a p p l y i n g such a 
d e m o c r a t i c system o f c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s ( r a t h e r than assuming a 
t e x t has o n l y one d e t e r m i n a n t meaning) the obvious problem we 
are now faced w i t h i s how t o determine which i n d i v i d u a l readers 
are b e s t q u a l i f i e d t o make a judgement as t o the 'relevance' 
o f a c r i t i c a l approach, and t h e r e f o r e , as t o the va l u e o f the 
work o f a r t . 
Once aga i n we are faced w i t h the problem of how t o av o i d 
t h e c i r c u l a r i t y o f the e x p e r t judge b e i n g someone who makes 
e x p e r t judgements. But l e t us t r y . Apart from the obvious, such 
as needing t o be s e n s i t i v e , p e r c e p t i v e , d i s c r i m i n a t i n g , 
u n p r e j u d i c e d , r a t i o n a l , and a 'person o f t a s t e ' , an expe r t 
judge would a l s o need t o be p l a i n common-sensical. Common sense 
would be i m p o r t a n t i f , f o r i n s t a n c e , a f e m i n i s t were t o advance 
Macherey's ( M a r x i s t ) ' s i l e n c e s ' argument ( t h a t what a t e x t does 
n o t say i s as i m p o r t a n t as what i t does say) i n ord e r t o c l a i m 
the r e l e v a n c e o f h i s or her i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n about 
Crime and Punishment. I f the f e m i n i s t c r i t i c were t o c l a i m t h a t 
i t i s an o v e r - r a t e d work of l i t e r a t u r e because i t f a i l s t o 
mention whether or n o t Ras k o l n i k o v was b r e a s t - f e d as a c h i l d , 
then t h e c r i t i c has f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e common sense. Another 
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i m p o r t a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r the competent c r i t i c , t h e n , i s 
f l e x i b i l i t y . The l a t e Peter F u l l e r was a b r i l l i a n t exponent of 
t h i s , n o t o n l y because he was able t o analyse h i s i n i t i a l 
s u b j e c t i v e response t o a p a i n t i n g i n terms o f an almost 
e n c y c l o p e d i c knowledge o f a r t h i s t o r y and a e s t h e t i c s , b u t al s o 
because he was common-sensical and f l e x i b l e enough t o r e a l i s e 
when h i s ( e a r l i e r ) M a r x i s t approach was no lo n g e r a p p r o p r i a t e . 
I n o t h e r words, f o l l o w i n g Hume's r e a s o n i n g , the more artwo r k s 
and c r i t i c a l t h e o r i e s t h a t a c r i t i c i s f a m i l i a r w i t h the b e t t e r 
w i l l be h i s or her f a c i l i t y f o r p e r c e p t i o n , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , 
e v a l u a t i o n and a p p r e c i a t i o n . According t o P l a t o the competent 
j u d g e ( o f mimetic a r t ) must have ' f i r s t , a knowledge of the 
n a t u r e o f the o r i g i n a l ; n e x t , a knowledge o f the c o r r e c t n e s s of 
the copy; and t h i r d l y , a knowledge o f the e x c e l l e n c e w i t h which 
the copy i s executed'.^ S u r e l y t h i s s t i l l a p p l i e s . Again, i t 
would seem t o be a case o f d e f i n i n g by example. 
Perhaps, t h e n , examples are common-sensical. We cons i d e r 
Supper a t Emmaus, Hamlet and Don Giovanni t o be paradigms of 
'g r e a t a r t ' because we a t t r i b u t e a e s t h e t i c v a l u e t o them i n 
equal measure. We r e c o g n i s e c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s i n each o f them, 
and these p r o p e r t i e s c o n s t i t u t e 'great a r t ' ( c o m p l e x i t y , 
i n t e n s i t y and u n i t y , f o r i n s t a n c e ) . Furthermore, t h i s l a b e l of 
'g r e a t a r t ' can be s u b s t a n t i a t e d by making comparison w i t h 
examples o f n o t - s o - g r e a t a r t . We can say t h a t these t h r e e 
examples o f 'g r e a t a r t ' are more a e s t h e t i c a l l y v a l u a b l e than, 
say, the s e n t i m e n t a l whimsy of Norman Rockwell or the 
p o r n o g r a p h i c s u b - l i t e r a c y of S h i r l e y Conran, or the blan d easy-
l i s t e n i n g o f James L a s t . To the e x t e n t t h a t the t h r e e a r t forms 
are comparable t h e s e , t h e n , can l e g i t i m a t e l y be s a i d t o be 
examples o f ' g r e a t ' and ' n o t - s o - g r e a t ' a r t . 
But would i t be f u t i l e t o compare two 'good' or 'g r e a t ' 
p a i n t i n g s which are 'good' or ' g r e a t ' f o r d i f f e r e n t reasons? 
Not n e c e s s a r i l y . I t may be t h a t some 'reasons' are b e t t e r than 
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o t h e r s . Much depends on t h e 'goodness' c r i t e r i a t h a t are being 
v o l u n t e e r e d by way of r e a s o n - g i v i n g . L e t us suppose, f o r the 
moment, t h a t some l i m i t e d form o f e s s e n t i a l i s m i s p o s s i b l e . I n 
an a b s t r a c t sense t h e essence of ' g r e a t ' a r t (as oppose to 
merely 'good') i s i t s c a p a c i t y t o s a t i s f y the a e s t h e t i c 
i n t e r e s t , perhaps t h r o u g h i t s e l e v a t i n g themes; or through the 
potency o f i t s e x p r e s s i o n ; or thr o u g h i t s c a p a c i t y t o 
' t r a n s p o r t t h e s o u l ' ; o r t h r o u g h i t s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f profound 
t r u t h s about t he human c o n d i t i o n ; or through i n t e l l e c t u a l and 
e m o t i o n a l s t i m u l a t i o n , i n the form of ed u c a t i o n and 
e n t e r t a i n m e n t . ^ Such e s s e n t i a l 'greatness' would c o n s t i t u t e an 
'example'. 
One obvious problem i n v o l v e d w i t h a p p e a l i n g t o examples t o 
d e f i n e 'good' a r t , though, i s t h a t we have no p r o o f t h a t the 
examples t h a t are b e i n g appealed t o are themselves examples of 
'good' a r t . Do we have t o l o o k t o o t h e r examples t o d e f i n e the 
f i r s t example? and i f so does t h i s i n v o l v e a r e g r e s s i o n t o 
i n f i n i t y , a r e d u c t i o ad absurdam? W e l l , not n e c e s s a r i l y . The 
q u e s t i o n i s , do 'examples' e n t a i l concepts? Without concepts 
a n y t h i n g can be c o n s i d e r e d as a r t . Speaking of a r t i s o n l y 
m e a n i n g f u l i f i t d e s c r i b e s a p a r t o f e x i s t e n c e . A d e f i n i t i o n of 
a r t t h a t covered e v e r y t h i n g would be absorbed by e x i s t e n c e i n 
g e n e r a l and would t h e r e f o r e l o s e i t s 'meaning'. 
As d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter Three, Kant r e f e r s t o an antinomy 
of t a s t e - e i t h e r we can or we cannot account f o r t a s t e . The 
antinomy a r i s e s over whether or not concepts are i n v o l v e d i n 
judgements of t a s t e . I f a judgement does n ot i n v o l v e concepts 
then i t cannot be the s u b j e c t o f disagreement, which i t i s ; i f 
however a judgement does i n v o l v e concepts then i t must be 
r a t i o n a l l y d i s p u t a b l e , and p r o v a b l e by reasons, which, Kant 
argues, i t i s n o t . Kant's a t t e m p t t o r e s o l v e t h i s antinomy by 
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t o n l y the i n d e t e r m i n a t e concept of the t h i n g - i n -
i t s e l f ( w h i c h u n d e r l i e s t he j u d g i n g s u b j e c t as w e l l as the 
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judged o b j e c t ) i s i n v o l v e d i n judgements o f t a s t e . I n o t h e r 
words, a c c o r d i n g t o Kant, t h e r e i s no d e t e r m i n a t e concept 
i n v o l v e d . N o n - c o g n i t i v e , c o n c e p t - f r e e judgements of t a s t e , f o r 
Kant, r e q u i r e n o t h i n g more than an e x e r c i s e of c o n t e m p l a t i o n . ^ 
S u r e l y though, the same c l a i m cannot be r e a l i s t i c a l l y made f o r 
c r i t i c a l ( a e s t h e t i c ) v a l u e judgements? Arguably, a c r i t i c a l 
( a e s t h e t i c ) judgement i s more than a simple response of t a s t e . 
Whether or n o t an a r t w o r k i s ' b e a u t i f u l ' i s perhaps a matter 
of t a s t e , whether or not i t i s 'good' i s a m a t t e r of c r i t i c a l 
( a e s t h e t i c ) judgement. I say t h i s because I b e l i e v e t h a t the 
a r t o b j e c t can be an i n s t r u m e n t of knowledge. I t can have 
meaning - a l t h o u g h i t need not - and t h e r e f o r e can be 
i n t e r p r e t e d and e v a l u a t e d . As I have a l r e a d y argued, our 
c a p a c i t y t o i n t e r p r e t and e v a l u a t e i s a c q u i r e d through l e a r n i n g 
r a t h e r than i n h e r i t a n c e . ^ But, so the s u b j e c t i v i s t argument 
goes, t h i s has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h t a s t e - we cannot be taught 
how t o respond. 
S u r e l y though, f o r the most p a r t , we are taught how t o 
respond. M a r x i s t , f o r m a l i s t and s t r u c t u r a l i s t c r i t i c s have 
tended t o d i s m i s s the idea of i n s t i n c t i v e , s u b j e c t i v e response 
as b e i n g r e a c t i o n a r y , r o m a n t i c and n a i v e . Even i f t h i s 
s u b j e c t i v e response comes from as eminent a s c h o l a r as F.R. 
L e a v i s or P e t e r F u l l e r i t can c a r r y no more weight than the 
response o f an e i g h t year o l d c h i l d unless i t i s supported by 
o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d reasons. Besides, as the American l i t e r a r y 
c r i t i c Rene Welleck suggests, however much a c r i t i c l i k e Leavis 
aims f o r the d i r e c t communication of h i s 'complete response', 
he cannot a v o i d u s i n g concepts or i n v o k i n g norms and 
standards 
So f a r I have suggested t h a t an i n t e l l e c t u a l l y s y s t e m a t i c 
approach t o c r i t i c i s m i s p r e f e r a b l e t o an i n s t i n c t i v e approach, 
but what form might t h i s system take i n p r a c t i c e ? The c r i t i c i s m 
o f l i t e r a t u r e s t r i k e s me as b e i n g l e s s p r o b l e m a t i c than the 
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c r i t i c i s m o f p a i n t i n g . We ' i n t e r a c t ' w i t h a l i t e r a r y t e x t on 
t h r e e l e v e l s : ( i ) two people can have the same sensorimotor 
e x p e r i e n c e o f i t ; ( i i ) have the same und e r s t a n d i n g of the 
nominal meaning of the words; and ( i i i ) have the same 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f i t s symbolic meaning. But what 'system' might 
we employ i n t h e ' p r a c t i c a l ' a p p r e c i a t i o n o f a p a i n t i n g ? F i r s t , 
l i k e F u l l e r , we must c o n s i d e r our i n i t i a l response t o i t and 
ask o u r s e l v e s why we l i k e or d i s l i k e i t . T h i s i s phase one, the 
s u b j e c t i v e response o f t a s t e . Second, we should attempt t o 
answer the f i r s t q u e s t i o n by c o n s i d e r i n g the f o l l o w i n g 
e m p i r i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e p o i n t s : Composition ( i s i t simple or 
complex? how i s t h e p a i n t i n g organised? what i s the scale? i s 
t h e r e a f o c a l p o i n t ? ) ; Space (does the p a i n t i n g have depth? 
a e r i a l or l i n e a r p e r s p e c t i v e ? i s i t c o n s i s t e n t ? ) ; L i g h t ( i s 
t h i s used t o d e f i n e form? what i s the s o u r c e ? ) ; L i n e (does i t 
have o u t l i n e o r i s i t c o n s t r u c t e d i n masses and t o n a l a r e a s ? ) ; 
Colour (how does t h i s r e l a t e t o composition? does i t focus 
p e r c e p t i o n ? ) ; Form ( i s t h e r e a sense o f t a n g i b l e form? How i s 
t h i s a c h i e v e d ? ) ; H a n d l i n g (what use i s made of t e x t u r e and 
f i n i s h ? ) S u b j e c t m a t t e r (what i s the n a r r a t i v e ? i s i t 
sy m b o l i c ? ) . . . Other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s might i n c l u d e i t s 
p r o p o r t i o n s and s i z e ; i t s medium; i t s l o c a t i o n ; i t s c o n d i t i o n ; 
i t s frame; and i t s t i t l e . We might a l s o ask c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n 
about i t s s t y l e : i s i t l i n e a r or p a i n t e r l y ? a b s t r a c t or 
i l l u s i o n i s t i c ? d e c o r a t i v e or expressive? and so on. A l l these 
q u e s t i o n s would c o n s t i t u t e phase two: the c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n 
or ' a e s t h e t i c judgement'. 
So f a r I have di s c u s s e d l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m i n r e l a t i o n t o 
a r t c r i t i c i s m , now, i n o r d e r t o t a c k l e the q u e s t i o n s I s e t out 
a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s c h a p t e r , I s h a l l d iscuss i t i n 
r e l a t i o n t o music c r i t i c i s m . 
A good work of f i c t i o n can be an i n s t r u m e n t of knowledge. 
I t has ' c o n t e n t ' . I t ' c o n t a i n s ' meaning. I t r e q u i r e s more than 
Page 86 of 192 Nigel Famdale 
Exemptification of 'Good' Art Chapter Six 
an e x e r c i s e o f t a s t e o r a ' g u t - r e a c t i o n ' i n order t o be 
e v a l u a t e d . Reading i s an a c q u i r e d s k i l l i n which codes must be 
l e a r n e d b e f o r e statements can be understood. C e r t a i n w r i t t e n 
words a c t as a s u b s t i t u t e s t i m u l u s which, through l e a r n i n g 
language, we a s s o c i a t e w i t h the o r i g i n a l s t i m u l u s . For example, 
t h e l e t t e r s t - r - e - e are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t he shape of a symbolic 
or i m a g i n a r y , or ' r e a l ' t r e e . ^ Once these codes have been 
l e a r n e d - and we are able t o make these a s s o c i a t i o n s - we can 
even l e a r n t o speed-read, t o l o o k ahead f o r cues t o c o n f i r m us 
i n our ' h o r i z o n s o f e x p e c t a t i o n ' and then t o f i l l i n from 
e x p e r i e n c e t h e p a r t s we have skipped over. Our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
o f language c o u l d t h e r e f o r e be s a i d t o i n v o l v e a c o n d i t i o n e d 
response.^ A l s o , because the w r i t t e n word can be g r a m m a t i c a l l y 
c o r r e c t o r i n c o r r e c t , passages o f prose can be s a i d t o be 
'good' or 'bad' examples of t h e i r k i n d - i n a f o r m a l sense as 
w e l l as i n terms o f the meaning of t h e i r c o n t e n t . Obviously i t 
i s d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h t r u t h - t e s t s i n t h i s area because i t 
i s d i f f i c u l t t o j u s t i f y c a l l i n g a work o f f i c t i o n ' t r u e ' or 
' f a c t u a l ' ( a l t h o u g h we do r e f e r t o c e r t a i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l 
i n s i g h t s as b e i n g ' p o e t i c t r u t h s ' ) . T h i s i s sometimes r e f e r r e d 
t o as the f a c t - v a l u e dichotomy: t h a t i s , v a l u e judgements do 
n o t n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e p u r e l y f a c t u a l statements - our 
e v a l u a t i o n o f a f a c t need n o t be synonymous w i t h the f a c t 
i t s e l f . But a e s t h e t i c judgements do n o t r e a l l y ' a s s e r t ' so much 
as 'persuade': 'You ought t o l i k e t h i s f o r reasons x y and z'. 
Music i s more p r o b l e m a t i c . I n music the 'statements' are 
n o t 'statements' i n any language about the q u a l i t y or 
performance o f a p i e c e , r a t h e r they are the music i t s e l f . I f we 
l i s t e n t o a p i e c e o f t r a d i t i o n a l music from our Western 
c u l t u r e we know when a 'wrong' n o t e i s pla y e d because we can 
f o l l o w i t s development, even i f we are u n f a m i l i a r w i t h the 
p a r t i c u l a r p i e c e o f music b e i n g p l a y e d ( j u s t as a musician can 
scan a score w i t h c e r t a i n e x p e c t a t i o n s ) . We have assessed the 
m u s i c a l phrase and decided i t i s not ' t r u e ' . I n the t o n i c 
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s c a l e , f o r example, we expect t o hear the seventh l o c a t e d 
towards t h e end o f a melody, i f i t comes a t the b e g i n n i n g we 
sense t h a t i t i s 'wrong'. However, when we hear I n d i a n or 
Chinese music f o r the f i r s t time i t o f t e n seems t o be j u s t an 
u n i n t e l l i g a b l e n o i s e . T h i s i s because we are u n f a m i l i a r w i t h 
the d i a t o n i c s c a l e . We do n o t 'understand' i t because we do not 
understand i t s concepts or m u s i c a l s t r u c t u r e - t h a t i s , which 
sounds are a v a i l a b l e , and how they are p u t t o g e t h e r . As 
Gombrich p u t s i t : 
Even an art of pure form, such as music, needs a background 
of expectations to become understandable.^ 
There are numerous anecdotes i n c i r c u l a t i o n which 
i l l u s t r a t e t h i s : one such concerns Ravi Shanka's f i r s t s i t a r 
c o n c e r t i n the West a t which the Western audience o b l i g i n g l y 
applauded h i s t u n i n g - u p ( w r o n g l y t h i n k i n g the c o n c e r t had 
s t a r t e d ) ; a s i m i l a r anecdote r e l a t e s how a Chinaman attended a 
c l a s s i c a l music c o n c e r t f o r the f i r s t time and hated i t , a p a r t 
f r o m , o f c o u r s e , the t u n i n g of the i n s t r u m e n t s a t the 
b e g i n n i n g ; t h e n t h e r e i s the one about t h e p a r t y of Eskimos i n 
Canada who a t t e n d e d a performance of O t h e l l o and thought t h a t 
the a c t o r s were a c t u a l l y b e i n g k i l l e d - because they d i d not 
understand the t h e a t r i c a l c o n v e n t i o n s a t work . . . and so 
on.-^^ I f we accept t h a t we need t o understand these 
c o n v e n t i o n s i n o r d e r t o e v a l u a t e , we must then ask how i t i s 
t h a t knowledge o f the c o n v e n t i o n s can i n c l u d e knowledge of 
a p p r o p r i a t e c r i t e r i a o f e v a l u a t i o n . 
As I suggested a t the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s c h a p t e r , one 
a b s t r a c t ' t r u t h - t e s t ' might be t o compare what i s seen or 
heard or e x p e r i e n c e d t o p r e v i o u s l y known s t r u c t u r e s , t h a t i s , 
'examples'. We must then c o n s i d e r whether the c u r r e n t statement 
f i t s i n w i t h or d e v i a t e s from these s t r u c t u r e s . I n music, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , n o t e s , harmonies and melodic l i n e s which are known, 
or are l i k e those which are known, would be c l a s s i f i e d as being 
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' t r u e ' . Those u n f a m i l i a r w i t h Western music and Western 
t h e a t r e would perhaps pass d i f f e r e n t judgements from 
Westerners, b u t , a r g u a b l y , b o t h would be p e r f o r m i n g the same 
a b s t r a c t ' t r u t h - t e s t ' . 
W h i l s t i n r e c e n t years t h e o r i e s of a r t as communication 
have encouraged t h e m i s l e a d i n g use of the word 'statement' t o 
r e f e r t o a b r u s h s t r o k e on a canvas^^ t h i s p r i n c i p l e of a 
' t r u t h - t e s t ' i s a l s o a p p l i c a b l e t o the v i s u a l a r t s . I do not 
n e c e s s a r i l y mean by t h i s t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o say t h a t i f a 
p a i n t e r i n t e n d e d t o i m i t a t e n a t u r e by way of an i l l u s i o n i s t i c , 
n a t u r a l i s t i c p a i n t i n g o f a landscape, b u t ended up p a i n t i n g the 
sky green and the grass b l u e , we c o u l d say h i s p a i n t i n g was 
' f a l s e ' . T h i s ' t r u t h - t e s t ' c o u l d n o t , f o r i n s t a n c e , be 
l e g i t i m a t e l y a p p l i e d t o an a b s t r a c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a 
landscape. I had more i n mind the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a ' t r u t h -
t e s t ' c o u l d i n some way be e s t a b l i s h e d i n terms of the frame of 
r e f e r e n c e i n which the work o f a r t i s p e r c e i v e d and i n t e r p r e t e d 
- a l o n g the c o n t e x t u a l l i n e s d i s c u s s e d above i n r e l a t i o n to 
music. There i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , a w e l l known anecdote about an 
e x p l o r e r who d i s c o v e r e d a p r i m i t i v e t r i b e i n Papua New Guinea 
and t o o k a photograph o f i t s C h i e f . The Chief c o u l d not 'see' 
h i m s e l f i n the photograph because he d i d not 'understand' how 
i t worked. He had had no experience of ' i n t e r p r e t i n g ' the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t h r e e d i m e n s i o n a l form as a f l a t 
g e o m e t r i c a l p r o j e c t i o n on a two d i m e n s i o n a l p l a n e . I n order t o 
'see' t h e photograph the Chief would have had t o l e a r n some of 
the p i c t o r i a l v o c a b u l a r y o f our Western c u l t u r e . That i s , he 
would have t o have some of the e x p e c t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d w i t h 
Western c r i t i c a l p a r l a n c e . I n a s i m i l a r sense, we r e q u i r e a 
s p e c i a l i s e d v o c a b u l a r y t o 'read' s o p h i s t i c a t e d p i c t o r i a l images 
i n our own c u l t u r e - because we have t o 'decode' the p a i n t e d 
s i g n s and symbols. I n t h i s c o n t e x t , as Tom Wolfe i r o n i c a l l y 
s a i d o f Modern A r t , b e l i e v i n g i s s e eing. 
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Perverse as t h i s r e a s o n i n g may seem, and b o r i n g and 
p r e t e n t i o u s though some Modern A r t undoubtedly i s , the f a c t 
remains t h a t i f we are t o a p p r e c i a t e Modern A r t we must do so 
on i t s own terms ( a l t h o u g h one s t i l l has the o p t i o n of 
r e j e c t i n g t h e terms and so the w o r k s ) . As Gombrich argues: 
Without some framework against whK^h to test and modify our 
first impressions. we are l e f t to the tender mercies of our 
i n i t i a l projections.•'••^ 
Le t me develop t h i s p o i n t . We cannot s i m p l y expect t o be 
a b l e t o open our a e s t h e t i c pores and breathe i n the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f an a r t w o r k w i t h o u t f i r s t f a m i l i a r i s i n g 
o u r s e l v e s w i t h i t s concepts. For i n s t a n c e , i n h i s seminal 
essay M o d e r n i s t P a i n t i n g ( 1 9 6 5 ) , Clement Greenberg argues t h a t 
i n emphasising the f l a t n e s s and t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l i t y of the 
p i c t u r e p l a n e . A b s t r a c t Expressionism has demanded t h a t we r e -
e v a l u a t e our p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h n a r r a t i v e and f i g u r a t i v e 
i l l u s i o n i s m . Through ' K a n t i a n ' s e l f - c r i t i c i s m , he argues. 
M o d e r n i s t p a i n t i n g can take on an autonomy which a l l o w s f o r 
s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n and, t h e r e f o r e , s e l f - j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Leaving 
a s i d e f o r the moment the q u e s t i o n o f whether or not we agree 
w i t h Greenberg's a n a l y s i s , l e t us c o n s i d e r whether or not such 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d t h e o r i e s are immediately a c c e s s i b l e t o the l a y -
p erson. Would i t n o t be unreasonable t o c o n j e c t u r e t h a t the 
average s p e c t a t o r has t o ' r e - l e a r n ' h i s or her c r i t i c a l 
v o c a b u l a r y i n o r d e r t o take t h i s t h e o r y on board? To t h i s 
e x t e n t our judgements seem t o be c o n t e x t u a l . Background 
knowledge about the h i s t o r y o f the p a i n t i n g - or a r t i s t ' s 
i n t e n t i o n s , or t h e o r i e s - may or may not be r e l e v a n t t o our 
judgement and a p p r e c i a t i o n , and the o n l y way we can f i n d out i s 
t o do our homework. 
Another i n s t a n c e : I f we contemplate a Mark Rothko canvas 
f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e we may f e e l a sense of profound melancholy, 
or a sense o f t r a n q u i l l i t y , or we may be d i s t u r b e d by the 
'mood' o f the p a i n t i n g . However, i t might be t h a t these 
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f e e l i n g s become r i c h e r and more i n t e n s i f i e d once we are t o l d 
t h a t i n 1970, w h i l s t p a i n t i n g t h i s canvas, Rothko o b s e s s i v e l y 
l i s t e n e d t o Schubert's ' T r o u t ' Q u i n t e t - the needle on the 
r e c o r d p l a y e r c o n t i n u a l l y g o i n g back t o the s t a r t o f the r e c o r d 
- and t h a t a f t e r he f i n i s h e d p a i n t i n g i t he committed s u i c i d e . 
I n t h i s case b i o g r a p h i c a l knowledge, a l b e i t melodramatic, may 
c o n f i r m one's o r i g i o n a l i m p r e s s i o n s , or indeed, d i s c o n f i r m 
them. But t h e o n l y way t o f i n d out i s t o a v a i l y o u r s e l f of t h a t 
knowledge i n the f i r s t p l a c e . S u r e l y , i n t h i s sense, such 
propaganda a r t as t h a t of N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s m , or S t a l i n ' s 
S o c i a l Realism, cannot be p r o p e r l y e v a l u a t e d i f d i v o r c e d from 
i t s h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t , namely, the gas chambers and the 
gulags? 
A d m i t t e d l y , these examples o f background knowledge 
i n f o r m i n g judgement may o n l y account f o r our immediate 
e m o t i o n a l response, b u t o t h e r examples of more complex ideas -
which are n o t i m m e d i a t e l y apparent - are not d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d . 
I n h i s essay The d i f f i c u l t y o f b e i n g an a r t i s t John Berger 
o f f e r s an i n g e n i o u s , i f somewhat p r e t e n t i o u s , defence of 
Jackson P o l l o c k ' s d r i p p a i n t i n g s . I t h i n k i t i s w o r t h q u o t i n g 
a t l e n g t h : 
Imagine a man brought up from tdrth in a white celL so that he 
has never seen anything except the growth of his own body. 
And then imagine that suddenly he is given some sticks and 
bright paints. I f he were a man with an innate sense of 
balance and colour harmony, he would then, I think, cover the 
white walls of his ceE as PoUock has painted his canvases. He 
would want to express his ideas and feelings about growth, 
time, energy, death, but he would lack any vocabulary of 
seen or remembered visual images with which to do so . . . I 
believe that Pollock imaginatively . . . isolated himself almost 
to that extent. His paintings are Hke pictures painted on the 
inside walls of his mind . . . His work amounts to an 
invitation: . . . discover the universal in your self, for in a 
one-man world you are universaU 
P's i n i t i a l comment i n response t o P o l l o c k ' s canvases 
might be 'Surely he's t a k i n g the mickey?', or words t o t h a t 
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e f f e c t . But i f P was asked t o read Berger's e x p l a n a t i o n and 
then r e t u r n t o l o o k a t the canvases, ar g u a b l y he would f i n d 
them more ' a c c e s s i b l e ' . A l t h o u g h he may conclude t h a t i t i s the 
c r i t i c and n o t t h e a r t i s t who i s the r e a l m i c k e y - t a k e r , and 
a l t h o u g h he may n o t n e c e s s a r i l y 'understand' h i s response any 
b e t t e r , he would, a r g u a b l y , be more i n c l i n e d t o make a more 
a p p r o p r i a t e , ' i n f o r m e d ' response. I n t h i s r e s p e c t c r i t i c s such 
as Berger, Greenberg and F u l l e r have an i m p o r t a n t r o l e t o p l a y . 
A c r i t i c i s an exemplar r a t h e r than a l e g i s l a t o r . C r i t i c i s m i s 
t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f a c o n s i d e r e d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e response t o an 
a r t w o r k w h i c h , w i t h t h e use o f concepts, j u s t i f i e s a p a r t i c u l a r 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and consequently i n f o r m s a p a r t i c u l a r t a s t e . The 
c r i t i c makes a r a t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between a r t w o r k s t h a t 
a r e w o r t h y o f our i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n and those t h a t are 
n o t . To t h i s e x t e n t t h e r e are such t h i n g s as ' s k i l l * , 
' e x p e r t i s e ' , 'competence' and ' s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ' i n v o l v e d i n 
a r t , l i t e r a r y and music c r i t i c i s m . 
W i l l i a m Charlton-*-^ c o n s i d e r s t h a t i n a c q u i r i n g s k i l l and 
e x p e r t i s e we a c q u i r e the a b i l i t y t o m o nitor r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s 
u n c o n s c i o u s l y and c o n t i n u o u s l y . He compares t h i s a b i l i t y w i t h 
t h a t o f an e x p e r t m u s i c i a n who can p l a y an i n s t r u m e n t w i t h o u t 
b e i n g c o n s c i o u s l y aware of the successive p o s i t i o n s of h i s 
f i n g e r s , C h a r l t o n concludes t h a t , because t h i s i s s i m i l a r t o 
the e x p e r t ' s unconscious awareness of f o r m a l f e a t u r e s i n a work 
of a r t , t a s t e i n a e s t h e t i c form i s i n f a c t a s k i l l . I n the next 
c h a p t e r I s h a l l develop t h i s p o i n t and o f f e r some s p e c i f i c 
examples o f how c e r t a i n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s can be s a i d t o be 
r e l e v a n t and v a l i d . 
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I n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r I suggested t h a t the a r t s are an 
a c q u i r e d t a s t e , and t h a t a r t and l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m are an 
a c q u i r e d s k i l l . I n t h i s c h a p t e r I w i l l develop these ideas by 
c o n s i d e r i n g 'good' a r t and l i t e r a t u r e i n terras of the 
r e l a t i o n o f form t o c o n t e n t . A work o f a r t or l i t e r a t u r e 
m ight be c o n s i d e r e d good i f and when we are not made aware of 
i t s f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e , t h a t i s , i f and when i t s form does not 
i n t e r f e r e w i t h out enjoyment of i t s c o n t e n t . As al r e a d y 
suggested, our knowledge o f language codes and f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e 
i s a c q u i r e d . A work of l i t e r a t u r e , though, i s 'good' 
independent of the s k i l l or o t h e r w i s e o f i t s reader. We can 
c l a i m t h i s i f , f o r i n s t a n c e , i t s language i s r i c h i n 
a s s o c i a t i o n s , i s a p p r o p r i a t e and f u n c t i o n a l , and i t s f o r m a l 
c o n s t r u c t i o n e f f i c i e n t l y communicates the meaning of the 
c o n t e n t . We can say i t i s 'bad' i f through p r e t e n t i o u s n e s s or 
i l l i t e r a c y t h e meaning of the c o n t e n t i s obscure, and the 
language i s redundant and c l i c h e d . I f a reader has a t a s t e f o r 
such p r e t e n t i o u s or obscure w r i t i n g t h e n , perhaps, we can say 
he i s u n s k i l l e d and t h e r e f o r e l a c k i n g i n t a s t e . A s b e f o r e , 
much here depends upon t h e procedure by which we determine the 
r e l e v a n c e o f t h e reasons t h a t are v o l u n t e e r e d i n support of a 
judgement. A r n o l d I s e n b e r g , f o r i n s t a n c e , d i v i d e s the c r i t i c a l 
process i n t o t h r e e p a r t s : v e r d i c t ( V ) , reason ( R ) , and the norm 
( N ) . T h i s process can be r e c o g n i s e d i n the f o l l o w i n g form o f 
s t a t e m e n t : 'This book i s good because i t has such-and-such a 
q u a l i t y ( Q ) , and any book w i t h t h i s q u a l i t y i s pro t a n t o good'. 
A c c o r d i n g t o Isenberg's f o r m u l a t i o n ^ V i s an u t t e r a n c e 
c o n d i t i o n a l upon R which appears i n a nor m a t i v e sentence. 
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Le t us examine t h i s . I f N i s based upon a sound i n d u c t i o n 
i t would ( t o g e t h e r w i t h R) a f f o r d a r e a l reason f o r a c c e p t i n g 
the v a l i d i t y o f V. T h i s , o f course, i s n o t an a b s o l u t e method 
f o r r e s o l v i n g disagreement about judgements. But i f such a 
method were p o s s i b l e i t would p r o b a b l y be along these l i n e s . 
The problem i s i n d e t e r m i n i n g Q. I s t h e r e a P l a t o n i c essence to 
a l l n o v e l s t h a t have a e s t h e t i c value? Or i s t h e r e a c e r t a i n 
arrangement o f c e r t a i n i n g r e d i e n t s x, y and z which, when 
reproduced, w i l l always o c c a s i o n a e s t h e t i c pleasure? Arguably 
t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n f o r r a u l i t o such genre as, say, crime f i c t i o n 
or r o m a n t i c f i c t i o n o r , as discu s s e d i n Chapter F i v e , t o Greek 
t r a g e d y . But i s each work of a r t unique? I would say not 
( a l t h o u g h I s e n b e r g m a i n t a i n s t h a t the c r i t i c i s not committed 
t o t h e g e n e r a l c l a i m t h a t the q u a l i t y named Q i s v a l u a b l e i n 
a l l c a s e s ) . 
I s e n b e r g argues t h a t i t i s the q u a l i t i e s o f the work of 
a r t t h a t a re good or bad, r a t h e r than the work i t s e l f . These 
q u a l i t i e s a re i n the mind o f the s u b j e c t and a c r i t i c can h e l p 
o t h e r people t o p e r c e i v e these q u a l i t i e s f o r themselves by use 
of c o n c epts. We have a concept of harmony and i f a c r i t i c 
a p p l i e s t h i s t o a p a i n t i n g we can see whether our p e r c e p t i o n of 
the presence of t h i s q u a l i t y agrees w i t h our c o n c e p t i o n of i t . 
The c r i t i c r e f e r s t o the 'i d e a ' o f a q u a l i t y r a t h e r than t o the 
q u a l i t y i t s e l f . I n t h i s way, concepts r e f e r r e d t o by c r i t i c s 
can be s a i d t o i n f l u e n c e t he way i n which we p e r c e i v e . This 
does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y mean, however, t h a t everyone agrees t h a t 
we can r e l y e x c l u s i v e l y on the competence of ' q u a l i f i e d ' 
c r i t i c s t o make our judgements f o r us. C l i v e B e l l , f o r 
i n s t a n c e , proposes a system of a e s t h e t i c s which has no 
o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y , i n s t e a d i t r e l i e s on p e r s o n a l experience 
and s u b j e c t i v e f e e l i n g a l o n e . He argues t h a t a e s t h e t i c 
judgement i s a m a t t e r o f p e r s o n a l t a s t e , and t h a t w h i l s t an 
a e s t h e t i c emotion might a r i s e a f t e r a c r i t i c has ' e x p l a i n e d ' an 
a r t w o r k t o us, i t must, n e v e r t h e l e s s , be f e l t f i r s t hand i f i t 
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i s t o be c o n s i d e r e d genuine [ c f . K a n t ] . Conversely, F.R. Leavis 
assumes an o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i o n i s p o s s i b l e by v i r t u e o f t h i s 
v e r y same i n d i v i d u a l response ( a l t h o u g h he i s t h i n k i n g i n moral 
r a t h e r than a e s t h e t i c t e r m s ) . He argues t h a t i t i s p r e c i s e l y 
because c r i t i c i s m i s devoted t o the i n d i v i d u a l response - and 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h a t response - t h a t i t may achieve 
o b j e c t i v i t y . The ' s c i e n t i f i c ' e x p l a n a t i o n s o f s t r u c t u r a l i s m and 
s e m i o t i c s would be c o n s i d e r e d i n t e r e s t i n g b u t i r r e l e v a n t f o r 
L e a v i s , because the v a l u e judgements they l e a d t o l a c k the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral ' i n t e g r i t y ' r e q u i r e d f o r o b j e c t i v e 
e v a l u a t i o n . I w i l l n o t d e t a i l L e a v i s 's t h e o r y h e r e , but i t i s 
w o r t h p o i n t i n g out t h a t the form o f c r i t i c i s m he advocates 
makes use of c o n c r e t e and d i r e c t language, i n the manner o f : 
'This - doesn't i t ? - bears such a r e l a t i o n t o t h a t ; t h i s k i n d 
of t h i n g - don't you t h i n k so? - wears b e t t e r than t h a t ' , ^ 
r a t h e r than o f a b s t r a c t language. T h i s approach has two 
advantages: f i r s t , a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f a response by Leavis 
always appears i n a c o n t e x t t h a t b o t h the reader and the 
c r i t i c can i d e n t i f y ; second, t h i s frame o f r e f e r e n c e - w i t h i n 
which r e l e v a n t comparisons might be made - must be t o a 
l i t e r a r y canon acknowledged by a common c u l t u r e . ^ 
I n t h i s c o n t e x t (as N o r t h r o p Frye suggests) c r i t i c i s m as 
knowledge i s one t h i n g , and value-judgements informed by t a s t e 
are a n o t h e r . ^ A l t h o u g h i t i s m i s l e a d i n g t o compare a c r i t i c 
such as B e l l whose t h e o r i e s d e a l p r i m a r i l y w i t h sensory a r t 
( v i s u a l ) w i t h a c r i t i c such as Leavis who deals w i t h i d e o -
sensory a r t ( l i t e r a t u r e ) , I b e l i e v e t h a t comparisons between 
the two a r t forms can p r o f i t a b l y be made. As suggested i n the 
l a s t c h a p t e r , t h e l e t t e r s and words we use as v i s u a l p r i n t e d 
s i g n a l s r e q u i r e a h i g h l y s p e c i a l i s e d knowledge of l i n g u i s t i c 
codes, j u s t as p a i n t e d images and symbols of Medieval and 
Renaissance a r t r e q u i r e a c e r t a i n v i s u a l l i t e r a c y on the p a r t 
of t h e v i e w e r . E x p e r i m e n t a l w r i t i n g may d e l i b e r a t e l y 
d e f a m i l i a r i s e these codes f o r e f f e c t , but on a p u r e l y 
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l i n g u i s t i c l e v e l the degree t o which our 'horizons of 
e x p e c t a t i o n ' are s a t i s f i e d o f t e n determines the degree t o which 
we i n i t i a l l y c o n s i d e r a t e x t t o be 'good' or 'bad'. 
A p a i n t i n g can be understood i n terms o f semantic codes 
s i m i l a r t o those used t o understand w r i t t e n language. When we 
l o o k a t r e l i g i o u s p a i n t i n g s from the Renaissance we need t o 
know what t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f the S a i n t s are i n order t o f o l l o w 
t h e n a r r a t i v e . Renaissance r e l i g i o u s p a i n t i n g can be s a i d t o be 
'about' something. I t i s 'meaningful' and (perhaps) has one and 
o n l y one d e t e r m i n a t e meaning. Arguably, people w i l l f i n d t h i s 
same meaning i n the p a i n t i n g i f and o n l y i f they 'understand' 
and i n t e r p r e t i t i n the same way. L i k e w r i t t e n language, the 
Renaissance p a i n t i n g ' d e s c r i b e s ' a s u b j e c t , whether r e a l or 
imagined, and, as such, i s m e a n i n g f u l . But does t h i s 
n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l y t o M o d e r n i s t p a i n t i n g ? Benedetto Croce, i n my 
view w r o n g l y , suggests n o t . He r e f e r s t o t h i s process of 
d e s c r i p t i o n i n terms o f ' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ' and makes a tenuous 
c o n n e c t i o n between t h i s and ' e x p r e s s i o n ' . For him, an a b s t r a c t 
e x p r e s s i o n i s t h a t which does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y evoke through 
a s s o c i a t i o n , nor d i r e c t l y r e f e r t o , an independent s u b j e c t 
m a t t e r . For Croce, r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t , 
because c o n c e p t u a l , whereas e x p r e s s i o n i s c e n t r a l t o the 
a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e because i t i s i n t u i t i v e , immediate and 
autonomous. 
To c o u n t e r Croce's t h e o r y we must reassess the r o l e of 
' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ' . What i s i t ? L e t us c o n s i d e r David B l e i c h ' s 
d e f i n i t i o n : 
Interpretation is an explanatory activity that is itself 
explained by the principles underlying the acquisition and use 
of language. Linguistic articulation - naming and identification 
- is the symbolizatixjn of experijence; interpretation is a 
resymboHzation motivated by the demand that the knowledge 
thus symbolized be explained, or converted into a more 
subjectively satisfying form. In this way all explanatijons are 
interpretative and may be understood as the construction of 
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new knowledge.*^ 
I d i s a g r e e . I n t e r p r e t a t i o n f i n d s r a t h e r than makes 
knowledge. The meaning i s a co m b i n a t i o n o f : ( 1 ) what the author 
i n t e n d e d the meaning t o be; ( 2 ) what the reader's shared 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f what t h e words the au t h o r uses a c t u a l l y mean; 
and ( 3 ) what meaning t h e r e i s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n the symbolic 
o b j e c t t h a t can be r e a l i s t i c a l l y e x t r a c t e d from i t . I f every 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s a p e r s o n a l , s u b j e c t i v e r e s y m b o l i s a t i o n then 
' a n y t h i n g goes'. A l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , however l u d i c r o u s or 
i r r e l e v a n t , c a r r y equal w e i g h t , because they i n v o l v e a 
s u b j e c t i v e c o n s t r u c t . An example might i l l u s t r a t e t h i s . During 
my mock exam f o r A l e v e l E n g l i s h I was g i v e n an 'unseen' poem 
t o a n a l y s e and c r i t i c i s e . Unbeknownst t o me the poem I was 
g i v e n was a war poem about the b a t t l e o f Ypres. A l l I had t o go 
on was the t i t l e 'Wipers' ( t h i s , I l a t e r found out was the 
nickname g i v e n by the B r i t i s h Army f o r 'Ypres'). As a 
consequence of t h i s I i n t e r p r e t e d the poem t o be about someone 
whose car had broken down on a d e s o l a t e road somewhere. The 
p r o t a g o n i s t ' s misery was f u r t h e r compounded by the f a c t t h a t i t 
was r a i n i n g and h i s windscreen wipers were broken. I even 
managed t o c o n t r i v e some symbolic meaning, namely t h a t the the 
road was a metaphor f o r L i f e and the wipers were a symbol of 
H e l l . . . My i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was c o m p l e t e l y i r r e l e v a n t , b u t , 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , i t in f o r m e d my judgement t h a t the poem was 
p r e t t y d i r e . 
L e t us c o n s i d e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n terms o f the symbolic 
f u n c t i o n o f a r t . B l e i c h suggests t h a t a s c u l p t u r e i s o n l y a 
b l o c k o f s t o n e , i t i s n o t a symbolic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a man 
u n t i l someone i n t e r p r e t s i t as such. The ' r e a l o b j e c t ' of stone 
becomes the 'symbolic o b j e c t ' o n l y when i t i s i n t e r p r e t e d . I 
doubt t h i s , b u t , i f i t i s t r u e , does the same apply f o r music? 
I n response t o the s t r u c t u r a l i s t t h e o r i e s of Roland Barthes, 
Susanne K. Langer has c o n s t r u c t e d a t h e o r y of p r e s e n t a t i o n a l 
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symbols which a t t e m p t s t o e x p l a i n the n a t u r e o f a r t i s t i c 
e x p r e s s i o n as an a r t i c u l a t i o n o f ' f e e l i n g ' . Her t h e o r y compares 
the d i s c u r s i v e symbols o f language and p r o p o s i t i o n a l thought t o 
the p r e s e n t a t i o n a l symbols i n h e r e n t i n music and the symbols of 
' f e e l i n g ' and form i n h e r e n t i n a r t . According t o Langer, an 
a r t w o r k can o n l y be understood i n terms o f i t s symbolic 
f u n c t i o n . That i s : 
A word or mark used arbitrarily to denote or connote 
something may be called an assodatLve symbol, for its meaning 
depends entirely upon assodation.' 
Langer f i g h t s shy o f a c t u a l l y c o n c l u d i n g t h a t music, t o o , 
i s a language o f meaning - because i t does n o t have a 
v o c a b u l a r y w i t h f i x e d r e f e r e n c e and a s s o c i a t i o n - b u t she does 
i m p l y t h a t music can be unders t o o d . Along s i m i l a r l i n e s Nelson 
Goodman argues t h a t a r t i s as c o g n i t i v e as s c i e n c e , i n s o f a r 
as i t r e f e r s t o o b j e c t s t h r o u g h i t s f o r m a l s t r u c t u r e . These 
r e f e r e n c e s may be r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l , e x p r e s s i v e o r , a t h i r d 
t e r m , 'exemplary'. T h i s sounds more reasonable. However, b o t h 
Langer and Goodman argue t h a t i t i s unnecessary, indeed 
r e p e t i t i v e , t o e x p l a i n and j u s t i f y our un d e r s t a n d i n g o f symbols 
i n terms o f language - what Clean t h Brooks r e f e r s t o as 'the 
heresy o f paraphrase'. How, t h e n , are we t o c o n s t r u c t a method 
of e v a l u a t i o n , w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g c o n c e p t u a l , ' e x p l a n a t i o n s ' , 
g i v e n t h e p l u r a l i t y o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ? 
F e e l i n g s do n o t depend upon s e n s a t i o n s or even p e r c e p t i o n s 
b u t r a t h e r they depend upon c o n c e p t i o n s . Although some sensory 
i m p r e s s i o n s arouse c e r t a i n f e e l i n g s [examples o f these are 
g i v e n i n Chapter E l e v e n ] these f e e l i n g s do n ot have a f f e c t i v e 
f e e l i n g tones t h a t are t i m e l e s s l y c o n s t a n t . This i s because an 
e m o t i o n a l f e e l i n g i s a r e a c t i o n t o a t o t a l s i t u a t i o n as i t i s 
understood a t a g i v e n p e r i o d i n t i m e . An em o t i o n a l f e e l i n g 
t h e r e f o r e depends upon t h e e n t i r e c o n c e p t u a l meaning of the 
s t i m u l u s and n o t j u s t upon the a f f e c t i v e tone. The terras we 
use t o d e s c r i b e a r t w o r k s , and t o a r t i c u l a t e our a e s t h e t i c 
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i m p r e s s i o n s o f them, are s i m i l a r t o those we use t o d e s c r i b e 
t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e a r t w o r k t o i t s s u b j e c t m a t t e r . These might 
be a f f e c t i v e , e x p r e s s i v e , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l or f o r m a l . I n s o f a r 
as these terms a r e d e s c r i p t i v e , and t h e r e f o r e c o n c e p t u a l , they 
would seem t o r e q u i r e an e x e r c i s e o f reason r a t h e r than a 
s i m p l e e x e r c i s e o f t a s t e . I f t h e a b i l i t y t o e x e r c i s e reason i s 
l e a r n e d e m p i r i c a l l y then a r t i s t i c achievement can perhaps be 
e v a l u a t e d , on one l e v e l , by the study o f an a r t i s t ' s t e c h n i c a l 
a b i l i t i e s - t h a t i s , h i s or her a b i l i t y t o i m i t a t e and conform 
t o t h e s t y l i s t i c c o n v e n t i o n o f a g i v e n p e r i o d i n t i m e . 
But, a g a i n , as asked i n Chapter F i v e , what of i n n o v a t i v e 
a r t f o r which c o n c e p t u a l language does n o t y e t e x i s t ? 
L i k e Croce, R.G.Collingwood argues t h a t t r u e a e s t h e t i c 
e x p e r i e n c e i s autonomous i n t h a t i t i s an a c t o f pure 
c o n t e m p l a t i o n , t h a t i s , i t e x i s t s i n the i m a g i n a t i o n . The 
problem w i t h t h i s argument, a p p e a l i n g though i t may seem, i s 
s i m i l a r t o t h a t a l r e a d y encountered w i t h Langer and Goodman: 
namely, t h a t i n c o n t e m p l a t i n g a r t as_ ' a r t ' we have a l r e a d y 
t a k e n on board a concept. 
T h i s i s by no means an e x c l u s i v e l y modern c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
though. The P l a t o n i c 'Idea' c o u l d be s a i d t o be the f i r s t 
example o f t h i s r e a s o n i n g . L a t e r , i n the Middle Ages, St. 
A u g u s t i n e ' s s u g g e s t i o n - t h a t because our p e r c e p t i o n s of beauty 
i n v o l v e n o r m a t i v e judgements they are t h e r e f o r e not r e l a t i v e 
and must t h e r e f o r e have o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y - can be seen as a 
development of t h i s reasoning.° T h i s concept of i d e a l order has 
met i t s most s i g n i f i c a n t c h a l l e n g e w i t h the Modernist movement. 
I f , as P l a t o and S t . Augustine might suggest, we must have a 
concept o f what a r t i s b e f o r e we can r e c o g n i s e an o b j e c t as 
b e i n g an a r t o b j e c t , then how are we t o accommodate Duchamp's 
r a d i c a l c l a i m t h a t one of h i s o b j e t t r o u v e should be considered 
as an a r t o b j e c t ? Arguably we have t o r e d e f i n e our conceptions 
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of a r t i n o r d e r t o do t h i s - a l t h o u g h sorae might argue t h a t 
Duchamp's ready-mades are h i s t o r i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , but 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y t r i v i a l . Even so, whether we are acknowledging or 
denying Duchamp's work as ha v i n g a r t s t a t u s we must do so 
th r o u g h a r e c e i v e d t h e o r y o r concept o f a r t . Theories o f a r t 
enable us t o pay s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o those a r t o b j e c t s which 
we deem worthy o f our s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n . I f t h i s were not the 
case then we would f a l l v i c t i m t o the s c e n a r i o - much beloved 
of s a t i r i s t s - o f u n w i t t i n g l y c o n t e m p l a t i n g the mop and bucket 
l e f t i n t h e c o r n e r o f the g a l l e r y . The mop and bucket would 
become j u s t as worthy o r unworthy o f our a t t e n t i o n as Supper a t 
Emmaus because we would be unable t o j u s t i f y why we should pay 
a t t e n t i o n t o Supper a t Emmaus and n o t t o the mop and bucket. 
An i l l u s t r a t i o n o f how t h i s can happen concerns the a r t i s t 
Joseph Beuys whose s t u d i o was cleaned up by c l e a n i n g 
c o n t r a c t o r s a f t e r he d i e d i n 1986. One c l e a n i n g woraen threw out 
a p a l e o f grease which had been hanging frora the c e i l i n g , l a t e r 
t o be t o l d i t was a 'Work of A r t ' e n t i t l e d Grease Corner which 
was v a l u e d by a l e a d i n g German a r t d e a l e r a t 50,000 German 
marks! I t f o l l o w s t h e n , t h a t b e f o r e you can contemplate a r t 
you must have some c o n c e p t i o n o f what a r t i s . This argument 
presupposes a r a t i o n a l mind which i n t u r n suggests t h a t our 
a e s t h e t i c judgement i s something we l e a r n , l i k e language, 
t h r o u g h t h e i n t e l l e c t . As C h a r l t o n has s a i d : 'The f a c u l t y o f 
a e s t h e t i c d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s l e s s a k i n d o f s e n s i t i v i t y than a 
k i n d o f i n t e l l i g e n c e ' . 
Does t h i s b r i n g us any c l o s e r t o r e s o l v i n g Kant's antinomy 
of t a s t e ? A r g u a b l y , we can account f o r our a e s t h e t i c 
judgements, b u t can we account f o r our judgements o f t a s t e ? I n 
what way are the two forms o f judgement d i f f e r e n t ? 
I p o i n t e d out i n Chapter Three t h a t Kant proposes a 
mi d d l e course between these two p o s i t i o n s . He argues t h a t our 
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a e s t h e t i c judgement of t a s t e i s a s y n t h e s i s of our e m p i r i c a l , 
sensory p e r c e p t i o n s and our r a t i o n a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n c e p t i o n s . 
However, as I a l s o suggested i n Chapter Three, ' a e s t h e t i c 
judgement' i s something o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n terms. Perhaps 
t h i s apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n c o u l d be avoided i f ' a e s t h e t i c 
judgement' became a compound word, a e s t h e t i c - j u d g e m e n t , the 
meaning o f which was separate from the meaning of the 
i n d i v i d u a l words from which i t i s formed. Anyway, t h e r e i s no 
' r e a l ' c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I say t h i s because on one l e v e l our 
e x p e r i e n c e o f , and a p p r e c i a t i o n o f , an a r t w o r k i s a e s t h e t i c 
( e m p i r i c a l , i n s t i n c t i o n a l , s e n s a t i o n a l and i r r a t i o n a l ) ; and on 
a n o t h e r h i g h e r l e v e l i t i s judgemental ( r a t i o n a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l 
and c o n c e p t u a l ) . A r g u a b l y , anyone i s capable of r e a c h i n g the 
f i r s t , i n s t i n c t i v e l e v e l o f a p p r e c i a t i o n ; b u t i t i s o n l y a t the 
second, i n t e l l e c t u a l l e v e l t h a t an a r t w o r k begins t o take on 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e ( s y m b o l i c ) 'meaning'. Consequently, i t i s t o 
t h i s second l e v e l t h a t the c r i t i c should address him or 
h e r s e l f . T h i s i s because i t i s o n l y a t t h i s l e v e l t h a t the 
c r i t i c can g i v e a reasoned j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r h i s or her 
judgement. I f t h i s were n o t the case and t h e r e were o n l y one 
l e v e l ( a c c e s s i b l e t o everyone because, i n K a n t i a n terms, f r e e 
f rom c o n c e p t s ) then a e s t h e t i c judgements c o u l d be u n r e l i a b l e , 
a r b i t r a r y , i r r e l e v a n t , and r e l a t i v e , and y e t s t i l l be of 
u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y - and t h a t would be a c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n 
t e r m s ! ^ 
Does t h i s reassessment bear up t o my e a r l i e r assessment 
t h a t t he antinomy of t a s t e can be r e s o l v e d through 
compromise? I would say so. There may be some argument over 
t a s t e , b u t n o t a l l arguments w i l l be v a l i d . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , 
some arguments w i l l be b e t t e r than o t h e r s . May we not assume 
t h a t , f o r i n s t a n c e , S i r Roy Strong's judgements of a e s t h e t i c 
t a s t e w i l l have more c r e d i b i l i t y t h a n , say, Eddie 'The Eagle' 
Edwards'? 
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S t r u c t u r a l i s t s argue, r a t h e r o p t i m i s t i c a l l y , t h a t t h e r e i s 
no such t h i n g as an uninformed reader: even i f a reader i s o n l y 
b r i n g i n g i g n o r a n c e t o a t e x t , he or she s t i l l has knowledge of 
th e l i n g u i s t i c codes i n v i r t u e o f the f a c t t h a t he or she can 
r e a d . An u n s k i l l e d r e a d e r , however, w i l l n o t always be able 
t o comprehend the meaning of a t e x t . The u n s k i l l e d reader 
cannot s i m p l y immerse him or h e r s e l f i n a t e x t and expect i t t o 
speak d i r e c t l y t o h i s or her unconscious s e l f i n order t o 
s a t i s f y h i s or her a e s t h e t i c i n t e r e s t . But does the same apply 
t o p a i n t i n g ? Not everyone can read words, but s u r e l y everyone 
can read p i c t o r i a l images, or a t l e a s t a l l o w the images t o 
speak t o t h e i r unconscious s e l f ? What about the i l l i t e r a t e 
cavemen who p a i n t e d a t Lascaux some f i f t e e n thousand years ago? 
W e l l , perhaps p a i n t i n g i s a s p e c i a l case. As Gombrich has 
p o i n t e d out,-*-^ we do not read the shape of a j u g i n t o a 
n a t u r a l i s t i c Dutch s t i l l - l i f e p a i n t i n g , we simply r e c o g n i s e i t . 
Perhaps t h e n , the problem i s n o t so much the a b i l i t y t o read 
p a i n t i n g , b u t the a b i l i t y t o read ' i n t o ' . That i s , 
i n t e r p r e t . Most people can read an i l l u s i o n i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
of an o b j e c t i n n a t u r e , but not everyone can read an a b s t r a c t 
e x p r e s s i o n o f i t - w i t h o u t f i r s t r e - l e a r n i n g t h e i r 
' v o c a b u l a r y ' . 
A e s t h e t i c i a n s i n The Age o f Enlightenment considered t h a t 
t h r o u g h an adequate e d u c a t i o n a l l i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d be d i r e c t e d 
toward t h e same a e s t h e t i c v a l u e s . S u r e l y t h e r e i s some t r u t h i n 
t h i s . I f meaning can be s a i d t o be communicated through 
c o n v e n t i o n a l codes, s i g n s and symbols, then when these 
c o n v e n t i o n s are s u b v e r t e d or new s c a l e s and mediums (such as 
' t e x t u r e ' i n M o d e r n i s t p a i n t i n g , w i t h the impasto p a i n t medium 
b e i n g p a r t o f t h e message) are taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , then 
these codes must be m o d i f i e d , t h a t i s , r e - l e a r n e d , a c c o r d i n g l y . 
The immediate and i n t u i t i v e response t h a t Croce and 
C o l l i n g w o o d espouse would be most unrewarding i n t h i s c o n t e x t . 
A c c o r d i n g t o Croce, the a r t w o r k e x i s t s i n a mental i n t u i t i o n 
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grasped by an a c t o f a e s t h e t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I f t h i s were the 
case then i t would be p o s s i b l e f o r anyone t o respond t o an 
a r t w o r k on a p u r e l y emotive, c o n t e m p l a t i v e l e v e l . Furthermore, 
everyone c o u l d do so w i t h o u t needing t o - perhaps w i t h o u t being 
a b l e t o - a r t i c u l a t e why or how they respond as they do. But 
a g a i n , s u r e l y we must ask o u r s e l v e s whether or not i t i s u s e f u l 
o r r e l e v a n t t o t a l k o f a ' v a l i d ' a e s t h e t i c judgement which i s 
u n j u s t i f i a b l e , cannot be communicated ( a l t h o u g h perhaps mutely 
s h a r e d ) , and i s r e l a t i v e t o each i n d i v i d u a l - r e g a r d l e s s of h i s 
or her c u l t u r a l e x p e r i e n c e or i n t e l l e c t . 
What i f , f o r i n s t a n c e , P decides t h a t King Lear i s an 
u n s u c c e s s f u l p l a y because he has wrongly i n t e r p r e t e d i t as 
b e i n g an a l l e g o r y about the m a l p r a c t i c e s o f eye-surgeons i n 
E l i z a b e t h a n England? Alth o u g h a neo-Hegelian i n v e s t i g a t i v e 
j o u r n a l i s t might c o n s i d e r t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o be v a l i d 
(because i t r e f l e c t s an aspect of the m e n t a l i t y o f our age) he 
would have an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e t r y i n g t o persuade o t h e r people 
o f i t s r e l e v a n c e and u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y . S u r e l y , t h e n , we can 
l e g i t i m a t e l y t a l k i n terms of the o b j e c t i v e meaning of words, 
t h a t i s , t h e i r s t a n d a r d meaning and accepted usage. This 
n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t s t he number of p o s s i b l e , r e l e v a n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . We share the meaning o f language w i t h the 
a u t h o r s who employ i t , t h e meanings of the words can thus be 
s a i d t o be d e t e r m i n a t e and o b j e c t i v e . The way we i n t e r p r e t the 
meaning o f these words i s n o t a r b i t r a r y e i t h e r . As E.D. H i r s c h , 
J r . has suggested, ^ -^  t h e r e are two e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g normative 
i d e a l s t h a t can be appealed t o : the a u t h o r ' s meaning and the 
b e s t meaning. These may n o t be the same, i n which case the 
c r i t i c who suggests the b e s t meaning becomes the author of the 
b e s t meaning. H i r s c h a l s o suggests t h a t the meaning of a t e x t 
does n o t change, i t i s f i x e d . I t i s the s i g n i f i c a n c e £f the 
meaning which i s i n f l u x from age t o age and person t o person. 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e the s i g n i f i c a n c e , n o t the meaning, t h a t i s 
r e l a t i v e . V a l i d i t y , f o r H i r s c h , i m p l i e s the correspondence of 
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an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o a meaning which i s r e p r e s e n t e d by the 
text.-*-^ A f t e r a l l , lawyers win or l o s e cases a c c o r d i n g t o the 
p r e c i s i o n w i t h which they d e f i n e t h e i r terms and appeal t o 
s t r i c t d e f i n i t i o n s . They o f t e n appeal t o what a 'reasonable' 
man would take the words t o mean. Perhaps i n t h i s sense i t i s 
p o s s i b l e t o come c l o s e t o a ' c o r r e c t ' , t h a t i s , v a l i d 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a l i t e r a r y t e x t or p a i n t i n g . T h i s does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t t h e r e i s o n l y one d e t e r m i n a t e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , o n l y t h a t some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are going t o be 
more a p p r o p r i a t e than o t h e r s . I n h i s essay Must the C r i t i c be 
C o r r e c t ? , R i c h a r d W. L i n d argues a g a i n s t t h i s view by 
s u g g e s t i n g t h a t i t does n o t f o l l o w t h a t j u s t because t h e r e are 
m i s r e a d i n g s t h e r e must be c o r r e c t r e a d i n g s . W e l l , perhaps n o t . 
But L i n d f a i l s t o a l l o w t h a t j u s t because the best p o s s i b l e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n cannot n e c e s s a r i l y be determined, i t does not 
f o l l o w t h a t we cannot determine t h a t some i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are 
b e t t e r than o t h e r s . I t might be t h a t the ' c o r r e c t ' 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s t h e one i n t e n d e d by t h e au t h o r or a r t i s t , i t 
does n o t f o l l o w , however, t h a t t h i s i s the 'best' 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , o r a b e t t e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n than any o t h e r . 
There may be an i n d e f i n i t e number of b e t t e r or worse 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and the most a e s t h e t i c a l l y v a l u a b l e one might 
be t h a t which combines the ' c o r r e c t ' a u t h o r ' s i n t e n t i o n w i t h 
t h e most r e l e v a n t of the ' b e t t e r ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . 
L i n d goes on t o argue, however, t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l l y 
d e t e r m i n e d meanings are merely necessary, n o t s u f f i c i e n t , f o r a 
coh e r e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the a r t work as a whole. I would go 
a l o n g w i t h t h i s i f what he means by i t i s t h a t a r e l e v a n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n might h e l p us t o understand a work of a r t . I f 
t h i s i s the case P c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y say ' I l i k e what I know' 
as oppose t o ' I know what I l i k e ' . I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s i m p l y 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and u n d e r s t a n d i n g , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , c o u l d be s a i d 
t o i m p l y enjoyment. But i s everyone f i t t e d w i t h a s i m i l a r 
c a p a c i t y f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g and enjoyment? P o s s i b l y n o t . I t i s 
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p o s s i b l e t h a t some people have never had, nor never w i l l have, 
an a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e o r emotion and, presumably, i t would be 
d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n t o such a person what an a e s t h e t i c 
e x p e r i e n c e or emotion i s l i k e . I'm not sure I have. I l i k e t o 
t h i n k I have b u t , i n the absence o f a vocabulary f o r 
d e s c r i b i n g , comparing, and communicating the way I f e e l , I have 
no r e a l way o f knowing whether or n o t my a e s t h e t i c experiences 
have been o f the same i n t e n s i t y and p r o f u n d i t y as everyone 
e l s e s ' . Thus a l t h o u g h a e s t h e t i c judgements qua emotional 
responses are h i g h l y i m p o r t a n t , they do n o t o f f e r us any 
i n s i g h t s as t o t h e cause o f the e m o t i o n a l e f f e c t ; v i z . the 
n a t u r e o f a r t (because a l t h o u g h f a c i a l expressions may r e g i s t e r 
t he e f f e c t , i n the absence o f reasons, the cause cannot be 
a d e q u a t e l y d e t e r m i n e d , a r t i c u l a t e d , and u n d e r s t o o d ) . I t i s t o 
a e s t h e t i c judgements qua c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s t h a t we must l o o k 
i n search o f such i n s i g h t s . 
A l t h o u g h I b e l i e v e i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n t o someone 
what an a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e i s l i k e , t h i s i s n o t t o say t h a t 
you cannot suggest ways and means by which someone might 
improve t h e i r chances o f d i s c o v e r i n g f o r themselves what i t i s 
l i k e . C e r t a i n b a s i c elements of a p p r e c i a t i o n can be t a u g h t . 
Consider Roger Fry's i n t e r e s t i n g analogy t o the p r i n c i p l e o f 
the w i r e l e s s . Fry suggests t h a t we can r e g a r d the a r t i s t as 
t r a n s m i t t e r , t he a r t o b j e c t as the medium, and the s p e c t a t o r as 
the r e c e i v e r . For the message t o work, he argues, the s p e c t a t o r 
must be ' t u n e d - i n ' t o the t r a n s m i t t e r . When the r e c e i v i n g 
i n s t r u m e n t i s crude and i m p e r f e c t , and the message complex, 
t h e n o n l y p a r t o f the message w i l l be r e c e i v e d and the 
r e c e i v e r can o n l y respond t o e x t r e m e l y b a s i c and v i o l e n t 
t r a n s m i s s i o n s . ^ ^ I f we pursue Fry's analogy we c o u l d say t h a t 
as an i n d i v i d u a l ' s a e s t h e t i c t a s t e s become more s o p h i s t i c a t e d , 
so h i s or her r e c e i v e r becomes more f i n e l y tuned. I n t h i s 
r e g a r d i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d be s a i d t o a t t a i n c u l t u r a l m a t u r i t y -
t h a t i s , the c a p a c i t y f o r the f u l l a e s t h e t i c experience - by 
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r e a l i s i n g t he f u l l a e s t h e t i c p o t e n t i a l o f an a r t w o r k [ c f . 
Ingarden's t h e o r y o f degrees o f c o n c r e t i o n ] . I n t h i s r e g a r d 
they might be l i k e c h i l d r e n r e a c h i n g m a t u r i t y i n a d u l t h o o d . 
A l s o i n t h i s r e g a r d , our t o l e r a n c e t h r e s h o l d f o r e a s i l y - f o u n d 
emotions, such as the s e n t i m e n t a l i t y and n o s t a l g i a o f c h o c o l a t e 
box a r t , i s lowered. An analogy w i t h the m a t u r i n g of c u l i n a r y 
t a s t e s c o u l d a l s o be u s e f u l l y made here. During c h i l d h o o d we 
have a s w e e t - t o o t h b u t i n a d u l t h o o d our t a s t e s develop and 
mature so t h a t we p r e f e r more s p i c y , savoury foods. To put i t 
c r u d e l y , people who have an a e s t h e t i c experience or emotion 
from c o n t e m p l a t i n g s o f t - f o c u s photographs of wide-eyed k i t t e n s ; 
o r from r e a d i n g Barbara C a r t l a n d n o v e l s ; or from (easy) 
l i s t e n i n g t o James L a s t r e c o r d i n g s , can be s a i d t o be 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y r e t a r d e d . As I mentioned e a r l i e r though, t h i s 
may n o t be a case o f h a v i n g a permanent t a s t e - h a n d i c a p , i t 
might be t h a t the p o t e n t i a l f o r development has simply not been 
r e a l i s e d . As Gombrich amusingly put i t : 
Whether we are writers, critics or painters, we are aH apt to 
forget that not everyone shares our knowledge and our past 
experience. But without such sharing, messages will die on the 
way from transmitter to receiver, not because we f a i l to be 
'attuned', but simpLy because there is nothing there to relate 
them tQ. Neither communication nor expression can function in 
a void.-*-^ 
Perhaps, t h e n , i t i s an a r t i c l e o f f a i t h t o b e l i e v e an 
a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e or emotion i s p o s s i b l e , and indeed t h a t i t 
i s even b e n e f i c i a l . I t might be t h a t such an emotion i s not 
p o s s i b l e and t h a t , as w i t h the Emperor's c l o t h e s , everyone 
b e l i e v e s c e r t a i n a r t w o r k s are good and c e r t a i n a r t w o r k s bad 
because everyone e l s e b e l i e v e s them t o be good or bad. Without 
c o n c e p t s , though, we do n o t have the t o o l s t o c h a l l e n g e such an 
absurd s u g g e s t i o n . To re-phrase Beardsley: w i t h o u t concepts a l l 
we a r e l e f t w i t h i s a d e f i n i t i o n o f good a r t as b e i n g t h a t 
which i s produced by good a r t i s t s who are good a r t i s t s i n 
v i r t u e of t h e i r h a v i n g produced good a r t . 
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By way o f c o n c l u s i o n t o t h i s c h a p t e r , i t should perhaps 
be accepted t h a t an a e s t h e t i c judgement should not be r e c e i v e d 
second hand, b u t , a l s o , t h a t c e r t a i n people do not have the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l c a p a c i t y - or a t l e a s t have not been adequately 
t r a i n e d - t o have a f u l l a e s t h e t i c experience or emotion f o r 
themselves. T h i s begs the q u e s t i o n : Should they be allowed t o 
undermine the s t a t u s t h a t a g i v e n p l a y , p a i n t i n g or symphony 
has as a good work o f a r t - as c o n f e r r e d upon i t by a c u l t u r a l 
e l i t e ? I t h i n k n o t . The ' f a u l t ' may be i n the p e r c e p t i o n of the 
consumer and n o t i n the competence of the producer or the 
q u a l i t y o f the p r o d u c t . I n the next chapter I s h a l l c o n s i d e r 
the e x t e n t t o which our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of a work of a r t are i n 
r e f e r e n c e t o i t s o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s . 
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S i b l e y ' s T h e o r y o f O b j e c t i v e 
P r o p e r t i e s 
I n t h e 1930s C.W. M o r r i s r a i s e d two i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n : 
( 1 ) I f an a r t o b j e c t can be a s i g n o f i t s e l f - t h a t i s , i f i t 
can i n v i t e us t o pay a t t e n t i o n t o i t f o r i t s own sake - can i t 
n o t a l s o be s a i d t o be a s i g n o f i t s p r o p e r t i e s ? ( 2 ) I f i t s 
a e s t h e t i c v a l u e i s one of i t s p r o p e r t i e s can the a r t o b j e c t be 
s a i d t o be a s i g n t h a t d e s i g n a t e s a value? To M o r r i s ' s two 
q u e s t i o n s might be added a t h i r d : ( 3 ) Are t h e r e a f i n i t e s et of 
i d e n t i f i a b l e p r o p e r t i e s which c o n s t i t u t e a e s t h e t i c value? I n 
t h i s and the n e x t c h a p t e r I s h a l l o f f e r answers t o the f i r s t 
two q u e s t i o n s and e x p l a i n why an answer t o the t h i r d q u e s t i o n 
cannot be r e a l i s t i c a l l y a t t e m p t e d . 
A r g u a b l y , t he most i n f l u e n t i a l and p r o v o c a t i v e e x p o s i t i o n 
of t h i s s u b j e c t t o have appeared i n r e c e n t years i s F.N. 
S i b l e y ' s essay O b j e c t i v i t y and A e s t h e t i c s . ^ I n t h i s essay 
S i b l e y throws down the o b j e c t i v i s t g a u n t l e t by c a l l i n g f o r an 
e x a m i n a t i o n o f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f a e s t h e t i c 
terms. There i s , he argues, a l e g i t i m a t e comparison t o be made 
between these and the terms used i n c o l o u r judgements: t h a t i s , 
i f we accept o b j e c t i v i t y i n the l a t t e r case, then we ought to 
accept i t i n the for m e r . 
S i b l e y addresses h i m s e l f t o the commonly-held assumption 
t h a t where p r o o f i s i m p o s s i b l e t h e r e can be no o b j e c t i v i t y -
t h a t i s , w i t h o u t p r o o f we are unable t o e s t a b l i s h the t r u t h or 
f a l s i t y o f an a e s t h e t i c judgement. He asks whether we a c t u a l l y 
need t o t e s t these p r o o f s ' f u l l y and s u c c e s s f u l l y ' , t h a t i s , 
c o n c l u s i v e l y , i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h a v a l i d judgement. Perhaps, 
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he argues, 'general agreement' w i l l s u f f i c e : 
. . . a realm of objectivity might be made possible by some limited (not 
widespread) actual agreement including some settled and virtually 
indisputable cases, together with a perhaps elaborate and hard to describe 
procedure that offers the possibility, by envisageabLe ways, of attaining 
wider agreement.'^ 
S i b l e y suggests t h a t an a e s t h e t i c term, l i k e ' g r a c e f u l ' , 
connote's dependent p r o p e r t i e s - whereas a c o l o u r term, l i k e 
b l u e , does n o t . Colour, r a t h e r , i s a simple p r o p e r t y on which 
we must a l l agree ( e x c e p t i n g those who are c o l o u r b l i n d ) . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , i t may be p o s s i b l e f o r us t o say we know t h a t the 
c o l o u r o f a g i v e n o b j e c t i s b l u e w i t h o u t b e i n g a b l e t o say why 
we know. To paraphrase S i b l e y ' s s u p p o s i t i o n : dependent 
a e s t h e t i c p r o p e r t i e s make a s i m i l a r l y d i r e c t appeal t o 
agreement, hence any p r o o f s o f f e r e d - as t o the v a l i d i t y of any 
g i v e n a e s t h e t i c term - appeal n o t t o o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s , but t o 
g e n e r a l agreement. We can agree on c o l o u r s and o t h e r prima 
f a c i e o b j e c t i v e m a t t e r s w i t h o u t p r o o f , t h e r e f o r e we should be 
a b l e t o agree on a e s t h e t i c terms w i t h o u t needing p r o o f . 
One weakness w i t h S i b l e y ' s analogy between c o l o u r concepts 
and a e s t h e t i c concepts i s t h a t a e s t h e t i c p r o p e r t i e s admit of 
degrees i n a way i n which c o l o u r s do n o t . Thus p a i n t i n g A may 
be deemed ' g r a c e f u l ' compared t o p a i n t i n g B b u t not compared t o 
p a i n t i n g C. For the c o l o u r term 'blue' t o be m e a n i n g f u l l y 
a p p l i e d , though, t he o b j e c t i n q u e s t i o n must be b l u e a c c o r d i n g 
t o some n o n - r e l a t i v e s t a n d a r d . But perhaps t o argue t h i s i s t o 
miss S i b l e y ' s p o i n t . His analogy i s a u s e f u l one i n s o f a r as 
c o l o u r s are deemed t o be o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s even though, l i k e 
a e s t h e t i c p r o p e r t i e s , they are n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e d t o 
exp e r i e n c e and t h e r e f o r e t o a s u b j e c t . 
But what counts as an a e s t h e t i c term? Are ' b e a u t i f u l ' , or 
' u g l y ' , f o r i n s t a n c e , a e s t h e t i c terms i n the same sense as 
' g r a c e f u l ' i s ? L e t us c o n s i d e r t h i s q u e s t i o n i n l i g h t of 
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p r e v i o u s comments I have made about Kant. Kant would argue t h a t 
on one l e v e l they are n o t the same, because, f o r him, something 
e i t h e r i s b e a u t i f u l or i s n o t . On t h i s l e v e l the terra b e a u t i f u l 
does n o t admit o f degrees. Nor does i t r e q u i r e comparison w i t h 
o t h e r n o n - b e a u t i f u l t h i n g s i n o r d e r t o be rendered m e a n i n g f u l . 
I n t h e K a n t i a n sense, beauty i s n e i t h e r r e l a t i v e t o the o b j e c t 
nor t h e s u b j e c t , b u t r a t h e r i s u n i v e r s a l t o the e x t e n t t h a t 
everyone ought t o s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i s e i t as being a p r o p e r t y 
o f the form of the o b j e c t . I n t h i s sense Kant i s able t o c l a i m 
t h a t judgements of a e s t h e t i c t a s t e which i n v o l v e the 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d c o n t e m p l a t i o n of the b e a u t i f u l are 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e and t h e r e f o r e u n i v e r s a l . On another l e v e l , 
however, Kant c l a i m s t h a t beauty does admit of degrees (as 
i m a g i n a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g may be i n raore or l e s s harmonious 
i n t e r a c t i o n ) seemingly w i t h o u t g oing back on h i s c l a i m t h a t 
i n d i v i d u a l a e s t h e t i c judgements are non-comparative. He does 
t h i s t h r o u g h c l a i m i n g t h a t t o r e c o g n i s e t h a t A i s more 
b e a u t i f u l than B depends on an a b i l i t y t o r e c o g n i s e beauty i n A 
and beauty i n B s e p a r a t e l y . Thus i t i s not l i k e r e c o g n i s i n g 
t h a t A i s b i g g e r than B which i s a t r u e comparative judgement 
i n v o l v i n g c o m p a r ative or r e l a t i v i s t i c terms. 
Now, can t h i s be a p p l i e d t o comparisons of c o l o u r ? 
L e a v i n g a s i d e the c o m p l i c a t i o n s i n v o l v e d w i t h shade and tone 
( p a l e - b l u e as opposed t o navy-blue, f o r i n s t a n c e ) can we not 
say the c o l o u r b l u e does not admit of degrees? I f p a i n t i n g A 
i s c o l o u r e d b l u e i t i s s t i l l g o i ng t o remain b l u e when i t i s 
compared t o p a i n t i n g s B and C. I t w i l l n o t suddenly become l e s s 
b l u e i n a way t h a t one f i g u r e might seem l e s s ' g r a c e f u l ' when 
compared t o another one. How, t h e n , i f a t a l l , i s the non-
r e l a t i v i t y o f c o l o u r d i f f e r e n t frora t he n o n - r e l a t i v i t y of 
beauty? Kant would argue t h a t t h e r e i s a w o r l d of d i f f e r e n c e -
i n t h a t c o l o u r i s r e l a t e d t o c o n t e n t w h i l s t beauty i s r e l a t e d 
t o f o r m . But, f o r reasons a l r e a d y mentioned, I f i n d Kant's 
account u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
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Consider ag 
L a r g e l y due t o 
a i n the 
Kant's 
o b j e c t i o n 
legacy i t 
I r a i s e d i n Chapter Four, 
i s assumed t h a t a e s t h e t i c 
judgement i s concerned e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h the p l e a s u r a b l e 
c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f non-dependent beauty. A l t h o u g h 'the b e a u t i f u l ' 
may be c a l l e d d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s - ' a e s t h e t i c v a l u e ' f o r 
i n s t a n c e , o r perhaps what B e l l l a t e r c a l l e d ' s i g n i f i c a n t form' 
- i t i s always c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a s s o c i a t i o n s o f mystery, i t i s 
an e s o t e r i c q u a l i t y c o n t a i n i n g 'Factor X'. I t i s , i n s h o r t , 
i n d e f i n a b l e and e l u s i v e . 
Osborne suggests t h a t c o r r e c t c r i t i c a l judgements should 
be made a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s o f beauty, b u t not t o 
o t h e r s . R i g h t e r has summarised Osborne's p o s i t i o n t h u s : 
The investigation of beauty is to be carried on in two ways: first by 
examining tine states of mind involved in the appreciation of beauty in 
works of art, and second by examining the objective properties in worte of 
art which are connected with this mental state. This latter is the search 
for the true nature of the 'objective beauty-property' - which after 
careful consideration is identified with the formd. dements in a work of 
art - with the arrangement of its parts into a coherent whole. Beauty is, 
in fact, the property of being an organic whole for perception, a whole 
that is normally of great complexity and intricate organization, and . . . 
the greater this complexity of elements organized, the greater the 
beauty.-^ 
The q u e s t i o n now t o be asked i s t h i s : How i s t h i s 
' o b j e c t i v e b e a u t y - p r o p e r t y ' d i f f e r e n t from o t h e r a e s t h e t i c 
terms which are d e s c r i p t i v e o f p r o p e r t i e s ('harmony', 
'elegance', ' l u c i d i t y ' , 'grace', ' i n t e n s i t y ' , ' c o m p l e x i t y ' , 
' u n i t y ' , ' u g l i n e s s ' , ' d u l l n e s s ' , ' s u b l i m i t y ' , and so on)? 
A r g u a b l y , what they have i n common i s t h a t they are a l l e i t h e r 
commendatory or d i s c r i m i n a t o r y , and can a l l be a p p l i e d i n a 
( n e u t r a l ) d e s c r i p t i v e way - and y e t , a t the same t i m e , the 
words themselves are the judgement. 'This p a i n t i n g i s complex' 
can be t r e a t e d as a statement o f f a c t - perhaps by comparing 
the complex p a i n t i n g w i t h a 'simple' p a i n t i n g . Now, a Kanti a n 
m i g h t argue t h a t t h e statement ' t h i s p a i n t i n g i s b e a u t i f u l ' 
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can a l s o be f a c t u a l , b u t not demonstrably so because we do not 
u n d e r s t a n d beauty i n terras of a comparison w i t h u g l i n e s s . 
R ather, the argument goes, beauty i s n o t r e l a t i v e t o the 
o b j e c t , i t i s r e l a t i v e t o the s u b j e c t ( i n the eye of the 
b e h o l d e r ) and i s ' f a c t u a l ' t o the e x t e n t t h a t everyone ought t o 
agree w i t h i t . Even i n t h i s new c o n t e x t the d i s t i n c t i o n b e ing 
d i s c u s s e d i s s t i l l t h a t between a e s t h e t i c terms qua responses 
o f t a s t e and a e s t h e t i c terms qua c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s . 
S i b l e y accepts t h a t t h e r e might be l i m i t e d disagreement 
because even though a e s t h e t i c p r o p e r t i e s are emergent they 
must be n o t i c e d i n ' i n t e r r e l a t i o n ' . However, he a l s o p o i n t s out 
t h a t c e r t a i n people might be u n w i l l i n g or unable t o a t t e n d 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y , so t h a t disagreement would r e s u l t , even though, 
w i t h a t t e n t i o n and t r a i n i n g , agreement ought t o occur. But, f o r 
S i b l e y , the apprehension of phenomenological p r o p e r t i e s 
r e q u i r e s a s p e c i a l s o r t o f s e n s i t i v i t y as w e l l as t r a i n i n g . * 
S i b l e y argues t h a t agreement i n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s not a r b i t r a r y 
t h a t i s , n o t dependent on c e r t a i n mental or emotional 
e x p e r i e n c e s - i n v i r t u e o f the e x t e n t t o which we d£ agree: 
Some people, I am saying, when they develop certain everyday capacities 
and acquire a diversity of not uncomraon experience and knowledge, 
exhibit a tendency to raake sirailar discrirainations.^ 
S i b l e y goes on t o n o t e , however, t h a t o t h e r people w i t h 
a p p a r e n t l y s i m i l a r knowledge and experience - and, of course, 
those who do n o t have the knowledge and experience - siraply do 
n o t agree. T h i s i s because, he p r o v o c a t i v e l y suggests, sorae 
people are i n c u r a b l y i n s e n s i t i v e , j u s t as some people are 
i n c u r a b l y c o l o u r - b l i n d : 
What we do not know is whether, by continuing efforts, we might pIVit a 
large measure of agreement in the majority of people, or whether many 
simply lack the latent capacities. Educators on art appredation assurae the 
former; history may suggest the latter. 
P u r s u i n g h i s c o l o u r - b l i n d n e s s analogy S i b l e y suggests t h a t 
i f an e l i t e o f such a e s t h e t i c connoisseurs were t o e x h i b i t a 
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f a i r l y c o n s t a n t degree o f agreement, over s e v e r a l g e n e r a t i o n s 
- t h a t i s , an e l i t e t h a t l e g i t i m a t e l y a p p l i e s 'the t e s t of 
t i m e ' - then i t would e s t a b l i s h a p o s s i b l e standard of 
judgement. I t i s w o r t h q u o t i n g S i b l e y a t some l e n g t h on t h i s 
p o i n t : 
We may therefore regard much existing difference in dLsccLmination as 
irrelevant. I t is not the majority being colour-sighted that permits a 
property language for colours, but the existence of a nucleus (large or 
small) making regular, detailed and closely identical distinctions. And as 
the 'opinions of the colour-blind can be ignored, so, in aesthetics, we can 
concentrate on the perceptive 'elite' group, even i f i t is a minority; for i f 
we are dealing with properties, we shall be no more interested in the 
'opinions' and 'disagreements' of people who cannot or can only fitfully 
recognize them than in those of people who evince no interest at aH in 
aesthetic matters.' 
T h i s seems t o be a not unreasonable s u g g e s t i o n . I f the 
p r o p e r t i e s o f a g i v e n a e s t h e t i c term are o b j e c t i v e l y p r e s e n t i n 
the a r t o b j e c t , then a member of the p e r c e p t i v e e l i t e group 
c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y p o i n t t o a g i v e n p r o p e r t y - such as a curved 
l i n e s u g g e s t i n g ' g r a c e f u l n e s s ' - and use t h i s as a form of 
' p r o o f ' t o s u p p o r t the r a t i o n a l argument he or she g i v e s i n 
s u p p o r t o f h i s or her i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and e v a l u a t i o n . One 
seemingly unanswerable q u e s t i o n t h a t t h i s r a i s e s though, i s 
t h i s : How can we know what c o l o u r another person i s 
e x p e r i e n c i n g when he p o i n t s t o a c e r t a i n o b j e c t ? We can only 
know what the o t h e r person says he i s e x p e r i e n c i n g . I n t h i s 
sense c o l o u r s can o n l y be s a i d t o be s o c i a l l y o b j e c t i f i e d , 
pace W i t t g e n s t e i n and the P r i v a t e Language argument. 
Perhaps, t h e n , i t i s m i s l e a d i n g f o r S i b l e y t o speak of 
the ' p r o o f o f an a e s t h e t i c judgement which simply c o n s i s t s i n 
p o i n t i n g t o those f e a t u r e s upon which the the a e s t h e t i c 
p r o p e r t i e s supervene. I t i s more c o m p l i c a t e d than t h a t . 
P o i n t i n g may be a s a t i s f a c t o r y way of i n d i c a t i n g c o l o u r , but 
not a e s t h e t i c v a l u e . P o i n t i n g i n and of i t s e l f does not i n v o l v e 
r e a s o n i n g . I n Chapters F i v e and Seven I proposed t h a t a 
degree of ' p r o o f might be found i n the r e l e v a n c e of the 
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which i n f o r m the judgement and t h a t such 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e r e l e v a n t reasons f o r t h a t 
judgement. L e t me develop t h i s p o i n t . Arguably, t h e r e are t h r e e 
forms o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : one concerns an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the 
s y m b o l i c meaning o f the c o n t e n t ; another i n v o l v e s the 'way' i n 
which we a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v e an o b j e c t (as w i t h the d u c k / r a b b i t 
phenomenon); w h i l s t another i n v o l v e s the use of a e s t h e t i c 
terms i n r e l a t i o n t o the form . . . I n the f i r s t two cases a 
K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h e r might argue t h a t the judgement of a e s t h e t i c 
v a l u e has l i t t l e t o do w i t h the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of - and 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f - meaning. This i s because, he or she would 
argue, an a r t w o r k i s n o t an i n s t r u m e n t o f knowledge, r a t h e r , i t 
i s concerned w i t h t h e p l e a s u r a b l e c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f the form. 
However, as I have suggested i n the t h i r d i n s t a n c e , 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n need n o t always be concerned w i t h 'meaning'. I t 
c o u l d be argued t h a t i f I o f f e r a commendatory c r i t i c a l 
e v a l u a t i o n o f a p a i n t i n g I might do so on the grounds t h a t I 
c o n s i d e r i t s form t o be ' g r a c e f u l ' . T h i s c o u l d apply as much t o 
an a b s t r a c t p a i n t i n g as t o a n a r r a t i v e p a i n t i n g [perhaps i n 
v i r t u e o f the G e s t a l t phenomenon I s h a l l go on t o discuss i n 
Chapter E l e v e n ] . To s u b s t a n t i a t e my c l a i m I c o u l d p o i n t t o an 
example of a p a i n t i n g t h a t I c o n s i d e r e d t o be ' g r a c e l e s s ' . Such 
a comparison would c o n s t i t u t e a r e l e v a n t reason f o r a p p l y i n g 
the term ' g r a c e f u l ' . Now, t h e r e i ^ an element of r e l a t i v i t y 
i n v o l v e d i n such a s c e n a r i o , b u t t h i s need not l e a d us down the 
n i h i l i s t i c road t o s u b j e c t i v i t y . P a r t o f t h i s r e l a t i v i t y l i e s 
i n t h e assumption t h a t grace i s always a commendatory term 
i n d i c a t i n g p o s i t i v e a e s t h e t i c v a l u e . T h i s need not be so. 
' G r a c e f u l ' as r e p r e s e n t e d i n a f r i v o l o u s , s i c k l y - s w e e t Rococo 
p a i n t i n g may be a p e j o r a t i v e term. Elsewhere, i n Picasso's 
b r u t a l l y fragmented images, ' g r a c e f u l ' may simply be deemed 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e . Again, i t would seem t h a t these terms are 
c o n t e x t - b o u n d , perhaps a c c o r d i n g t o genre, and - another sense 
i n which i t might be r e l a t i v e - depending upon the comparisons 
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t h a t are made . . . as i n the case of p a i n t i n g A being 
g r a c e f u l compared w i t h p a i n t i n g B but not C.^ 
O b v i o u s l y , much here depends upon the o n t o l o g i c a l s t a t u s 
we accord t o the a r t w o r k b e i n g d i s c u s s e d . Problems w i l l a r i s e 
i f we are d i s c u s s i n g music s c o r e s , b u t even i n such p r o b l e m a t i c 
cases s u r e l y the p r i n c i p l e s t i l l a p p l i e s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t o 
i n d i c a t e t o someone which p a r t i c u l a r passage of music you wish 
t o e v a l u a t e . I t i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d enough t o 
' e x p l a i n ' why the m u s i c a l c l i m a x t o Wagner's T r i s t a n und I s o l d e 
can be i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms o f a sexual c l i m a x . The e v o c a t i o n 
of mood i n music i s perhaps somewhat t r i c k i e r t o e x p l a i n . Can 
we say t h a t a g i v e n p i e c e of music i t s e l f expresses melancholy, 
i n c o n t r a s t t o i t b e i n g the composer who i s expressing 
melancholy? Music can be s a i d t o ' o b j e c t i v e l y ' express 
melancholy i n a m e t a p h o r i c a l sense, t h a t i s , the music c o u l d be 
s a i d t o have c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e ' p r o p e r t i e s ' which evoke 
f e e l i n g s o f melancholy i n the l i s t e n e r . On the o t h e r hand, 
perhaps t h e melancholy belongs t o the i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t who 
l i s t e n s t o the music. The q u e s t i o n i s , can we i d e n t i f y c e r t a i n 
passages o f music which are m e l a n c h o l i c - or which we recognise 
as b e i n g capable o f evoking f e e l i n g s o f melancholy - w i t h o u t 
n e c e s s a r i l y f e e l i n g the melancholy ourselves? What we a c t u a l l y 
f e e l about a p i e c e o f music ( t h e s u b j e c t i v e f e e l i n g s t h a t the 
music evokes) may n o t correspond w i t h the o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s 
we a t t r i b u t e t o i t . I can say ' t h i s music i s m e l a n c h o l i c ' even 
i f i t does n o t make me, p e r s o n a l l y , f e e l melancholy. I can a l s o 
go on t o g i v e reasons f o r t h i s judgement along the l i n e s of 
' t h i s music i s m e l a n c h o l i c because i t i s slow and the tones are 
muted'. [To be e x p l a i n e d i n Chapter Eleven] 
I f , on the o t h e r hand, the s u b j e c t i v i s t p o s i t i o n i s taken 
t o i t s l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n we can say t h a t the o b j e c t of 
p e r c e p t i o n i s n o t even needed because i t o n l y serves as a 
c a t a l y s t o f an a e s t h e t i c response [pace Croce's view t h a t the 
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a r t o b j e c t i s merely the occasion o f the a r t ] . According t o 
t h i s ' r a d i c a l ' s u b j e c t i v i s t view, such a c a t a l y s t would n o t be 
necessary because i t i s the e x p e r i e n c e , not the o b j e c t or i t s 
p r o p e r t i e s , which c o n s t i t u t e s the a e s t h e t i c v a l u e . Because such 
e x p e r i e n c e i s independent o f o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s , any o b j e c t 
can be accorded a r t s t a t u s , by anyone, r e g a r d l e s s of the degree 
t o which they are i n t e l l e c t u a l l y and p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y i l l -
e q uipped. But how, i t must be asked, c o u l d a s u b j e c t i v i s t 
account f o r o b j e c t i v e phenomena ( i n t e l l e c t u a l - s e n s u a l s t i m u l i : 
s e mantic, f o r m a l , s y m b o l i c , and h i s t o r i c a l ) which are e x t e r n a l 
t o t h e p e r c i p i e n t , but which, n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n f l u e n c e our 
judgements? I f the s u b j e c t i v i s t p o s i t i o n i s c o r r e c t , such 
phenomena sho u l d n o t e x i s t - i n s o f a r as they do, s u b j e c t i v i s m 
i m p l i e s consequences t h a t c o n t r a d i c t the known 'evidence'. Such 
'evidence' can be s a i d t o be ' f a c t u a l ' i n v i r t u e of the 
o b j e c t i v i t y of S i b l e y ' s a e s t h e t i c terms. 
I t seems reasonable f o r S i b l e y t o t a l k of c e r t a i n 
a e s t h e t i c terms b e i n g f a c t u a l and c o r r e c t , i n s o f a r as he i s 
p r epared t o d e f i n e what he means by ' f a c t ' . A ' f a c t ' , f o r 
S i b l e y , i s t h a t which a nucleus o f people (an e l i t e ) agree upon 
when they a p p l y a g i v e n a e s t h e t i c terra t o a s p e c i f i c o b j e c t . ^ 
Thus i n r e s p e c t o f c o l o u r s we can agree enough (by p o i n t i n g to 
a range of c o l o u r p e r c e p t i o n s and by r e f e r r i n g t o the 
s c i e n t i f i c laws which govern these p e r c e p t i o n s ) t o c l a i m t h a t 
we are d e a l i n g w i t h f a c t s . I n a s i m i l a r sense t h e r e can be 
enough agreement t o v a l i d a t e a c l a i m t h a t c e r t a i n a e s t h e t i c 
terms are a p p l i c a b l e t o c e r t a i n p a i n t i n g s . 
A b y - n o w - f a m i l i a r o b j e c t i o n needs t o be r e c o n s i d e r e d here. 
The n o t i o n of an a e s t h e t i c e x p e r t , or e l i t e o f e x p e r t s , i s o n l y 
u s e f u l i f i t can be d e f i n e d w i t h o u t c i r c u l a r i t y [ c f . Hume's 
'competent j u d g e ' i n Chapter Two]. Thus i t i s f u t i l e t o d e f i n e 
the e x p e r t as one who u s u a l l y makes c o r r e c t judgements si n c e i t 
i s t h e same e x p e r t who has t o decide which judgements are 
Page 116 of 192 Nigel Famdale 
Objective Properties Chapter Eight 
c o r r e c t . Other q u a l i f i c a t i o n s 
These a r e , I have suggested. 
have 
t h a t 
t o be taken i n t o account, 
'good' judgements are those 
t h a t are a d e q u a t e l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d w i t h r e l e v a n t reasons, and 
which have s u r v i v e d p r o t r a c t e d d i s p u t e s , t h a t i s , have s u r v i v e d 
t h e t e s t o f t i m e . Thus we can say t h a t , a l t h o u g h T o l s t o y and 
Ruskin a r e c o n s i d e r e d t o be e x p e r t s , T o l s t o y ' s c r i t i c i s m s of 
King Lear and Ruskin's of W h i s t l e r have n o t w i t h s t o o d the t e s t 
o f t i m e . 
A new o b j e c t i o n i s t h i s : I t i s n o t enough t h a t any group 
o f people who c o n s i s t e n t l y agree i n t h e i r judgements should 
count as e x p e r t s . I t a l l depends upon t h e i r reasons f o r j u d g i n g 
as they do. Thus teenyboppers might be c o n s i d e r e d the best 
judges o f those pop groups which most appeal t o t h e i r age 
group. Teenyboppers might be more s e n s i t i v e t o the p r o p e r t i e s 
t h a t go t o make up a good teenybopper r e c o r d than an a d u l t 
might be. For i n s t a n c e , a good pop r e c o r d might be one i n which 
t h e l y r i c s are s h a l l o w and s e n t i m e n t a l , and which has a c a t c h y , 
r e p e t i t i v e , s y n t h e s i s e d 4/4 b e a t . Thus c i t i n g these p r o p e r t i e s 
a teenybopper might v a l i d a t e h i s or her judgement t h a t a K y l i e 
Minogue r e c o r d i s good o f i t s k i n d . As b e f o r e , t h i s does lead 
t o a k i n d o f r e l a t i v i s m , b u t not one t h a t n e c e s s a r i l y takes us 
down the road t o s u b j e c t i v i t y . Such g e n e r i c or c o n t e x t u a l 
judgements have, themselves, t o be taken i n c o n t e x t . Thus we 
can argue t h a t w h i l s t K y l i e Minogue's s i n g l e I Should Be So 
Lucky might be a good example o f i t s k i n d , i t s k i n d i s not 
p a r t i c u l a r l y 'good'. T h i s c o u l d be demonstrated by comparing 
i t w i t h a r e c o r d i n g of Wagner's Tannhauser. A teenybopper might 
h a t e the Wagner r e c o r d i n g , c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t i t i s b o r i n g and 
d e p r e s s i n g and t h a t a l l c l a s s i c a l music 'sounds the same', but 
t h i s may be because the teenybopper i s i n s e n s i t i v e t o the 
nuances o f Wagner's music. L i k e w i s e , an ' e x p e r t ' on c l a s s i c a l 
(Romantic) music may be i n s e n s i t i v e t o the q u a l i t i e s o f pop 
music. I n a s i m i l a r sense he or she may be unable t o 
d i s c r i m i n a t e between d i f f e r e n t examples, but a t l e a s t i n a l l 
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p r o b a b i l i t y he or she w i l l be a b l e t o a p p r e c i a t e why a 
teenybopper c o n s i d e r s K y l i e Minogue t o be good - the r e v e r s e , 
however, i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e . The p o i n t i s t h i s : a l t h o u g h 
someone may be an e x p e r t i n a p a r t i c u l a r genre (opera) t h i s 
does n o t q u a l i f y him or her t o assume e x p e r t i s e i n o t h e r genres 
(such as pop) b u t by the same token j u s t because a song such as 
I Should Be So Lucky i s c o n s i d e r e d t o be good of i t s k i n d t h i s 
does n o t mean t h a t i t s k i n d shares a s i m i l a r s t a t u s t o o t h e r 
' k i n d s ' such as opera. On the c o n t r a r y , i n many r e s p e c t s ( t o o 
numerous t o l i s t h e r e ) t he operas o f Wagner can be s a i d t o be 
v a s t l y s u p e r i o r t o the pop songs of K y l i e Minogue. W h i l s t i t i s 
m i s l e a d i n g t o compare pop music w i t h Romantic opera. Pop A r t 
w i t h Renaissance a r t , T e l e v i s i o n ' s i t c o m ' w i t h Greek Tragedy, 
i t i s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , p o s s i b l e t o c l a i m t h a t , a c c o r d i n g t o 
c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c standards o f e x c e l l e n c e , c e r t a i n forms are 
s u p e r i o r o r i n f e r i o r t o o t h e r s . I t c o u l d be argued, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , t h a t Wagner's Tannhauser i s ' g r e a t e r ' than K y l i e 
Minogue's I Should Be So Lucky, i n s o f a r as the c r i t e r i a f o r 
j u d g i n g 'Great Music' should n o t be t h a t i t has 'shallow and 
s e n t i m e n t a l l y r i c s , w i t h a r e p e t i t i v e , s y n t h e s i s e d 4/4 beat', 
b u t r a t h e r t h a t i t should be ' s p i r i t u a l l y and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
e l e v a t i n g , and have a c a p a c i t y t o produce a p r o f o u n d l y 
r e w a r d i n g a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e i n the l i s t e n e r ' . Again, t o make 
another cheap and obvious comparison, S h i r l e y Conran i s a 
b e t t e r w r i t e r o f p u l p f i c t i o n than I r i s Murdoch, but g e n e r a l l y . 
I r i s Murdoch i s a b e t t e r ' l i t e r a r y ' w r i t e r - w i t h the c r i t e r i a 
f o r ' b e t t e r ' here b e i n g , more i n t e l l e c t u a l l y r e w a r d i n g , and 
more a e s t h e t i c a l l y p l e a s i n g from a l i t e r a r y p o i n t - o f - v i e w . One 
of the problems w i t h t h i s method of j u d g i n g a c c o r d i n g t o 
canons i s l i k e t h a t o f the c h i c k e n and the egg. Do our reasons 
f o r j u d g i n g something t o be good determine what s h a l l be i n the 
canon, or does the canon determine the reasons? Did A r i s t o t l e 
s e t o u t a f o r m u l a f o r good tragedy and then decide which p l a y s 
conformed t o i t , o r d i d he (as i s more l i k e l y the case) watch 
e x i s t i n g good t r a g e d i e s and then t r y t o analyse what p r o p e r t i e s 
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they had i n common? Perhaps these are unanswerable q u e s t i o n s . 
They do, however, b r i n g us c l o s e r t o r e s o l v i n g the p e r e n n i a l 
and t h o r n y q u e s t i o n o f what t o do i f two members o f such an 
e l i t e o f e x p e r t s d i s a g r e e . Consider S i b l e y a g a i n : 
What concerns us is the state of affairs, including occasional 
disagreements, within the nucleus who largely agree. For i t is here -
roughly speaking, amongst professional and lay critics through the ages 
(by virtue of whose broad agreement we classify them as critics) - that 
genuine disagreements without significant parallel in the realm of colours 
may occur (though, of course, no ^ a r p line divides the nucleiis from the 
rest; the fully colour-sighted, too, shade into the mildly colour-
defective.-'-^ 
There i s no c l e a r - c u t s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem, but 
perhaps we can take c o n s o l a t i o n i n the e x t e n t t o which t h e r e i£ 
agreement. S i b l e y reasons t h a t because t h e r e i s a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
amount o f s t a b l e consensus then i t i s f a r from c l e a r t h a t the 
e x i s t e n c e o f u n r e s o l v e d disagreements i s a c o n c l u s i v e argument 
a g a i n s t o b j e c t i v i s m . 
I t has been suggested by, among o t h e r s , T.S. E l i o t ( i n 
h i s essay The F u n c t i o n o f C r i t i c i s m ) t h a t the c r i t i c should 
overcome h i s p e r s o n a l p r e j u d i c e s and 'compose h i s d i f f e r e n c e s 
w i t h as many o f h i s f e l l o w s as p o s s i b l e , i n the common p u r s u i t 
o f t r u e judgement'. Agreement and disagreement may take v a r i o u s 
forms b u t i t i s no argument t o say t h a t j u s t because c r i t i c s do 
d i s a g r e e t h i s undermines the occasions when t h e r e i s agreement. 
Be t h i s as i t may, some c r i t i c s , such as Ducasse,^-'- dismiss 
agreement as b e i n g merely the occasions on which c r i t i c s judge 
a l i k e because they are c o n s t i t u t e d a l i k e . Ducasse argues t h a t 
c r i t i c s are c o n s t i t u t e d a l i k e because they are s u b j e c t e d t o the 
s o r t o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r e s s u r e a p p r o p r i a t e t o the c a u s a t i o n of 
such a judgement. S u r e l y though, i n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s defence of 
s u b j e c t i v i t y Ducass 
c o r n e r . I f s o c i a l c 
judgement cannot 
c o n d i t i o n e d a l i k e 
ie has, as i t were, p a i n t e d h i m s e l f i n t o a 
c o n d i t i o n i n g determines a judgement then the 
be s u b j e c t i v e because everyone who i s 
w i l l judge a l i k e and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e i r 
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judgements w i l l take on an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e or q u a s i - o b j e c t i v e 
v a l i d i t y . T h i s i s because, a l l o t h e r t h i n g s being equal, 
everyone i n l i k e c i r c u m s t a n c e 'ought' t o a r r i v e a t the same 
judgement. As Jonathan C u l l e r has argued, even though e x p e r t s 
may d i s a g r e e about meaning t h i s should n o t undermine the f a c t 
t h a t they f o l l o w a common s e t of i n t e r p r e t a t i v e c o n v e n t i o n s : 
A primary task of the study of reading is to describe the operations 
responsibLe for the interpretations we find plausible.^ 
I n s e c t i o n f i v e o f h i s essay S i b l e y t u r n s t o the c o r r e c t 
a p p l i c a t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c ( p r o p e r t y ) terms or concepts. He asks: 
sh o u l d these concepts make demands f o r agreement - or 
e x p l a n a t i o n where agreement i s l a c k i n g - as p a r t of t h e i r 
l o g i c ? From t h i s i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n S i b l e y asks two f u r t h e r 
q u e s t i o n s : i ) Should we use a e s t h e t i c concepts w i t h elements o f 
an o b j e c t i v e l o g i c , r e q u i r i n g some agreement and e x p l a n a t i o n s 
o f disagreement? and i i ) i f so, then are we able t o f i n d some 
agreement and some workable e x p l a n a t i o n s o f disagreement? 
S i b l e y a l l o w s t h a t peoples' o p i n i o n s do change b u t , he 
argues, t h i s does n o t make the c h o i c e o f which group of people 
- t h a t i s , which e l i t e should d i s c e r n which p r o p e r t i e s and 
d e f i n e which terms - an a r b i t r a r y c h o i c e . Rather, he argues, 
the c h o i c e i s no more a r b i t r a r y than i s our choi c e over c o l o u r . 
Everyone accepts t h e concept of b l u e as b l u e , and red as r e d . 
S i b l e y c o n s i d e r s c o l o u r s t o be a paradigm of p r o p e r t i e s . He 
argues t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e behind these p r o p e r t i e s a p p l i e s t o 
o t h e r l e s s r i g i d c oncepts. Consequently, as w i t h c o l o u r s , the 
' i s ' o f the a t t r i b u t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c terms i s t i e d t o the group 
a b l e t o agree r e g u l a r l y on the maximum of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s . 
S i b l e y concludes t h a t some a e s t h e t i c judgements may, i n t h i s 
sense, be r i g h t or wrong, apt or i n a p p r o p r i a t e , t r u e or f a l s e -
bu t t h a t , because no r e a l p r o o f can be o f f e r e d , a l l we have t o 
go on i s n u c l e a t e concepts. The judgements of t h i s n u c l e u s , he 
argues, may not be unanimous, b u t t h i s does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y 
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i m p l y s u b j e c t i v i t y . I t merely i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e should be 
f u r t h e r s p e c i f i c d e f i n i n g o f the a e s t h e t i c terms being used. 
I n h i s essay O b j e c t i v i t y and A e s t h e t i c s , M i c h a e l Tanner 
argues t h a t S i b l e y ' s d i s t i n c t i o n here i s between o b j e c t i v e -
concepts and response-concepts. U n i v e r s a l agreement i s n o t , 
a c c o r d i n g t o t h i s view, a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r o b j e c t i v i t y : 
inasmuch as everyone might agree on the a p p l i c a t i o n of a term 
l i k e ' g r a c e f u l ' w i t h o u t a c t u a l l y a g r e e i n g on what ' g r a c e f u l ' 
means. As S i b l e y p u t s i t : 
For us to be using a word as a property term, i t is required that, to be 
using i t correctly, people must (not merely may) in certain circumstances 
apply i t to m ore or less, the sa m e cases ... A personal response concept 
makes no such demand.-'-^  
Tanner takes i s s u e w i t h t h i s . He argues t h a t an e l i t e 
group whose c o l o u r or a e s t h e t i c d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s happen to 
c o i n c i d e , may o n l y be one of many p o s s i b l e ' e l i t e s ' . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , he argues, t o say t h a t an o b j e c t i s a p a r t i c u l a r 
c o l o u r i s t o say no more than t h a t one group c a l l s i t t h a t 
p a r t i c u l a r c o l o u r . Another group might c a l l i t a d i f f e r e n t 
c o l o u r , by v i r t u e o f the s i m i l a r i t i e s and c o n t r a s t s t h a t they 
p e r c e i v e between i t and another o b j e c t . Tanner assumes from 
t h i s t h a t b o t h groups cannot be r i g h t , b u t q u e s t i o n s whether or 
no t i t i s a c t u a l l y p o s s i b l e t o determine which group i s wrong. 
I would argue t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e . I suggested e a r l i e r i n 
t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t n o t a l l e l i t e s shared the same s t a t u s - as i n 
the case o f the teenyboppers. I would a l s o argue t h a t i t i s 
p o s s i b l e t o have more than one e l i t e which can make d i f f e r i n g 
though r e l a t i v e l y v a l i d ' p a n a e s t h e t i c ' judgements. [ l s h a l l 
e l a b o r a t e on t h i s concept i n the next c h a p t e r . ] What does i t 
mean t o say t h a t a judgement i s v a l i d ? I t need n o t mean t h a t a 
g i v e n judgement i s d e f i n i t i v e , u n i v e r s a l and a b s o l u t e f o r e v e r . 
Rather, a judgement c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a g i v e n c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n 
may be s o c i a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t o t h a t c u l t u r e f o r a g i v e n p e r i o d 
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o f t i m e . Community A might r e c o g n i s e c e r t a i n values which 
Community B r e j e c t s or i s unaware o f ; or community A may have 
s i m i l a r v a l u e s t o Community B but order them accor d i n g t o a 
d i f f e r e n t h i e r a r c h y . I n b o t h communities the judgements they 
make may be, t o use t h a t troublesome word, ' r e l a t i v e l y ' v a l i d . 
That i s , u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d f o r a l l members of t h i s s p e c i f i e d 
group a c c o r d i n g t o the e x t e n t t o which the judgements are 
p a n a e s t h e t i c . T h i s i s not t o assume, however, t h a t the 
judgement o f each i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i n the comraunity w i l l be 
s i m i l a r l y v a l i d . The i n d i v i d u a l i s n ot n e c e s s a r i l y a microcosm 
o f the community. I n the next chapter I s h a l l pursue t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e o f ' r e l a t i v e o b j e c t i v i t y ' f u r t h e r . I s h a l l a l s o 
p r e s e n t o t h e r o b j e c t i o n s t o S i b l e y ' s t h e o r y and determine how 
e f f e c t i v e l y t hey can be c o u n t e r e d . 
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I n p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s I have argued t h a t d e f i n i t i o n s of 
a r t are c u l t u r a l l y dependent, and t h a t they cannot t h e r e f o r e be 
t r u l y u n i v e r s a l . But i f they are n o t u n i v e r s a l then what 
becomes o f the ' t e s t o f t i m e ' I have a l s o argued f o r ? I s each 
age c u l t u r a l l y d i f f e r e n t from p r e c e d i n g ages? I s the past 
another c o u n t r y , 'they do t h i n g s d i f f e r e n t l y there'? For the 
most p a r t I suspect i t i s , b u t t h i s need not undermine my 
argument. Can we n o t accept t h a t when two d i f f e r e n t ages, or 
two d i f f e r e n t communities w i t h i n the same age, agree or 
d i s a g r e e about t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n s of a r t t h a t b o t h can be 
e q u a l l y , t h a t i s , r e l a t i v e l y c o r r e c t ? T h i s i s n o t t o l i c e n c e a 
f u l l - b l o w n t h e o r y o f r e l a t i v i s m , r a t h e r i t i s i n t r o d u c e the 
concept I w i s h t o d i s c u s s i n t h i s c h a p t e r : v i z . r e l a t i v e 
o b j e c t i v i t y . 
There may be c e r t a i n e x p l a n a t i o n s as t o why Community A 
has a d i f f e r e n t s e t of v a l u e s t o Community B. I n Chapter S i x , 
f o r i n s t a n c e , I suggested reasons why music i s c u l t u r e -
dependent. But t h e r e are o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s : coraraunity A may 
have a more advanced l e v e l of knowledge about t h e o r i e s of a r t , 
about t h e h i s t o r y o f the a r t s , and about c e r t a i n p s y c h o - s o c i a l 
aspects of a r t r e c e p t i o n . Community B's e m o t i o n a l - c o g n i t i v e 
c a p a c i t i e s may be unequal t o those of Comraunity A. There may be 
a d i v e r s i t y o f c u l t u r a l and a r t i s t i c t r a d i t i o n s between 
Communities A and B. Coraraunity B raay have d i f f i c u l t y i n 
d i s c e r n i n g p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t i e s of o b j e c t - p r o p e r t i e s and i n 
a r t i c u l a t i n g t he k i n d s o f a e s t h e t i c values corresponding to 
these q u a l i t i e s . 
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I t might be t h a t i f these two communities - each w i t h 
t h e i r own r e l a t i v e l y v a l i d v a l u e systems - came i n t o c o n t a c t 
w i t h one another i t would be p o s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t one 
v a l u e system was s u p e r i o r t o another (perhaps i n terms of 
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n , m a t u r i t y , s e n s i t i v i t y , and e c l e c t i c i s m ) . This 
c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d a l o n g the l i n e s s e t out i n Chapters Six 
and Seven, v i z . t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of language or a r t 
' s t a t e m e n t s ' may be e i t h e r v a l i d or i n v a l i d ; a l s o i n Chapter 
E i g h t v i z . the s u p e r i o r i t y o f Wagner over K y l i e Minogue. 
E m p i r i c a l data - such as sensual o b s e r v a t i o n s or i n t e l l e c t u a l -
a n a l y t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of f o r m a l 
s t r u c t u r e s and symbols - may be r e f e r r e d t o i n order t o 
e s t a b l i s h t h i s v a l i d i t y or i n v a l i d i t y . The two communities 
would have t o c a r r y out t h e i r e v a l u a t i o n s under i d e n t i c a l 
c o n d i t i o n s . The v a l u e s of one community (A) c o u l d then perhaps 
accommodate or subsume the values of another ( B ) . I t would not 
n e c e s s a r i l y m a t t e r i f B d i d not accept t h a t i t s values were 
i n f e r i o r t o those of A - they may do g i v e n time - what would be 
i m p o r t a n t would be t h a t A had become aware of the values of B 
and had s u b s e q u e n t l y e i t h e r d i s m i s s e d them, through s t r e n g t h of 
argument, or subsumed them, or even exchanged them i n 
p r e f e r e n c e t o some of t h e i r own v a l u e s . An example of t h i s 
might be the accommodation of p r i m i t i v e ideas and symbols i n 
T w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y a r t . I n t h i s r e s p e c t i t may a l s o be p o s s i b l e 
t o suggest ways i n which the l i t e r a r y m e r i t s or shortcomings of 
Salman Rushdie's The S a t a n i c Verses can be considered 
o b j e c t i v e l y . Community A (Western, l i b e r a l and d e m o c r a t i c ) may 
c o n s i d e r the book t o have a e s t h e t i c v a l u e a c c o r d i n g t o c r i t e r i a 
X, y and z. These might be such t h i n g s as complex f o r m a l 
s t r u c t u r e and u n i t y , s o p h i s t i c a t e d n a r r a t i v e t e c h n i q u e , and 
p r o f o u n d s y m b o l i c or a l l e g o r i c a l c o n t e n t . Community B ( i s l a m i c 
f u n d a m e n t a l i s t ) may c o n s i d e r i t t o have no a e s t h e t i c v a l u e 
whatsoever, a c c o r d i n g t o one c r i t e r i o n (w) o n l y : v i z . t h a t i t s 
c o n t e n t can be i n t e r p r e t e d as b e i n g blasphemous. We c o u l d say, 
t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a judgement which i s r e l a t i v e t o a s p e c i f i c 
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frame o f r e f e r e n c e may, n e v e r t h e l e s s , be r e l a t i v e l y o b j e c t i v e . 
Thus, i f judgement X i s v a l i d f o r Community A and judgement Y 
f o r Community B, judgements X and Y may not be o b j e c t i v e l y 
v a l i d w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n ; b u t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , X i_s v a l i d f o r 
A and Y i_s v a l i d f o r B.^ Might i t be p o s s i b l e , t h e r e f o r e , t o 
c o n s t r u c t a continuum o f p a n a e s t h e t i c v a l u e ? ^ Zero c o u l d 
r e p r e s e n t a e s t h e t i c a l l y n e u t r a l o b j e c t s ; r i g h t of zero c o u l d 
r e p r e s e n t p o s i t i v e v a l u e s ; and l e f t o f zero c o u l d r e p r e s e n t the 
re a l m o f n e g a t i v e v a l u e s . P o s i t i v e values c o u l d be i d e n t i f i e d 
w i t h t h e absence of c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y n e g a t i v e ones. I n the case 
of The S a t a n i c Verses i t s l i t e r a r y v a l u e c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d 
a c c o r d i n g t o a r a t i o o f t h r e e p o s i t i v e values ( x , y and z) to 
one n e g a t i v e v a l u e ( w ) . A s i r a i l a r p r i n c i p l e has been proposed 
by C h i l d : 
I t is the group predispositions to which the social -historical 
relativity of esthetic value has reference. I t is the group 
predispositions, „ moreover, which concretize the objective 
ground in generaL 
B l e i c h a p p l i e s t h i s p r i n c i p l e t o knowledge i n a broader 
sense: 
I f two individuals are obligated to one another, they are in 
the same community. The pedagogical relationship in pursuit of 
common knowledge incurs a mutual obligation to either 
synthesize the knowledge or to form a new coraraunity defined 
by other coraraon knowledge.^ 
How does t h i s r e l a t i v i t y p r i n c i p l e square w i t h the the o r y 
of o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s and concepts? To r e t u r n t o Tanner, I 
suspect t h a t h i s problem i s t h a t he i s drawing the wrong 
c o n c l u s i o n s from S i b l e y ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between o b j e c t i v e -
concepts and response-concepts.^ A f t e r a l l , i n proposing a 
' p r o p e r t y t h e o r y ' S i b l e y i s f o l l o w i n g i n a d i s t i n c t i v e 
t r a d i t i o n i n Western a e s t h e t i c s . According t o the p h i l o s o p h e r s 
o f A n c i e n t Greece, f o r i n s t a n c e , good works of a r t have an 
i n t r i n s i c , o b j e c t i v e v a l u e p r o p e r t y . E i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y 
t h e o r i s t s h e l d t h a t good works o f a r t have a p r o p e r t y , or set 
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o f p r o p e r t i e s , which are i n s t r u m e n t a l i n occasioning 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d p l e a s u r e - p l e a s u r e b e i n g v a l u a b l e . ^ Consider, 
a l s o , t he account o f beauty t h a t Thomas Reid o f f e r s as an 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o Kant's. L i k e S i b l e y , Reid contends t h a t beauty 
i s a p r o p e r t y o f the b e a u t i f u l o b j e c t . I t i s i m p o s s i b l e , he 
argues, t o p e r c e i v e t he beauty o f an o b j e c t w i t h o u t p e r c e i v i n g 
t h e o b j e c t , o r , a t l e a s t , c o n c e i v i n g i t . ^ He makes a u s e f u l 
d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i m a r y p r o p e r t i e s which an o b j e c t has i n 
i t s e l f , independent of an observer and which are t h e r e f o r e 
o b j e c t i v e (such as s i z e , shape, s o l i d i t y , s o f t n e s s , and 
hardness) and t e r t i a r y o r secondary p r o p e r t i e s which i n v o l v e 
i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h an observer (such as c o l o u r s , t a s t e s and 
s m e l l s ) . A c c o r d i n g t o James Manns, Reid's terms are borrowed 
from Locke who c o n s i d e r e d t h a t the s e n s a t i o n we have of an 
o b j e c t i s occasioned by a p r i m a r y p r o p e r t y and t h a t t h i s 
corresponds t o our idea o f the o b j e c t . I n terms of the 
C a r t e s i a n mind-matter d u a l i t y t he p r i m a r y p r o p e r t i e s are an 
o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f m a t t e r whereas the t e r t i a r y p r o p e r t i e s 
need t o be expe r i e n c e d and so are a s u b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n o f 
mind.^ Reid b e l i e v e s t h a t we can have d i r e c t and t h e r e f o r e 
o b j e c t i v e c o n t a c t w i t h r e a l i t y t h r o u g h the pri m a r y p r o p e r t i e s . 
There i s a s u b t l e d i s t i n c t i o n here between ideas and 
s e n s a t i o n s . Sensations a c t as signs which i n f o r m an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t , and, as such, they 
f u n c t i o n s i g n i f i c a n t l y - b u t t h i s does n o t mean t h a t they are 
i d e a s . I n o t h e r words, we become d i r e c t l y aware of a r t o b j e c t s 
t h r o u g h t he s e n s a t i o n s which s i g n i f y them.^ This seems 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t he h e d o n i s t i c view h e l d by c e r t a i n post-war 
Anglo-American a e s t h e t i c i a n s t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements do not 
r e f e r t o c l a s s e s o f o b j e c t s or c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s or emotions, 
b u t r a t h e r t o the way c e r t a i n o b j e c t s appear t o the senses. 
Now, as Osborne argues, i f our a e s t h e t i c experience can be 
reduced t o h a v i n g p l e a s a n t s e n s a t i o n s , and i f p l e a s u r a b i l i t y 
can be c o n s i d e r e d t he one and o n l y c r i t e r i o n of a e s t h e t i c 
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judgement, t h i s s t i l l does n o t account f o r the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
o f t h e appearance o f c e r t a i n o b j e c t s t h a t make them b e t t e r a ble 
t o h o l d our a t t e n t i o n , e l e v a t e us, engross us, t r a n s p o r t us, 
and so f o r t h , f o r the o b j e c t ' s own sake r a t h e r than f o r the 
sake o f the s u b j e c t . I f t h i s were n o t the case then a e s t h e t i c s 
would be reduced t o the s o l i p s i s m o f p e r s o n a l t a s t e , and a l l 
t h a t would remain would be the s t a t i s t i c a l or s o c i o l o g i c a l 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p e r s o n a l , s u b j e c t i v e preference.-'-^ I n o t h e r 
words, i f a r t i s o n l y concerned w i t h p l e a s u r e then i t w i l l 
n e c e s s a r i l y be a s u b j e c t i v e e n t e r p r i s e . But i t i s n o t . A 
h i e r a r c h y o f a r t cannot be determined s o l e l y a c c o r d i n g t o 
p l e a s u r a b i l i t y , I n such a case, as Ingarden has p o i n t e d o u t , i t 
would be the s u b j e c t ' s p l e a s u r e not the work of a r t t h a t was 
b e i n g v a l u e d . Furthermore, because the s u b j e c t raay have 
d i f f e r e n t responses o f p l e a s u r e t o the o b j e c t a t d i f f e r e n t 
t imes and i n d i f f e r e n t moods, n o t o n l y w i l l h i s judgement be 
r e l a t i v e i t w i l l a l s o be h o p e l e s s l y s u b j e c t i v e . This assumption 
° t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements are based upon the e x p e r i e n c i n g of 
p l e a s u r e - i s a legacy o f Kant's assumption t h a t a e s t h e t i c 
judgements a r e based e x c l u s i v e l y on 'the b e a u t i f u l ' . I n the 
l a s t c h a p t e r I q u e s t i o n e d the supposed s u b j e c t i v i t y of 
a e s t h e t i c terms such as ' g r a c e f u l ' , now I s h a l l attempt to 
answer the q u e s t i o n t h a t has been l e f t begging: I s beauty an 
o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t y ? A c c o r d i n g t o Reid, beauty i s a p r o p e r t y 
which i s s e p a r a t e from b o t h p r i m a r y and t e r t i a r y p r o p e r t i e s -
because b o t h of these are siraple whereas beauty i s r e l a t i o n a l 
and complex. However, as Manns puts i t : 
Our judgements as to the beauty of things are as systematic 
in attributing the beauty to the thing as our judgements of 
perception are in attributing qualities to the thing . , . and 
systematic attribution , , , is held to stand as its own 
justification,-'--^ 
I f Manns a l s o assumes here t h a t comprehension i s p a r t of 
a p p r e h e n s i o n , meaning t h a t you can say not o n l y t h a t you know 
an o b j e c t i s b e a u t i f u l , b u t a l s o t h a t you can say why you know, 
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then i t must be assumed t h a t the p r o p e r t i e s being r e f e r r e d t o 
are p r i m a r y ones, i n f o r m i n g t e r t i a r y ones.^^ Now, two forms 
which our c r i t i c i s m might take are the f a c t u a l - d e s c r i p t i v e and 
the n o r m a t i v e - e v a l u a t i v e . The d e s c r i p t i v e assumes t h a t o t h e r s 
can see, or be persuaded thr o u g h s t r e n g t h of argument t o see, 
an o b j e c t as you see i t ( s e e i n g a s ) ; the e v a l u a t i v e assumes 
t h a t c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s o f the appearance o f an o b j e c t can be 
r e f e r r e d t o ( s e e i n g ) . O n e o f the problems w i t h t h i s view, 
however, i s t h a t e v a l u a t i o n i s based upon comparison - the idea 
o f d e f i n i n g a r t by example [Chapter S i x ] ; or by c l a i m i n g an a r t 
work t o be good as an example o f i t s k i n d [Chapter Four] -
and, as such, denies the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the value of an 
a r t w o r k i s r e l a t e d t o the uniqueness o f the p r o p e r t i e s we 
d e s c r i b e by way o f c i t i n g reasons f o r our e v a l u a t i o n . Osborne: 
Evaluation involves comparison of particulars under a common 
description and things canipt be evaluated in respect of 
features in which each is unique. 
Elsewhere, •'•^  S i b l e y has argued t h a t when an a e s t h e t i c 
p r o p e r t y i s r e f e r r e d t o i n an a e s t h e t i c judgement, an a e s t h e t i c 
concept i s used. When t h i s a e s t h e t i c concept i s a p p l i e d , an 
a e s t h e t i c term i s used. And when an a e s t h e t i c terra i s c o r r e c t l y 
used, the user has e x e r c i s e d h i s or her t a s t e - t h a t i s , he or 
she has been p e r c e p t i v e , s e n s i t i v e and d i s c r i m i n a t i n g . To use 
S i b l e y ' s example o f the a e s t h e t i c term ' g r a c e f u l ' : i f someone 
were t o r e f e r t o a curved l i n e as b e i n g ' g r a c e f u l ' then t h a t 
would r e q u i r e an e x e r c i s e o f t a s t e , whereas i f someone were t o 
si m p l y say ' t h a t i s a curved l i n e ' then t h a t would n o t . 
Ted Cohen c r i t i c i s e s t h i s as being an a r t i f i c i a l 
d i s t i n c t i o n . • ' • ^ He argues t h a t you do not need t a s t e i n order t o 
ap p l y t h e term ' g r a c e f u l ' . P o s s i b l y n o t , b u t , a r g u a b l y , you do 
need t a s t e i n o r d e r t o apply the term a p p r o p r i a t e l y . Cohen goes 
on t o c r i t i c i s e S i b l e y by making, what he assumes t o be, an 
u n f a v o u r a b l e comparison w i t h Hume's t h e o r y o f t a s t e . Both, 
Cohen argues, ask whether and how judgements of t a s t e can be 
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s u p p o r t e d . Whereas Hume r e f e r s t o the j o i n t v e r d i c t of ' t r u e 
j u d g e s ' , S i b l e y r e f e r s t o a ' p e r c e p t i v e e l i t e ' . Both c o n s i d e r 
t a s t e t o be a s p e c i a l c a p a c i t y t o n o t i c e ( d e l i c a c y of t a s t e ) 
and, i n Hume's case, a c a p a c i t y t o f e e l ( d e l i c a c y of p a s s i o n ) . 
S i b l e y ' s (and Hume's) problem, as Cohen sees i t , i s t h a t 
a l t h o u g h some p r o p e r t i e s are i_n the o b j e c t , some, such as 
beauty and sweetness, are not i n the o b j e c t , as such. Rather, 
they are i n the s entiment o f the s u b j e c t . Could, then, two 
' t r u e j u d g e s ' n o t i c e the same t h i n g s i n the o b j e c t but ' f e e l ' 
d i f f e r e n t responses t o them? Presumably they c o u l d . I t would 
seem, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t a d i f f e r e n c e of a f f e c t i v e response t o an 
o b j e c t i m p l i e s a d i f f e r e n c e o f p e r c e p t i o n . On the o t h e r hand, 
i n t h e o r y i f n o t i n p r a c t i c e , i t i s p o s s i b l e and i m p o r t a n t t o 
d i s t i n g u i s h t h e p u r e l y sensory from the a f f e c t i v e . Two people 
might b o t h s u c c e s s f u l l y d e t e c t the b i t t e r n e s s of an o l i v e but 
whereas one enjoys the f l a v o u r , the o t h e r does n o t . S i m i l a r l y , 
even though we can say t h a t a e s t h e t i c p r o p e r t i e s are emergent 
or s u p e r v e n i e n t , and though we can s t i l l agree on a l l o t h e r 
p r o p e r t i e s of the o b j e c t , i t might be t h a t A l i k e s b l ue 
p a i n t i n g s and B hates them - y e t b o t h agree on the a t t r i b u t i o n 
o f the phrase 'blue p a i n t i n g ' . As ever, the d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t 
seems t o be s u g g e s t i n g i t s e l f here i s t h a t between a e s t h e t i c 
judgements qua q u a s i - o b j e c t i v e c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s and 
a e s t h e t i c judgements qua s u b j e c t i v e and e m o t i o n a l responses of 
t a s t e . 
Cohen i s p a r t i a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n making h i s o b j e c t i o n , but 
he does n o t acknowledge t h a t the c o n c l u s i o n t o be drawn from 
h i s o b j e c t i o n are germane t o the argument. Namely, t h a t i f 
t h e i r responses are d i f f e r e n t then s u r e l y t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
v i s u a l i m p r e s s i o n s - or a t l e a s t the modes i n which these 
i m p r e s s i o n s are r e c e i v e d - must a l s o be d i f f e r e n t . I n t h i s 
r e s p e c t i t might mean an a e s t h e t i c e q u i v a l e n t of c o l o u r -
b l i n d n e s s or tone-deafness or d y s l e x i a . I n o t h e r words, as 
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concluded i n Chapter Seven, i t might be the consumer/subject 
r a t h e r than t h e p r o d u c t / o b j e c t t h a t i s a t f a u l t . 
Morawski h o l d s a s i m i l a r view t o t h a t o f S i b l e y : 
The objectivity of judgement depends for its status not only 
upon its subject . . . but also upon its object- Thus the 
differences between taste and judgement are of a 
psychological and epistemological character . . . To ascertain 
the objectivity of both taste and judgement some reference 
must be made to the objective quaOities remaining in some 
definite relations with the subject who responds to them.-*-' 
Perhaps a f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made here, then, i s 
t h a t between the c o g n i t i v e and the a e s t h e t i c way of p e r c e i v i n g . 
On the o t h e r hand, i f we r e l a t e our p e r c e p t i o n t o our own 
p e r s o n a l experiences then t h i s too can be n o n - a e s t h e t i c 
a c t i v i t y . I n Edward Bullough's example, the man who watches 
O t h e l l o and t h i n k s o f h i s own e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n t o the p l a y , 
t h a t i s , t o the u n f a i t h f u l n e s s o f h i s own w i f e , i s not 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d . ^ ^ Perhaps one way of d e s c r i b i n g t h i s d i f f e r e n c e 
i s i n terms o f the a t t e n t i o n t h a t should be p a i d t o the 
i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s o f the a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t and i t s p r o p e r t i e s . 
I s i t , t h e n , t o the p e r c e i v e d p r o p e r t i e s of the phenomenal 
o b j e c t t h a t we must at t e n d ? Or i s i t t o the p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s 
o f t h e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t ? How would t h i s account f o r p e r c e p t i o n s 
of mood, or the c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f a b s t r a c t i d e a s , f o r instance? 
D i s i n t e r e s t i n t h i s c o n t e x t r a i s e s more q u e s t i o n s than i t 
answers. 
W h i l s t i t c o u l d be argued t h a t 'Form' can be an o b j e c t i v e 
p r o p e r t y - i n v i r t u e o f , what Kant might c a l l , i t s 
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y i d e a l s p a t i a l and temporal r e l a t i o n s w i t h i t s 
p e r c i p i e n t - i t does n o t f o l l o w t h a t t h i s ' o b j e c t i v i t y ' i s 
independent o f the s u b j e c t . That i s , i n K a n t i a n terms, the 
p l e a s u r e produced by the f r e e - p l a y o f the i m a g i n a t i o n i s 
su b j e c t - d e p e n d e n t . S i m i l a r l y , Kant holds t h a t t e r t i a r y 
p r o p e r t i e s o f s e n s a t i o n , such as c o l o u r and sound, belong t o 
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the r e a lm o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e knowledge - judgements of sense -
and, as such, are concerned merely w i t h l i k e s and d i s l i k e s . 
The i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n f o r Kant here i s between a e s t h e t i c 
judgements o f t a s t e about form - which may be of u n i v e r s a l l y 
s u b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y - and a e s t h e t i c judgements about co n t e n t 
which a r e , f o r Kant, merely s u b j e c t i v e . T h u s I cannot c l a i m 
my p r e f e r e n c e f o r b l u e over a l l o t h e r c o l o u r s t o have u n i v e r s a l 
v a l i d i t y . Judgements of t a s t e c o n c e r n i n g non-dependent beauty, 
on t he o t h e r hand, a r e , f o r Kant, u n i v e r s a l l y l e g i s l a t i v e 
because they are concerned w i t h s e n s i b i l i t y . T h is i s an 
e x t r e m e l y s u b t l e d i s t i n c t i o n . A n y t h i n g can be seen as being 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y b e a u t i f u l , and a judgement of t a s t e of t h i s s o r t 
l a y s c l a i m t o the agreement of everyone. 
The second p a r t o f t h i s a n a l y s i s i m p l i e s t h a t judgement 
can be e i t h e r u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d or i n v a l i d - independent of 
the i n d i v i d u a l j u d g i n g s u b j e c t . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , S i b l e y seems 
to be i n agreement w i t h Kant. Where they p a r t company, however, 
i s over t he o b j e c t i v e - as d i s t i n c t , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , from 
u n i v e r s a l - v a l i d i t y o f judgements o f t a s t e . Kant argues t h a t 
because beauty i s n o t a concept, t h e r e a r e , t h e r e f o r e , no 
p r o p e r t i e s such t h a t any g i v e n o b j e c t w i t h these g i v e n 
p r o p e r t i e s must be c o n s i d e r e d b e a u t i f u l . The p l e a s u r e f e l t from 
c o n t e m p l a t i n g non-dependent beauty i s , f o r Kant, s u b j e c t i v e l y 
u n i v e r s a l . I t i s the necessary c o n n e c t i o n t h a t Kant makes 
between t he f r e e - p l a y o f the i m a g i n a t i o n and the f e e l i n g of 
p l e a s u r e , t h a t i n f o r m s h i s use of the ex p r e s s i o n ' u n i v e r s a l 
v a l i d i t y ' . 
Kenneth F. Rogerson, i n h i s essay The Meaning of U n i v e r s a l 
V a l i d i t y i n Kant's A e s t h e t i c reads t h i s e x p r e s s i o n as meaning a 
r a t i o n a l e x p e c t a t i o n f o r agreement. The assumption i s t h a t i f 
one person f i n d s an o b j e c t b e a u t i f u l , everybody e l s e w i l l as 
w e l l . O b v i o u s l y I am o v e r - s i m p l i f y i n g Kant's p o s i t i o n here, 
b u t , b a s i c a l l y , Kant says t h a t i f I f i n d a t h i n g b e a u t i f u l then 
Nigel Famdale Page 131 of 192 
Chapter Nine Relative Objectivity 
I w i l l b e l i e v e t h a t o t h e r s ought t o agree w i t h me, even i f they 
do n o t . I t i s a m a t t e r of i m p u t i n g r a t h e r than demanding 
agreement. A l s o , Kant r e q u i r e s t h a t b e f o r e a person can make a 
c l a i m t o the u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y o f h i s or her judgement, he or 
she must f i r s t a t t e n d t o the o b j e c t i n a c e r t a i n way, namely: 
( i ) t he s u b j e c t must be d i s i n t e r e s t e d ; ( i i ) the s u b j e c t must 
d e r i v e p l e a s u r e from c o n t e m p l a t i n g the o b j e c t ; and ( i i i ) t h i s 
p l e a s u r e must be l o c a t e d i n the f r e e - p l a y of the i m a g i n a t i o n 
and the f a c u l t y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I f and o n l y i f these t h r e e 
c r i t e r i a have been s a t i s f i e d , then the s u b j e c t can c l a i m t h a t 
everyone i n l i k e c ircumstances ought t o experience pleasure 
a l s o . The p l e a s u r e i s t h e r e f o r e , s t r i c t l y speaking, n e i t h e r 
r e l a t i v e nor s u b j e c t i v e . On the o t h e r hand, as Tanner r a t h e r 
amusingly comments w i t h r e g a r d t o S i b l e y ' s t h e o r y , i t would be 
p r e p o s t e r o u s f o r someone t o f a l l i n l o v e and expect - because 
o f h i s loved-one's p r o p e r t i e s - every r i g h t - t h i n k i n g and r i g h t -
f e e l i n g person t o f a l l i n l o v e w i t h h i s loved-one a l s o . So t o o , 
Tanner argues, i t i s absurd t o expect t h a t everyone of 
i n t e l l i g e n c e , s e n s i b i l i t y and t a s t e should respond i n l i k e 
manner and i n the same degree t o o b j e c t s apprehended 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y . I do not t h i n k , however, t h a t Tanner's 
comparison here i s a f a i r one. A f t e r a l l , human beauty i s , i n 
Kant's sense, dependent. There are too many o b v i o u s l y 
s u b j e c t i v e - p h y s i c a l , s e x u a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l - f a c t o r s t o be 
taken i n t o account, which would not n e c e s s a r i l y apply i n the 
case o f the a e s t h e t i c e v a l u a t i o n of a p a i n t i n g . 
U l t i m a t e l y , though, i t i s Tanner who l e v e l s the most 
t e l l i n g c r i t i c i s m s o f S i b l e y ' s t h e o r y . The c r i t i c i s m s are 
f a m i l i a r ones which s h o u l d , perhaps, be considered as 
c a u t i o n a r y f o o t n o t e s t o the t h e o r y . These a r e : ( i ) how much 
agreement i s t h e r e c o n c e r n i n g a e s t h e t i c judgements? and ( i i ) i s 
t h e r e enough agreement c o n c e r n i n g a e s t h e t i c judgements - of the 
necessary k i n d - t o say t h a t they are o b j e c t i v e ? . . . 
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One p o s s i b l e response t o Tanner's c r i t i c i s m s can be 
l o c a t e d i n Stephen Davies's essay The R a t i o n a l i t y of A e s t h e t i c 
Responses. On a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t t a c k , Davies concurs w i t h 
S i b l e y ' s premise t h a t the responder may j u s t i f y h i s response by 
r e f e r r i n g t o p r o p e r t i e s o f the work of a r t . But he a l s o 
e s t a b l i s h e s premises by which ( 1 ) we can say t h a t the work of 
a r t i s t h e e m o t i o n a l - o b j e c t of t h i s a e s t h e t i c response, and ( 2 ) 
agreement c o n c e r n i n g these a e s t h e t i c responses might be 
measured. 
Davies argues t h a t i f the above premises were not the case 
- and t h a t , i n s t e a d , the work of a r t was the p e r c e p t u a l - o b j e c t 
o f t h e response and i t s cause - then the response c o u l d not 
i n d i c a t e t he responder's a p p r e c i a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the 
work o f a r t . The work of a r t would merely be the occasion f o r 
the response. F u r t h e r m o r e , the responder's d e s c r i p t i o n of the 
work of a r t - w h i l s t s e r v i n g t o i d e n t i f y the cause of h i s 
response - would n o t serve t o j u s t i f y the r e l e v a n c e of the 
response. I t would n o t i n d i c a t e t h a t a) the responder b e l i e v e d 
t h a t t he work of a r t d i s p l a y e d the r e s p o n s e - r e l e v a n t 
p r o p e r t i e s ; or t h a t b) o t h e r people c o u l d i d e n t i f y the 
responder's response and hence t h a t c ) the responder c o u l d 
i d e n t i f y h i s own response - because the r e l e v a n c e of h i s 
response c o u l d n o t be j u s t i f i e d . 
For Davies t h e n , the e m o t i o n a l - o b j e c t i n s t a n t i a t e s the 
f o r m a l o b j e c t o f the e m o t i o n a l or a e s t h e t i c response. The work 
of a r t i s the e m o t i o n a l - o b j e c t of the a e s t h e t i c response. He 
o f f e r s an example o f t h i s (borrowed from Roger S c r u t o n ) : Our 
response t o a p a i n t i n g of a w a i f may be one of sadness, and 
t h i s would correspond t o our a c t u a l f e e l i n g s toward an a c t u a l 
w a i f . The r e l a t i o n between the e m o t i o n a l - o b j e c t and the a c t u a l 
e m o t i o n , t h e n , i s l i k e t h a t of m a k e - b e l i e f t o b e l i e f . J u s t as 
such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l s u b j e c t - m a t t e r i s the e m o t i o n a l - o b j e c t 
o f an a e s t h e t i c response t o t h a t s u b j e c t ( t h e w a i f ) , so i n non-
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l p a i n t i n g our responses r e s t on response-
r e l e v a n t m a k e - b e l i e f . 
I f we accept that the emotion/emotional-object relation can be 
secured by the imagination in its quasi-belLef form, there will 
be no difficulty in maintaining that aesthetic responses to 
representational art are rational to the extent that they may 
be supported by reference to features of the work of art 
(whose actuality is knowingly entertained rather than 
believed).^" 
Davies concludes t h a t the r a t i o n a l i t y of a e s t h e t i c 
responses can be c l a i m e d on the grounds t h a t a person can 
j u s t i f y h i s responses by d e s c r i b i n g the e m o t i o n a l - r e l e v a n t 
p r o p e r t i e s he p e r c e i v e s w i t h o u t b e l i e f i n the work of a r t . 
Response can be i d e n t i f i e d a c c o r d i n g t o what our d e s c r i p t i o n of 
the work o f a r t says we would do i ^ we b e l i e v e d we were seeing 
an a c t u a l scene t h a t corresponded t o the repres e n t e d one, 
namely, f e e l compassionate towards the w a i f . 
Where the response is an aesthetic one, our access to 
another's emotional response is through that which he says 
rather than that which he does.'^ -'-
Agreement c o u l d t h e r e f o r e be measured i n terms of the 
degree of correspondence between these d e s c r i p t i o n s of 
r e s p o n s e - r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t i e s . Perhaps, t h e n , we may conclude 
t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s which determine a e s t h e t i c value 
may be r e s u l t a n t - a f u n c t i o n of o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s x, y and z -
as w e l l as complex and s i m p l e , p r i m a r y and t e r t i a r y , c oncrete 
and a b s t r a c t . T h i s , I f e e l , p a r t i a l l y answers Tanner's 
c r i t i c i s m s . F i r s t , because the reasons g i v e n i n support of the 
a e s t h e t i c judgements w i l l be enough t o conclude t h a t they are 
o b j e c t i v e i f , second, they r e f e r t o o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s t h a t 
n e c e s s a r i l y correspond t o r e s p o n s e - r e l e v a n t d e s c r i p t i o n s . 
I n l i g h t o f t h i s we can r e t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n s posed a t 
the b e g i n n i n g o f the l a s t c h a p t e r and conclude t h a t : f i r s t , the 
a r t o b j e c t can be a s i g n o f i t s e l f i n v i r t u e of i t s being a 
s i g n o f i t s r e s p o n s e - r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t i e s ; second, the a r t 
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o b j e c t can be s a i d t o be a s i g n t h a t d e s i g n a t e a v a l u e , i n 
v i r t u e o f i t s a e s t h e t i c v a l u e b e i n g l o c a t e d i n b o t h i t s primary 
and t e r t i a r y p r o p e r t i e s ; and t h i r d , t o ask whether or not t h e r e 
are a f i n i t e s e t o f p r o p e r t i e s which c o n s t i t u t e t h i s a e s t h e t i c 
v a l u e i s t o ask t h e wrong q u e s t i o n because r e s p o n s e - r e l e v a n t 
p r o p e r t y v a l u e s are n o t f i x e d b u t r a t h e r , as I suggested a t the 
b e g i n n i n g of t h i s c h a p t e r , are p a n a e s t h e t i c , t h a t i s , 
r e l a t i v e l y o b j e c t i v e . I n the n e x t chapter I s h a l l d i scuss how 
t h i s r e l a t i v e o b j e c t i v i t y i s i n c o n t r a s t t o the a b s o l u t e 
o b j e c t i v i t y o f s c i e n c e , b u t a l s o how i t i s comparable i n terms 
of t h e procedures by which i t i s communicated. 
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I n t he l a s t c h a p t e r I argued t h a t t h r o u g h r e a s o n - g i v i n g 
t h a t r e f e r s t o r e s p o n s e - r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t i e s our a e s t h e t i c 
judgements can take on a r e l a t i v e o b j e c t i v i t y . I n t h i s chapter 
I s h a l l d i s c u s s the e x t e n t t o which the procedures f o r doing 
t h i s are l e a r n e d r a t h e r than i n t u i t e d . 
I n r e c e n t years David Best has addressed h i m s e l f t o the 
q u e s t i o n o f whether or not a r t a p p r e c i a t i o n can be taught.-^ 
Unless a r t a p p r e c i a t i o n i s o b j e c t i v e , he argues, t h e r e i s no 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n c l u d i n g a r t s and l i t e r a t u r e i n e d u c a t i o n . 
Inasmuch as we are a b l e t o teach i t as a s u b j e c t and t o set 
c e r t a i n standards o f knowledge, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c i t i n g 
reasons which r e f e r t o o b s e r v a b l e , o b j e c t i v e phenomena i s , f o r 
Best, n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d . I f 'beauty' i s a term of a p p r a i s a l 
r a t h e r than a p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e term which r e f e r s t o 
p r o p e r t i e s , then the q u e s t i o n must be asked: I s beauty t i e d t o 
o b j e c t i v e standards o f a p p r a i s a l ? 
I f beauty is^ i n the eye of the b e h o l d e r , then we do not 
need t o s u p p o r t our c l a i m s t h a t something i s b e a u t i f u l . I n 
Chapter Seven I d i s c u s s e d the ambiguous p o s i t i o n h e l d by 
Langer, namely t h a t a r t o b j e c t s symbolise, t h a t i s , o b j e c t i f y 
s u b j e c t i v e emotion. I n these and o t h e r examples the a m b i g u i t y 
a r i s e s from the r e l a t i o n s h i p o f the s u b j e c t t o the o b j e c t . The 
two are m u t u a l l y dependent. As suggested i n Chapter One, an a r t 
o b j e c t cannot a p p r e c i a t e another a r t o b j e c t ; i t needs a 
s u b j e c t , j u s t as a s u b j e c t needs an o b j e c t . I n what t h e n , does 
t h i s assumed-to-be p o l a r o p p o s i t i o n c o n s i s t ? To argue t h a t a r t 
a p p r e c i a t i o n must be e i t h e r s u b j e c t i v e or o b j e c t i v e , i s 
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m i s l e a d i n g o r , r a t h e r , o v e r l y s i m p l i s t i c . Yet s u b j e c t i v i s t s do 
p r e c i s e l y t h i s . A t y p i c a l s u b j e c t i v i s t argument might be: a) we 
each p e r c e i v e a r t w o r k s t h r o u g h our own senses b) we cannot 
p e r c e i v e a r t w o r k s t h r o u g h anyone el s e ' s senses c) our 
p e r c e p t i o n s o f a r t w o r k s are our own and no one e l s e ' s , 
t h e r e f o r e d) our p e r c e p t i o n s o f a r t w o r k s must be s u b j e c t i v e . . 
. But these arguments are s u p e r f i c i a l inasmuch as a l l 
p e r c e p t i o n s are s u b j e c t i v e i n the t r i v i a l sense of being 
a s c r i b a b l e t o a s u b j e c t even when they are p e r c e p t i o n s of 
o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s . 
Best o f f e r s one p o s s i b l e response t o t h i s type of argument 
by p o i n t i n g out t h a t we accept judgements i n science, 
mathematics and l o g i c as b e i n g o b j e c t i v e and y e t these must 
a l s o be p e r c e i v e d t h r o u g h the senses. Any judgement - be i t 
s c i e n t i f i c or a e s t h e t i c - r e q u i r e s p e r c e p t i o n , i n t h a t i t i s 
the p r o d u c t of a sense i m p r e s s i o n . Thus i t f o l l o w s t h a t 
s c i e n t i f i c judgements must be as s u b j e c t i v e , i n t h i s r e s p e c t , 
as a e s t h e t i c judgements. Such judgements may not be a b s o l u t e or 
d e f i n i t i v e - s c i e n t i f i c laws are c o n t i n u a l l y b eing m o d i f i e d and 
reassessed - b u t t h i s i s not t o say t h a t they are not 
o b j e c t i v e . The o b j e c t i v e need n o t be the a b s o l u t e . O b j e c t i v i t y 
does n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e c e r t a i n t y , or n o n - r e l a t i v i t y . 
( A d m i t t e d l y though, t h e r e i s no guarantee t h a t an o b j e c t i v e 
'approach' w i l l r e s u l t i n the d i s c o v e r y of an o b j e c t i v e t r u t h . 
An o b j e c t i v e approach i s p o s s i b l e even i f r e l a t i v i s m i s t r u e . ) 
Best a s s e r t s t h a t t o compare a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t i v i t y w i t h 
s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y i s m i s l e a d i n g : t o say t h a t a l l a c t i o n s 
can be o b j e c t i v e l y e x p l a i n e d s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , i s not t o say t h a t 
a l l o b j e c t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s o f a c t i o n s are s c i e n t i f i c . 
To put the matter another way, the important point to 
recognize is that whereas i t is true that we should demand 
objective substantiation for statements made about artistic 
appreciati£»n, not aU objective substantiation is scientific^ 
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Here, Best i s s u g g e s t i n g t h a t we should n o t be asking 
whether a e s t h e t i c judgements are s c i e n t i f i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e , but 
r a t h e r whether they are o b j e c t i v e - which i s not the same 
t h i n g . The o t h e r u s u a l o b j e c t i o n t o comparing a e s t h e t i c w i t h 
s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t i v i t y i s , of course, t h a t t h e r e are no 
r e c o g n i s e d methods f o r r e s o l v i n g disagreements i n a e s t h e t i c s . 
Again though, t h i s i s m i s l e a d i n g because much depends on the 
vagueness or o t h e r w i s e o f the a e s t h e t i c judgement. I f we are 
asked t o say whether or n o t we c o n s i d e r P o l l o c k t o be a Great 
A r t i s t , we might say t h a t we do n o t , because we co n s i d e r d r i p 
p a i n t i n g s t o have no a e s t h e t i c v a l u e . But i f we are asked t o 
say whether or n o t we c o n s i d e r him t o be a good ' A c t i o n ' 
p a i n t e r , we might w e l l say t h a t we do. Furthermore, by c i t i n g 
o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s o f the d r i p p a i n t i n g we are able t o g i v e 
reasons f o r a r r i v i n g a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . 
Another weakness i n the s u b j e c t i v i s t argument i s t h a t i f 
a l l judgements are e q u a l l y v a l i d , then we must admit of an 
u n l i m i t e d number o f p o s s i b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which i n f o r m the 
judgement. The d u c k / r a b b i t drawing i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n t h i s 
r e s p e c t . O b v i o u s l y , t h e r e are two p o s s i b l e ways of i n t e r p r e t i n g 
t he shape; some people see i t as a r a b b i t , some as a duck, b u t , 
as suggested e a r l i e r , i f someone were t o see i t as an i r o n i n g -
b o a r d , t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s hould be deemed i n a p p r o p r i a t e . 
T h e i r subsequent judgement of i t should a l s o be deemed 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e . They might say ' t h i s i s a useless drawing' and 
i f asked why they t h i n k t h i s , they might say, 'because i t 
doesn't l o o k much l i k e an i r o n i n g - b o a r d ' . However, i f someone 
were t o p o i n t o u t c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e f e a t u r e s o f the drawing and 
then say, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t ' t h i s shape here i s supposed t o be 
an e a r ' then t he person may then 'see' the r a b b i t a f t e r a l l , 
and c o n s e q u e n t l y c o n s i d e r i t t o be a good drawing o f a r a b b i t . 
S i m i l a r l y , t h e way we 'see' the form determines the way we 
i n t e r p r e t t h e meaning of the c o n t e n t . J u s t as a person may be 
's e e i n g ' something t h a t o b j e c t i v e l y i s n o t t h e r e , then so may a 
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person make an i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . This i s t o say 
t h a t we cannot make a proper e v a l u a t i o n o f a work u n t i l we 
understand i t and we cannot understand i t u n t i l we i n t e r p r e t 
i t s meaning.-* The p o i n t I am making here i s t h a t w h i l s t t h e r e 
may be no one c o r r e c t way o f se e i n g , t h e r e are i n c o r r e c t ways 
of s e e i n g . I t cannot be proved t h a t t h e same i s t r u e of 
a e s t h e t i c responses o f t a s t e , b u t , as I have s t r e s s e d b e f o r e , 
responses o f t a s t e are a separate a c t i v i t y from c r i t i c a l 
e v a l u a t i o n s based upon an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f meaning. Best 
a g a i n : 
An important characteristic of aesthetic appreciation is that 
i t allows for an indefinite but not unlimited possibility of 
valid or intelligible interpretaBBn.^ 
W i t h r e g a r d t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n Best draws a u s e f u l p a r a l l e l 
between s c i e n c e and the a r t s . N e i t h e r , he argues, y i e l d 
i n f a l l i b l e c o n c l u s i o n s , b u t , r a t h e r , b o t h u l t i m a t e l y depend 
upon t h e way i n which o b j e c t i v e f e a t u r e s are i n t e r p r e t e d . As I 
read him what he i s sa y i n g here i s t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgement may 
n o t , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , be o b j e c t i v e - b u t then, s t r i c t l y 
s p e a k i n g , n e i t h e r i s s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. The problem w i t h 
t h i s argument i s t h a t we a t l e a s t know what we mean when we 
d e s c r i b e s c i e n t i f i c knowledge as bei n g o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d , but 
what do we mean when we d e s c r i b e a e s t h e t i c knowledge as being 
o b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d ? There i s a d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made between 
a b s o l u t e and r e l a t i v e o b j e c t i v i t y [ c f . Bernard C. Heyl's 
t h e o r y ] . Science i s the sta n d a r d by which we measure o t h e r 
c l a i m s t o o b j e c t i v i t y , b u t t h i s need n o t i n f e r t h a t science i s 
an a b s o l u t e , p a r a d i g m a t i c s t a n d a r d . For the r e l a t i v i s t t h e r e 
are s t i l l s t andards b u t t h e standards are f l e x i b l e r a t h e r than 
f i x e d and u n i v e r s a l (as would be the case f o r an a b s o l u t i s t ) . 
The d i f f e r e n c e i s i n the degree o f the c o r r e c t n e s s o f the 
judgement, n o t i n the k i n d o f c o r r e c t n e s s - because b o t h depend 
upon human p e r c e p t i o n , which i n t u r n depends upon 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n seems t o be t h a t 
t h e way i n which we i n t e r p r e t can be l e a r n e d . Consider Ben 
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Shahn's p o i n t : 
Intuition in art is actually the result of prolonged tuition. 
The so-called 'innocent eye' does not exist. The eye at birth 
cannot perceive at all, and i t is only through training that i t 
leams to recognise what i t sees.-* 
Best makes two p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s : t h a t i ) the c r e d e n t i a l s o f 
knowledge can o n l y be l e g i t i m a t e l y bestowed where o b j e c t i v e 
s u b s t a n t i a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e , and t h a t i i ) a r t i s t i c judgements 
can be s u b s t a n t i a t e d . A judgement, t h e n , whether s c i e n t i f i c or 
a e s t h e t i c , can o n l y be s u b s t a n t i a t e d or r e f u t e d by r e f e r e n c e t o 
what i s e x t e r n a l l y o b s e r v a b l e , t h a t i s , t o o b j e c t i v e 
p r o p e r t i e s . Best a g a i n : 
. . . an artistic judgement should certainly be personal, in the 
sense that one should have experienced and thought about the 
relevant work for oneself. But that does not preclude 
objectivity. On the contrary, to be inteUigihLe at all, a 
personal judgement must be objective. And to be worth while 
and enriclidng i t must be informed, educated. Education of 
artistic judgement consists in progressively extending and 
refining the capacity for discrimination." 
E d u c a t i o n i n the a r t s , t h e n , as i n o t h e r e d u c a t i o n a l 
f i e l d s , presupposes the p o s s i b i l i t y o f being able t o g i v e 
reasons f o r the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which i n f o r m 
p a r t i c u l a r judgements, by r e f e r r i n g t o o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a or 
d a t a . ^ C e r t a i n o b j e c t i o n s have been l e v e l l e d a t t h i s 
p r o p o s i t i o n , one of which [A. T. Winterbourne's O b j e c t i v i t y i n 
Science and A e s t h e t i c s ] suggests t h a t i t i s the product of a 
f a l s e l y s y l l o g i s t i c argument: 
I t is the misconstrual of this relationship [between 
intelligihility - explanation - and data] which gives rise to 
the thesis that increasing information generates better 
explanations. This unwarranted equivalence" is affirmed because 
of tEe conflation of two propositi'ons: first, the true 
proposition that information is independent of a given 
conceptual framework with, second, the proposition that tiiere 
is no difference between information and explanation, which is 
false.^ 
But s u r e l y t h e a n t i t h e s i s o f t h i s , t h a t a decrease of 
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i n f o r m a t i o n generates b e t t e r e x p l a n a t i o n s , would be m a n i f e s t l y 
f a l s e a l s o . ^ I f Best's analogy between s c i e n t i f i c and a r t i s t i c 
knowledge i s a p p l i c a b l e here then s u r e l y a l e g i t i m a t e 
comparison can a l s o be made between the methods i n which t h i s 
r e s p e c t i v e knowledge i s a c q u i r e d , t h a t i s , t o take on board a l l 
a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n as b e i n g p o t e n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t and then 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y t o r e j e c t t h a t which proves t o be i r r e l e v a n t or 
s u p e r f l u o u s t o the s t r o n g e s t , most a p p r o p r i a t e c o n c l u s i o n . Both 
s c i e n t i f i c and a e s t h e t i c judgement can be r e f u t e d and j u s t i f i e d 
o n l y w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h a t which i s e x t e r n a l l y observable. 
S u r e l y a l s o , i n terms o f p r o b a b i l i t y , the more e x t e r n a l l y 
o b s e r v a b l e d a t a t h a t t h e r e i s a v a i l a b l e , the more l i k e l y i t i s 
t h a t some w i l l prove t o be r e l e v a n t . Disputes a r i s i n g from 
q u e s t i o n s as t o what i s and i s n o t r e l e v a n t might be r e s o l v e d 
by an appeal t o consensus o p i n i o n , t h a t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y o f shared methods of assessment, or r a t h e r , 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e standards a g a i n s t which d i s p u t e s might be 
r e s o l v e d . A l s o , as suggested i n Chapter F i v e , d i s p u t e s can be 
r e s o l v e d t h r o u g h ' s t r e n g t h of argument' and 'the t e s t of t i m e ' . 
Such r a t i o n a l agreement or disagreement may not be u n i v e r s a l 
b u t i t may be o b j e c t i v e because, f i r s t , science may be 
o b j e c t i v e w i t h o u t b e i n g u n i v e r s a l , and second, i t i n v o l v e s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s w h i c h , by d e f i n i t i o n , admit of disagreement. 
( T h i s s a i d , however, i t i s a l s o the case t h a t s c i e n t i f i c 
t h e o r i e s can be t e s t e d and so are i n p r i n c i p l e f a l s i f i a b l e , the 
same i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e o f a e s t h e t i c judgements.) 
I n a nother essay Best i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n apropos 
of standards [ c f . p o i n t c below w i t h the form of r e l a t i v i s m 
sometimes used t o d e f i n e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s and the b e l i e f s of 
p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s ] : 
a) Objectivity requires shared standards within a community or 
school of thought. These standards can, of course, change. 
(Clearly disagreement, properiy so-called, presupposes such 
shared standards.) b) Objectivity does not require shared 
judgements, or agreement in opiniDns. c) Objectivity does not 
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require shared standards between communiti'es or schools of 
thought.-^" 
Winterbourne dismisses the analogy w i t h science on the 
grounds t h a t i n a e s t h e t i c judgements - u n l i k e s c i e n t i f i c ones -
t h e r e a re no shared d e c i s i o n procedures t o f a c i l i t a t e the move 
from a g i v e n p r o p o s i t i o n t o i t s p r o o f . C l e a r l y t h i s i s too 
sweeping a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n , and anyway, as Best suggests, t o say 
something i s o b j e c t i v e i s n o t the same as t o say t h a t i t i s 
s c i e n t i f i c . T h e r e f o r e , when Winterbourne makes a comparison 
between a e s t h e t i c and s c i e n t i f i c statements - along the l i n e s 
o f : S t h i n k s t h a t a) the Mona L i s a i s r u b b i s h , and b) t h a t 
w ater f r e e z e s a t lOOoC - he i s d o i n g so under f a l s e p retences. 
O b v i o u s l y they are n o t the same type o f statement, the former 
cannot be o b j e c t i v e l y proved or d i s p r o v e d simply by an appeal 
t o consensus o p i n i o n , whereas, t o an e x t e n t , the l a t t e r can. 
( I t s h o u l d be borne i n mind, however, t h a t consensus o p i n i o n i s 
l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t i n s o f a r as the t h e o r y can be t e s t e d and 
shown t o be f a l s e . ) Again though, a f a i r e r comparison than 
Winterbourne's might change the emphasis: S might say ' I t h i n k 
t h a t t h e Mona L i s a i s r u b b i s h , b u t t h a t does n o t mean t h a t i t 
i s r u b b i s h . ' Or, t o p u t the two statements on a more equal 
f o o t i n g : ' I t h i n k t h e Mona L i s a i s r u b b i s h , because i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t t o t e l l from i t whether she i s s m i l i n g o r f r o w n i n g , 
and such a m b i g u i t y o f e x p r e s s i o n weakens the i n t e n s i t y o f the 
p o r t r a i t , ' compared t o ' I t h i n k water f r e e z e s a t lOOoC because 
someone t o l d me i t d i d ' . W i t h r e f e r e n c e t o [ h i s ] example, 
W i n t e r b o u r n e argues t h a t t h e evidence which c o n s t i t u t e s the 
'meaning' o f b) a l s o forms grounds f o r b e l i e v i n g i t , whereas 
th e 'evidence' o f a) never, i n i t s e l f , g i v e s grounds f o r the 
acceptance o f i t qua a e s t h e t i c judgement. The r e l a t i o n o f b) t o 
i t s evidence may, he argues, be seen as a paradigm f o r what i t 
means t o understand evidence. But, a g a i n , examples o f a e s t h e t i c 
p r o p o s i t i o n s - r a t h e r than a e s t h e t i c judgements - which 
resemble Winterbourne's s c i e n t i f i c one, and which i n v e r t h i s 
argument, can r e a d i l y be thought o f . For i n s t a n c e , S t h i n k s 
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t h a t a) 'mathematics i s r u b b i s h ' and b) 'Picasso's b l u e p e r i o d 
p a i n t i n g s are i n f a c t p a i n t e d l i m e - g r e e n ' . 
Best and Winterbourne do, however, seem t o agree w i t h the 
ide a t h a t b o t h s c i e n t i f i c and a e s t h e t i c judgements are based 
upon i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Where they p a r t company i s over the 
q u e s t i o n o f the e x t e n t t o which these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are 
o b j e c t i v e . The answer i s a n e c e s s a r i l y vague one, t h a t o l d g e t -
o u t c l a u s e : t o an e x t e n t . J u s t as, t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , they are 
a l s o s u b j e c t i v e . The r e s p e c t i v e judgements, then, should be 
made i n r e l a t i o n t o the e x t e n t t o which the s u b j e c t i v e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a re an i r r e l e v a n c e . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , c o n t r a r y 
t o Winterbourne's argument, a e s t h e t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , j u s t as 
much as s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , i n v o l v e s knowing what t o 
le a v e o u t . W i nterbourne: 
Scientific interpretation often consists in knowing what to 
leave out; aesthetic interpretation consists in rea(Sng things 
I t s h o u l d a l s o be remembered, as Winterbourne i s f o r c e d t o 
a d m i t , t h a t i n s c i e n c e , as i n a e s t h e t i c s , t h e r e are no 
i n d i s p u t a b l e ' f a c t s ' - i f by ' f a c t s ' i t i s meant t h a t an 
a s s e r t i o n o f a p r o p o s i t i o n i s supposed t o be i n c o r r i g i b l e w i t h 
r e g a r d t o a l l t h e p o s s i b l e frameworks i n which the p r o p o s i t i o n 
1 2 
might appear.-^ Furthermore, t h e r e i s no a b s o l u t e d i s t i n c t i o n 
between t h e v a r i o u s degrees o f i n t e r p r e t a t i v e statement i n 
sci e n c e and the v a r i o u s degrees o f d e s c r i p t i v e statement t h a t 
i n f o r m an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n a e s t h e t i c s . As Raman Seldon puts 
i t : 
The attraction of a clear-cut distinction between an objective 
criticism and a subjective 'experience of literature' is 
evident: the criteria of scientific objectivity are more neariy 
satisfied as tlie, subjective experience is phased out of the 
critical procedure.-^ 
So, a r e we any c l o s e r t o d e c i d i n g whether or n o t a e s t h e t i c 
judgement can be taught? Can we, f o r i n s t a n c e , be taught t o 
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r ead i n t o , t h a t i s , i n t e r p r e t meaning, when the meaning i s not 
o b j e c t i v e l y present? Perhaps the d i s t i n c t i o n here i s between 
p u b l i c and p r i v a t e response - perhaps where the two most 
c o n s i s t e n t l y meet i s where the most a u t h e n t i c judgement l i e s , 
as i n the correspondence of r e s p o n s e - r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t y 
d e s c r i p t i o n s d i s c u s s e d a t the end o f the p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r . 
Perhaps such c o n t i n g e n t agreement i s enough t o f a c i l i t a t e a 
v a l i d a e s t h e t i c judgement. Perhaps a l s o we can a v o i d the 
s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e antinomy by b e i n g t a u g h t t o l i k e a l i k e 
( n o t t h a t t h a t would be p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r a b l e ! ) . We can, 
perhaps, judge a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a which, depending 
on t h e e x t e n t t o which the c r i t e r i a are s a t i s f i e d , can p e r m i t 
us t o say ' I can see why I ought t o t h i n k i t i s good, but I 
s t i l l do n o t l i k e i t ' . Or, as a v a r i a t i o n on the theme 
i n t r o d u c e d i n Chapter One, ' I am no a r t e x p e r t , but I know what 
I ought t o l i k e ' . 
Much here depends upon r e c e p t i o n t h e o r y , t h a t i s , upon 
what importance we should a t t a c h t o the r o l e of the s p e c t a t o r . 
I t m ight be t h a t the f r e e - s t a n d i n g a r t o b j e c t i s complete i n 
i t s e l f , t h a t i s , autonomous. Or i t might be t h a t a r t i s 
f u n d a m e n t a l l y concerned w i t h communication and so the product 
i s i n c o m p l e t e u n t i l i t has been consumed and responded t o i n a 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d manner, by competent s p e c t a t o r s . This i s , of 
c o u r s e , opposed t o the view taken by r a d i c a l s u b j e c t i v i s t s who 
h o l d t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgement i s a c t u a l l y concerned w i t h 
i n c o r r i g i b l e judgements of t a s t e - which cannot be taught 
because everyone i s h i s or her own a u t h o r i t y w i t h r e g a r d t o h i s 
or her own t a s t e . But, as Osborne puts i t : 
Aesthetic interest leads to outward-turning forms of activity 
and inclines us typically to absorption in an object presented 
for perception, not an inward-dwelling upon our own moods and 
emotions. 
Osborne a l s o o f f e r s a means of c i r c u m n a v i g a t i n g Kant's 
antinomy i n t h a t he s t i l l concedes t h a t t h e r e must be a 
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personal, t h a t i s , f i r s t - h a n d response to the a r t object - but 
t h a t t h i s need not assume t h a t there i s a l i m i t l e s s number of 
possible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s because: 
ImaginatLon must be held in leash and restricted to that 
sympathetic identification which facilitates the apprehension 
of what is there to be apprehended. 
Best, too, r e f e r s to t h i s concession, only he does so i n 
terms of an educated emotional capacity to become involved i n a 
personally meaningful way. As Nick McAdoo also points out [ i n 
Aesthetic Education and the Antinomy of Taste] the i m p l i c a t i o n 
of t h i s o b j e c t i v e t h i n k i n g seems to be that aesthetic 
disagreements w i l l tend to asymptotically disappear over time, 
as a capacity f o r pure, d i s i n t e r e s t e d contemplation of the 
object improves. For t h i s to be the case, i t seems, we must 
accept the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t disputes can be resolved, that some 
judgements i f not a c t u a l l y , absolutely v a l i d , are at l e a s t more 
v a l i d - or even less i n v a l i d - or perhaps b e t t e r , than others. 
Are we now any closer to answering the question set out 
at the beginning of t h i s chapter, v i z : can aesthetic judgement 
be taught? The only reasonable answer i s to say that yes i t 
would seem i t can be to an extent, and t h a t perhaps the best we 
can hope f o r i s a s t a t e of compromise. I n l i g h t of t h i s i t i s 
worth quoting McAdoo by way of conclusion: 
We may regard the antinomy between aesthetic judgement and 
taste as embodying not an impossible logical demand but rather 
an inter-play between personal and public worlds, open to 
modification on dJther dde - for i f the personal response 
were not as cnn-igihle as the judgemental one then i t would be 
ineducatable; but equally, i f the judgement lacked a basis in 
experience and the 'feeling of rightness', then i t would be 
mere mechanical rule-following. Out of such interplay comes, in 
greater or less measure, I would argue, about as much 
agreement in judgement as we can hope for.-'-" 
I n the next chapter I s h a l l draw my arguments together by 
suggesting t h a t the judgement-informing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s I have 
been r e f e r r i n g to can be made about form as w e l l as content. 
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C o n t e n t 
I n previous chapters I have argued th a t judgements may be 
supported by reference to o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s . I t may be that 
these p r o p e r t i e s can be described and i n t e r p r e t e d and, because 
insp e c t a b l e , such d e s c r i p t i o n and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n may be e i t h e r 
appropriate or i n a p p r o p r i a t e . But what about less obviously 
p h y s i c a l p r o p e r t i e s , where reference i s made not so much to 
content as to form? I f form i s separate from content i n poetry 
then surely c e r t a i n formal p r o p e r t i e s such as rhyme-scheme and 
d i c t i o n can be appreciated independently of the ideas f o r which 
they are the v e h i c l e - t h i s pure-poetry-as-art-object view i s 
t y p i f i e d by the not i o n t h a t 'a poem should not mean but be'. 
But i s such a separation possible? And what about painting? Can 
we ever separate the form of Whistler's Arrangement i n Grey 
and Black from the content, namely that the arrangement i n grey 
and black a c t u a l l y represents Whistler's mother? I n t h i s 
chapter I w i l l argue th a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 'form' - especially 
i n music and p a i n t i n g - i s not as a r b i t r a r y and subjective an 
a c t i v i t y as i s commonly believed. I w i l l then compare these 
formal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s w i t h some apparently 'universal' 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of n a r r a t i v e content. F i n a l l y , I s h a l l propose 
c e r t a i n ' t e s t s ' which might i l l u s t r a t e t h i s consistency of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n p r a c t i c e . 
F i r s t though, a word about the hermeneutical i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of Gestalt psychology. With i t s emphasis on the 
phenomenological o b j e c t i v i t y of Gestalt q u a l i t i e s , Gestalt 
psychology has, i n recent years, supported the argument f o r 
the autonomy of the work of art: I do not agree w i t h t h i s 
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argument [ i n the Croce and Collingwood sense of autonomy] but, 
t h i s apart, I t h i n k Gestalt theories have some i n t e r e s t i n g 
a p p l i c a t i o n s . 
I t i s assumed t h a t , because of Gestalt, the patterns we 
perceive as abstract forms and shapes are u n i v e r s a l l y 
c o n s i s t e n t . For instance, when someone sees the pattern of two 
dots and a curve represented i n a c e r t a i n way w i t h i n a c i r c l e , 
they w i l l t h i n k of a face. I n h i s essay On Drawing An Object 
Richard Wollheim discusses the figure-ground hypothesis of 
Gestalt psychology which holds t h a t our capacity to 
d i s c r i m i n a t e elements w i t h i n the v i s u a l f i e l d depends upon our 
a b i l i t y to see them on something else, that i s , say, black 
l i n e s on - or behind or l e v e l w i t h - a white background. This 
capacity permits us to 'see' representations and 
c o n f i g u r a t i o n s , and to perceive three-dimensional objects on a 
two-dimensional plane, as, f o r instance, w i t h the 
aforementioned face. I n t h i s sense we d i s c r i m i n a t e the v i s u a l 
element i n o p p o s i t i o n t o , or i n contrast w i t h , something else. 
Also, i n t h i s sense, emotional q u a l i t i e s or p r o p e r t i e s , such as 
sadness or happiness, could be seen as phenomenologically 
o b j e c t i v e q u a l i t i e s of the Gestalt character of the form of an 
artwork; q u a l i t i e s t h a t need only be recognised rather than 
f e l t . We can understand a tragedy without a c t u a l l y crying -
f a i l u r e to p h y s i c a l l y respond should not imply a f a i l u r e to 
understand. 
Gestalt psychologists argue that the human i n t e l l e c t does 
not perceive things i n the world as unrelated fragments, but, 
r a t h e r , as c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of elements, themes or meaningfully 
organised wholes. I t has been suggested-^ that such a 
psychological theory of formal o r g a n i s a t i o n , or organic u n i t y , 
has precedents i n Kant's theory of aesthetic judgement. More 
r e c e n t l y , though, Gombrich has suggested t h a t when we i n t e r p r e t 
i n f o r m a t i o n from a p a i n t i n g we exercise consistency t e s t s to 
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compare the messages we receive from various parts of the 
p a i n t i n g f o r t h e i r c o m p a t i b i l i t y w i t h the whole. But, i n a 
broader sense, we are also comparing and modifying what we 
expect to see w i t h what we a c t u a l l y do see. We attend to a 
'good' work of a r t as a whole. I n p a i n t i n g we respond to a 
combination of shape, t e x t u r e , colour and subject matter; i n 
music we respond to the combined gamuts of rhythm, volume and 
p i t c h ; i n l i t e r a t u r e we respond to the form, s t r u c t u r e , and 
content, and so on. 
However, when we encounter a second-rate p a i n t i n g , or 
piece of music, or work of l i t e r a t u r e , we become aware of the 
separate elements from which the whole i s constructed, perhaps 
i s o l a t i n g one p a r t i c u l a r feature as being at f a u l t , colour, 
rhythm or grammar, f o r instance. This might also be explained 
i n terms of the s i m p l i c i t y hypothesis,^ i n s o f a r as a shape, 
sound or sentence w i l l seem r i g h t unless our a t t e n t i o n i s drawn 
to i t . I f i t i s ' r i g h t ' we don't n o t i c e i t , i f i t i s 'wrong' i t 
stands out from the whole l i k e the p r o v e r b i a l sore thumb 
(although t h i s might w e l l have been the a r t i s t ' s i n t e n t i o n ) . 
This could be one c r i t e r i o n by which we could attempt to 
j u s t i f y an a e s t h e t i c judgement. Also, i n t h i s respect, Gestalt 
could e x p l a i n our i n t e l l e c t u a l d r i v e towards organising and 
ordering artworks i n t o h i e r a r c h i e s of what i s 'good' and 'not 
so good'; th a t i s , towards making aesthetic value judgements. 
When a c r i t i c makes such a value judgement i t i s usually 
supported by a j u s t i f i c a t i o n - an appeal to consensus opinion 
which he or she hopes w i l l correspond to the immediate 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e experience of the i n d i v i d u a l who, a f t e r 
reading h i s or her c r i t i c i s m , confronts the a r t o b j e c t . I n t h i s 
way the c r i t i c could be said to be making an appeal to our 
' c o l l e c t i v e s u b j e c t i v i t y ' or, to use Kant's terms, 'subjective 
u n i v e r s a l i t y ' . 
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Although Carl Jung's theories are now regarded w i t h a 
deal of suspicion, they - as w e l l as Freud's - are important 
to t h i s discussion not only because of the immense influence 
they have had on Modernist a r t i s t s and w r i t e r s but also because 
of the explanations they o f f e r about the behaviour of the 
i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i n the community, and of the community as a 
whole. From these theories i t i s tempting to construct a model 
whereby a ' s o p h i s t i c a t e d ' i n d i v i d u a l i s assumed to be a 
microcosm of the community, and a r t i s assumed to have a 
P l a t o n i c essence which pervades a l l types - perhaps what Jung 
i d e n t i f i e s as archetypal myths and symbols - from which i t can 
be suggested th a t ( i n a Humean sense) the p a r t i c u l a r , 
s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h i s 'sophisticated' i n d i v i d u a l 
ought to represent an ' o b j e c t i v e ' communal standard of 
e v a l u a t i o n - through the f a c u l t y of the c o l l e c t i v e unconscious. 
According to Jung: 
. . . Certain images are endowed with an intrinsic and constant 
significance.^ 
But t h i s i s , of course, d i f f i c u l t to prove or disprove and 
as such i s l a c k i n g i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l or psychological precision 
and a u t h o r i t y . Yet, despite t h i s , i t continues to preoccupy the 
minds of philosophers, psychologists and a r t i s t s a l i k e . I t s 
a t t r a c t i o n seems to l i e i n the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t our response to 
a r t , and the c r e a t i o n of the artwork i t s e l f , i s not as 
a r b i t r a r y as s u b j e c t i v i s t s would claim i t to be. Perhaps, 
ins t e a d , as c o l l e c t i v i s t s would have us b e l i e v e , periods, 
n a t i o n s , races, and classes are u n i f i e d psychological e n t i t i e s . 
As w e l l as suggesting t h a t we see patterns and shapes as 
u n i f i e d wholes, Gestalt psychologists also suggest that some 
formal aspects of a r t - l i n e s , shapes and tones - have 
emotional q u a l i t i e s . They maintain t h a t aesthetic perception 
involves an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of emotional meaning through 
seeing these formal q u a l i t i e s as an organised whole. Whilst 
there w i l l always be i n d i v i d u a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s i n the perception 
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and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of emotional and symbolic meaning 
according to the su b j e c t i v e expectations and emotional 
a t t i t u d e s of the p e r c i p i e n t - there w i l l also be a s i g n i f i c a n t 
degree of agreement. Let us, then, consider some examples of 
ae s t h e t i c p r o p e r t i e s , emotional q u a l i t i e s , and f e e l i n g tones 
t h a t have u n i v e r s a l connotations f o r our occidental u n i f i e d 
psychological e n t i t y : 
1. I f we are presented w i t h drawings of a s t r a i g h t l i n e 
and a s l i g h t l y curved l i n e and are asked which one we consider 
to be the more ' g r a c e f u l ' , we w i l l almost i n e v i t a b l y choose 
the curved l i n e - perhaps because we associate the contours of 
the human body w i t h gracefulness. 
2. I f we are asked to describe which of two pieces of 
music - one i n f a s t tempo, high p i t c h and high volume, the 
other i n slow tempo, low p i t c h and low volume - i s sad, we 
would almost i n v a r i a b l y chose the slow piece. Perhaps t h i s i s 
because sad people move slowly - the f u n e r a l march as oppose 
to the dance-step ( c f . Langer's account of t h i s i n terms of 
music being a symbol of an emotion). There i s also considerable 
agreement as to the a p p l i c a t i o n of c e r t a i n 'shape' descriptions 
to music, f o r example, jagged as oppose to square. Charles L. 
Stevenson o f f e r s another example of t h i s form of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : He suggests th a t Debussy's Reflections on the 
Water i s not r e l a t e d to the sound of the mood 'water' so much 
as to the way q u i e t l y shimmering water looks. He concludes that 
t h i s resemblance between sound and si g h t i s attended by a 
resemblance of mood as well.'^ 
3. I n f a n t s do not have to learn that a slow, s o f t l u l l a b y 
i s supposed to be soothing and s o p o r i f i c . S i m i l a r l y , we can 
t a l k of the v a r i e t i e s of musical i n t e r v a l s and chords i n terms 
of being tense and c o l d , or relaxed and warm. Our response i n 
such cases i s not to the chord i t s e l f but to the composer's 
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choice of the chord w i t h i n an organised s t r u c t u r e . I n a s i m i l a r 
sense the minor scale has the e f f e c t of expressing melancholy -
the major scale does the opposite. High p i t c h , as i n Hitchcock 
f i l m s , suggests tension - perhaps because i t evokes the 
screeching sounds tha t s t a r t l e d b i r d s make. This e f f e c t can 
also be achieved through j a r r i n g t o n a l opposites as i n the 
theme tune f o r Jaws. I t can also be achieved through a 
quickening, thumping drum-beat, as i n the p a l p i t a t i o n s of the 
hea r t . Conversely, a g e n t l e , slow r e p e t i t i v e drum-beat can 
evoke f e e l i n g s of s e c u r i t y , as i n the i n t e r n a l rhythms of the 
mother's womb. A l i g h t , t i n k l i n g sound, on the other hand, can 
be evocative of childhood, as i n Prokofiev's Peter and the 
Wolf. 
4. I f we are asked to look at two abstract shapes or 
c o n f i g u r a t i o n s - one 'smooth', rounded, and biomorphic, the 
other 'hard', angular and geometrical - and are asked which one 
we would describe as warm and relaxed, and which one as cold 
and tense, there would be considerable agreement. There would 
also be considerable agreement i f we were asked to say which 
shape we would describe as 'gold' and which as ' i r o n ' . I n t h i s 
respect we can say tha t even abstract a r t has 'meaning' .and 
th a t although my example need not be the one and only 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s meaning i t i s c e r t a i n l y an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which, because r e c u r r i n g , ought to be taken 
s e r i o u s l y . 
5. I f we are asked to choose which of the colours red and 
blue we t h i n k of as hot, or dangerous, or as a metaphor f o r 
vi o l e n c e , we choose red - because red i s associated w i t h f i r e 
and blood and t r a f f i c l i g h t s , j u s t as brown i s w i t h earth and 
excrement and, i n a less obvious, s o c i o l o g i c a l sense, purple 
i s associated w i t h r o y a l t y . I n t h i s respect we can also t a l k of 
synesthetic metaphors, such as red being a loud colour, or of 
black being a heavy colour. 
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6. I f we are asked which of the colours red and blue we 
t h i n k i s advancing out of the p i c t u r e plane and which receding 
i n t o i t , because of the laws of a e r i a l perspective there i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t unanimity - w i t h the i l l u s i o n that red colours 
advance being a property of 'redness'. 
7. I f we are asked to decide which of two drawn l i n e s , one 
h o r i z o n t a l one v e r t i c a l , we consider to be the most ' r e s t f u l ' 
we would almost i n v a r i a b l y chose the h o r i z o n t a l l i n e . This i s 
because we are subject to g r a v i t a t i o n and, as such, our n a t u r a l 
r e s t i n g p o s i t i o n i s h o r i z o n t a l . We sleep h o r i z o n t a l l y and f e e l 
secure t h a t we cannot f a l l from a h o r i z o n t a l p o s i t i o n . 
8. I n the physiognomic perception of p o r t r a i t p a i n t i n g we 
can a t t r i b u t e c e r t a i n intrasensory associations: a frowning 
face can be said to be dark, cold and b i t t e r ; w h i l s t a smiling 
face can be described as b r i g h t , warm and sweet. Also, 
t e l e v i s i o n and f i l m d i r e c t o r s o f t e n r e l y on the 'subliminal' 
t e l e v i s u a l l i t e r a c y of t h e i r audience, t h a t i s , the a b i l i t y to 
f i l l i n n a r r a t i v e gaps, and to associate c e r t a i n 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i t h c e r t a i n camera angles. For example, 
extreme close-ups of faces suggest v i l l a i n y by p i n - p o i n t i n g 
personal space invasion and f a c i a l tension which can be read i n 
terms of the d e c e i t f u l or g u i l t y nature of the character. 
Arguably, a l l these associations are u n i v e r s a l f o r 
r a t i o n a l Westerners and, i n most cases, Easterners as w e l l . 
They are not r e l a t i v e w i t h i n our c u l t u r e , and are not subject 
to the v a r i a t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t i v i t y . ^ I n the above 
examples a l l the shapes, colours and sounds can be said to have 
an equivalent n a t u r a l ' f e e l i n g tone'.^ The emotions we 
associate w i t h these p r o p e r t i e s - our equating c e r t a i n 
sensations, warm colours and smooth o u t l i n e s w i t h f e e l i n g s of 
w e l l - b e i n g and contentment, slow music w i t h melancholy, and so 
on - may be considered i n terms of poetic c l i c h e , but, 
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nonetheless, they do have a c e r t a i n o b j e c t i v e currency. Also, 
there are c e r t a i n symptoms f o r these emotions - laughing, 
c r y i n g , b l u s h i n g , and so f o r t h - t h a t can be considered 
o b j e c t i v e to the extent t h a t they are e x t e r n a l i s e d , observable 
and u n i v e r s a l . Surely t h i s i n d i cates that the f a m i l i a r 
s u b j e c t i v i s t l i n e , as t y p i f i e d , f o r example, i n the f o l l o w i n g 
q u o t a t i o n from B l e i c h , i s inadequate: 
The assumption derived from the objective paradigm that alL 
observers have the same perceptual response to a symboli:: 
object creates the illiLsinn that the object is real and that 
its meaning must reside in i t . ' 
Furthermore, there i s not only a c o r r e l a t i o n of 
associations but also of preferences. There have been numerous 
experiments conducted i n America th a t point to t h i s u n i f o r m i t y 
of preference f o r c e r t a i n colours and shapes. One such i s that 
of the psychologist Kate Gorden who found t h a t of two groups of 
one hundred students there was a c o r r e l a t i o n of between 97-99% 
o 
w i t h respect to the pleasing q u a l i t i e s of c e r t a i n rectangles.° 
S i m i l a r l y , Robert Sadacca conducted an experiment whereby 178 
students were asked to express preferences f o r c e r t a i n colours 
and designs presented i n a series of paired comparisons.^ To 
avoid preferences being explained i n terms of stereotype, h a l f 
of the colours were concrete - t h a t i s , i n r e l a t i o n to 
something s p e c i f i c such as a colour f o r a car - and h a l f were 
a b s t r a c t . Working on the p r i n c i p l e t h a t i f B i s preferred to A, 
and C to B, then i f C i s not p r e f e r r e d to A a ' c i r c u l a r t r i a d ' 
or reversed judgement has taken place, Sadacca discovered that 
of the 488 preferences made there could have been 420 
' t r i a d s ' , h a l f of which could have occurred by chance. I n 
a c t u a l f a c t there was only 37.5 ' t r i a d s ' . Thus p o i n t i n g to a 
consistency of preference which surely cannot be c o i n c i d e n t a l . 
I s there a ready explanation f o r this? Perhaps there i s . 
Whenever we see or hear a strange object or sound we are able 
to e i t h e r consciously or unconsciously associate i t w i t h , or 
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r e l a t e i t t o , something f a m i l i a r . We respond to s i t u a t i o n s i n 
meaningful contexts, hence the Gestalt tendency to organise 
u n f a m i l i a r shapes and sounds i n t o meaningful wholes. We p r o j e c t 
i n t o these f o r e i g n objects and sounds some facet of our shared 
or personal past experiences. Are our perceptions, then, 
determined by our c o l l e c t i v e and/or p r i v a t e sensory experiences 
- what Kant describes as seeing things not as they are but as 
we are? Whether t h i s view i s true or not i s , of course, one of 
the oldest and most problematic questions i n the h i s t o r y of 
ideas. Does the existence of things consist i n t h e i r being 
perceived? As i n Berkeley's o f t e n quoted example: Does a tree 
f a l l i n g i n a f o r e s t make any sound? Consider Osborne's 
explanation: 
The . . . idea of organic unity takes account of the concept 
of emergent collective properties . . . CoHectLve properties, 
or properties of collectLve wholes, are either reducible or 
emergent. Emergent properties of collective wholes are 
properties whijch are not logically entailed by the properties 
which its constituent parts manifest in other circumstances 
and the special relations in which they stand to each other in 
this particular whole . . . Judgments based upon apprehension 
of such collective wholes can reasonably claim universal 
intersubjectlve validity since their impact is upon a cognitLve 
faculty of awareness • • The power to appreciate in tWs way 
is an acquired skill , . 
I agree. But what about the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of ' p r i v a t e ' 
meaning? Does there come a point where p r i v a t e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
overlaps w i t h c o l l e c t i v e experience? I f so, i s t h i s the point 
at which a good p a i n t i n g becomes a great p a i n t i n g and the good 
p a i n t e r becomes a genius? I n the case of Picasso perhaps we 
only come to appreciate h i s p r i v a t e symbolism when he uses i t 
c o n s i s t e n t l y through h i s work (and even then i t i s s t i l l o f t e n 
ambiguous as, f o r instance, when he take a mythological subject 
l i k e the Minataur and invests i t w i t h p r i v a t e s i g n i f i c a n c e ) . 
How can we answer these questions? Perhaps one method would be 
to compare and co n t r a s t the responses of a number of 
i n d i v i d u a l s (under a n a l y s i s ) to the same work of a r t . As 
Gombrich suggests: 
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If the theory of unconscious com munixiatLon makes sense, i t 
could be tested through the recipients alone - i f their 
reports tally there was an inteisubjective meaning - like a 
cede for which there is a standard key. 
This 'code' i s best explained i n terms of what Jung c a l l s 
the ' c o l l e c t i v e unconscious', or 'objective psyche'. I t w i l l be 
r e c a l l e d t h a t h i s 'discovery' of t h i s myth-creating l e v e l of 
mind, came about as a consequence of h i s attempts to reconcile 
s u b j e c t i v e myths - as expressed through the delusional systems 
of h i s psychotic p a t i e n t s - w i t h e x t e r n a l , o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . 
By comparing these myths w i t h those of p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s and 
w i t h those of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s e d r e l i g i o n s he concluded that the 
myths were a means by which people make sense of t h e i r world 
[ c f . T.S. E l i o t ' s theory of the o b j e c t i v e c o r r e l a t i v e ] . He 
c i t e s as an example of t h i s mythology the b e l i e f - held by 
apparently sane C h r i s t i a n s - i n the s c i e n t i f i c a l l y impossible 
V i r g i n B i r t h . But Jung's much-discussed example of his 
paranoid schizophrenic p a t i e n t who, through ha l f - c l o s e d eyes, 
could see the phallus of the sun from which the wind 
o r i g i n a t e d , i s perhaps a more t e l l i n g case i n p o i n t . The 
p a t i e n t ' s v i s i o n or p r o j e c t i o n was i d e n t i c a l to one Jung came 
across years l a t e r i n a previously unpublished Greek l i t u r g y of 
the c u l t of Mithras. The p a t i e n t could not have known t h i s . 
Jung t h e r e f o r e concluded t h a t there are c e r t a i n myths and 
symbols which are archetypal. There are, of course, c e r t a i n 
p l a u s i b l e explanations f o r these myths and symbols. The 
s i m i l a r i t y of Hero myths, f o r instance, can be explained i n 
terms of the s i m i l a r l i f e experiences, acts of bravery and so 
f o r t h , t h a t occur i n d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s . The symbols of the 
snake as e v i l ; or the phallus as procreative power; or of the 
vessel as womb; or the house as a body; are s i m i l a r l y 
e x p l i c a b l e . As i s the concurrence of dream symbolism i n 
d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s , and at d i f f e r e n t periods of h i s t o r y . . . 
The problem w i t h these symbols, though, i s that a dream of a 
house may simply be a dream of a house and not of a symbolic 
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body. Also, because i t has no p r e d i c t i v e value, i t i s 
u l t i m a t e l y untestable from a s c i e n t i f i c p o i n t of view. 
The question t h a t we should address ourselves to i n 
r e l a t i o n to Jung's theory, however, i s t h i s : To what extent i s 
our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of symbolism i n p a i n t i n g learned and 
t h e r e f o r e o b j e c t i v e and to what extent i s i t i n s t i n c t i v e -
because determined by the c o l l e c t i v e unconscious - and 
t h e r e f o r e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e ? 
Contemporary psychologists suggest t h a t , because our 
everyday experiences are dependent upon previous experiences, 
we l e a r n to react to symbols ra t h e r than to t o t a l o r i g i n a l 
s t i m u l i . Perception, i n these terms, becomes a process of 
inference from past learned experiences. Such patterns of 
behaviour might be understood i n terms of a conditioned 
response r a t h e r than an i n s t i n c t i v e one. This i s a useful 
explanation f o r the way we c o l l e c t i v e l y respond to symbols i n 
a r t . 
I t might be t h a t there i s a f i x e d code f o r the 
transmission of symbols. Symbolic meaning may be an obje c t i v e 
'property' of the symbol. The language of l i t e r a t u r e and music 
has a symbolic r e l a t i o n to what i t s i g n i f i e s , and i n a s i m i l a r 
way p a i n t i n g has a mimetic r e l a t i o n to the signs i n obje c t i v e 
r e a l i t y . I t might be, t h e r e f o r e , that our perceptions of 
symbols are l i k e our perceptions of o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . They 
might themselves be sel e c t i o n s of r e a l i t y , that i s , e s s e n t i a l l y 
l i k e the objects t h a t are perceived, and therefore e m p i r i c a l l y 
v e r i f i a b l e . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , they might be l i k e s c i e n t i f i c 
hypotheses. According to Hermann von Helmholtz, perceptions are 
unconscious inferences from sensory and memory data; hence 
' i l l u s i o n s ' can be explained i n terms of mistaken perceptual 
inference - we see what we expect to see. I n comparing two 
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p a i n t i n g s , t h e r e f o r e , we tend to recognise s i m i l a r i t i e s and 
stereotypes r a t h e r than d i f f e r e n c e s . 
I n equating o b j e c t i v i t y of symbolic meaning w i t h 
u n i v e r s a l i t y of response I am merely suggesting one possible 
way i n which questions of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n might be treated 
o b j e c t i v e l y . My next question i s : Are these 'universal' 
responses discoverable e m p i r i c a l l y ? And, once discovered, do 
they f u r n i s h us w i t h o b j e c t i v e c r i t e r i a f o r a) i n t e r p r e t i n g a 
work of a r t and b) assigning a value to i t ? Like Gombrich I am 
uncomfortable w i t h the notion that there i s a c o l l e c t i v e 
s p i r i t which governs the perception of a r t . Rather, l i k e him, I 
suspect t h a t i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t we w i l l recognise a family 
resemblance between symbolic p a i n t i n g s that are developed at a 
s i m i l a r time and place. I n t h i s respect the a r t i s t ' s p r i v a t e 
symbolic meaning becomes rel e v a n t only when i t coincides w i t h 
p u b l i c symbolic, and therefore o b j e c t i v e , meaning. Gombrich 
again: 
The point about . . . paintings is not that their creator, Kke 
all of us, has an unconscious in which these archaic modes of 
syrabolization Kve on; nor even that Hke all of us he partakes 
in his mind of the qualities of Oedipus, Pygmalian, and perhaps 
of Bkiebeard. The point is that he found himself in a situation 
in which his private conflicts acquired artistic relevance. 
Without the social factors, what we may term the attitudes of 
the audience, the style or the trend, the private needs could 
not be transmuted into art. In this transmutation the private 
meaning is all but swallowed up. 
I discussed i n the opening to t h i s chapter the o b j e c t i v e 
Gestalt q u a l i t y of reading two dots and a curve w i t h i n a 
c i r c l e as being a face. Such physiognomic perception i s surely 
u n i v e r s a l . But there i s also the phenomenon of pysiognomic 
f a l l a c y to consider. That i s , the apparently subjective a b i l i t y 
to 'see' faces i n clouds, or i n k - b l o t s , or wallpaper and so 
on."^ -* I n the a p p r e c i a t i o n of abstract a r t , t h i s , l i k e the 
a b i l i t y to form myths, may be p a r t i a l l y explained i n terms of a 
compulsion to render i n t e l l i g i b l e the seemingly u n i n t e l l i g a b l e . 
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According to Rorschach, i f we see i n k - b l o t s as wholes then 
t h i s i n d i c a t e s a preference f o r abstract ideas, whereas 
r e a c t i n g to the b l o t s as d e t a i l s indicates a preference f o r 
concrete r e a l i t i e s . So, even w i t h these apparently subjective 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of random patterns and configurations there i s 
a seemingly u n i v e r s a l standard by which responses can be 
analysed. There i s also an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e element insofar as 
we are able to p o i n t to d i f f e r e n t areas of an i n k - b l o t and 
expl a i n which p a r t i s , say, the hand, which part the le g , which 
the head, and so on. I n t h i s way other people can then 'see' 
the same f i g u r e t h a t we s u b j e c t i v e l y 'see', even though i t s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are not a c t u a l l y there but are only imagined to 
be there. 
I n h i s essay Aesthetic Perception and O b j e c t i v i t y , V i r g i l 
C. A l d r i c h argues t h a t : 
Thinking physicaHstdcalLy . . . one is required to say both 
that what grounds . . . aesthetic experience is the experience 
of physical objects, and that their physical objects have the 
sort of objectivity that predudes them from det^mining what 
subjectively (imaginatively) counts as aesthetic experience.•'• 
What I take t h i s to mean i s that our aesthetic experiences 
are o b j e c t i v e i n v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t they are provoked by 
phy s i c a l o b j e c t s ; y e t , pa r a d o x i c a l l y , they are subjective i n 
v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t they are aesthetic experiences. 
However, i t could be argued th a t i l l u s i o n s , j u s t l i k e physical 
o b j e c t s , have 'physical q u a l i t i e s ' t h a t can be imaginatively, 
but nevertheless o b j e c t i v e l y , 'seen'. I s , then, perceived 
a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t i v i t y the same t h i n g as physical o b j e c t i v i t y ? 
Are both p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r ae s t h e t i c experience? Again, the 
d i s t i n c t i o n seems to be between what we can imagine 'with our 
eyes open' and what i s p h y s i c a l l y there, and not simply 
determined by the imagination. 
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With reference to the duck/rabbit f i g u r e , A l d r i c h suggests 
t h a t i f we 'see' the duck aspect we can do so only i f our eyes 
are open. We are not imagining i t . However: 
I f . . . you imagine something about what you see, 'see' is an 
observation term, and what you see is a physical object some 
of whose physical qualities you are overlooking in favour of 
other physical qualities i t might have had . . . This is not to 
see i t as anything, or to see anything 'in' i t , in the 
aesthetically relevant sense, SucH" perception is not aesthetic 
I t is observation, not prehension. 
I f A l d r i c h i s implying here th a t what the imagination sees 
i s a e s t h e t i c a l l y i r r e l e v a n t i f i t does not coincide w i t h what 
there i s a c t u a l l y , i m a g i n a t i v e l y , 'out there' to see, then I 
would go along w i t h t h i s . However, A l d r i c h seems to be 
confusing the a e s t h e t i c experience to be had from seeing 
o b j e c t i v e representations, t h a t i s , i l l u s i o n i s t i c and r e a l i s t i c 
ones, w i t h the apparent s u b j e c t i v i t y of imagining physical 
objects to be something other than what they a c t u a l l y are, that 
i s , 'seeing as'. To the extent t h a t a determinate aesthetic 
o b j e c t may be p h y s i c a l or phenomenal i t may be ' o b j e c t i v e l y ' 
'seen' as something other than i t a c t u a l l y i s . 
A l d r i c h argues th a t what makes representations o b j e c t i v e 
i s the f a c t t h a t i t i s objects t h a t are represented. He goes on 
to argue t h a t t h i s i s not the case f o r expressive content. Yet 
i n some Modern A r t surely the expression i£ p h y s i c a l l y 
o b j e c t i f i e d i n terms of painted abstractions (as, f o r instance, 
w i t h Rothko's 'melancholic' p a i n t i n g s ) ? The point i s t h a t as 
long as one observer can make another observer 'see' what he or 
she i s s u b j e c t i v e l y and i m a g i n a t i v e l y seeing a physical object 
as; what he or she i s reading i n t o t h a t physical object; and 
how he or she i s i n t e r p r e t i n g i t s meaning; then h i s or her 
observations can be said to take on an o b j e c t i v e currency. I 
suggested i n Chapter Five that disputes among two experts might 
be resolved through an appeal to the o b j e c t i v e properties of 
the a r t object i n question. Disagreement occurs when these 
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p r o p e r t i e s are not perceived i n a s i m i l a r manner. As P r a t t has 
convincingly argued, •'•^  the same stimulus when viewed from 
d i f f e r e n t angles and a t t i t u d e s , w i l l give r i s e to a v a r i e t y of 
d i f f e r e n t perceptual organisations, a, b, c . . . z. The same 
c r i t i c may s l i p from one such angle or a t t i t u d e , a to d, 
perhaps u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , thus g i v i n g a d i f f e r e n t judgement, 
even thought the stimulus has not changed. When c r i t i c s 
disagree i t i s perhaps, t h e r e f o r e , because one i s judging b 
w h i l s t the other i s judging f . 
But how could t h i s o b j e c t i v i t y be tested? 
I n h i s essays The Psychologist's Search For S c i e n t i f i c 
O b j e c t i v i t y I n Aesthetics and The Construction of Objective 
Tests Of A Form Of Aesthetic Judgement, Gorden Westland 
i d e n t i f i e s three methods - as used i n experimental psychology 
by means of which the o b j e c t i v i t y , or otherwise, of 
a e s t h e t i c judgements might be established. These are: i ) The 
mechanism of ae s t h e t i c apprehension, f o r instance, eye-
movements during perception of aesthetic objects; and 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n d i v i d u a l colour perception, i i ) Sociological 
studies of how people a c t u a l l y respond to aesthetic m a t e r i a l , 
and to what extent there i s agreement ( t h i s deals w i t h the 
c o l l e c t i n g of q u a n t i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n about people's r e a c t i o n s ) . 
And i i i ) The c o n s t r u c t i o n of t e s t s to measure c e r t a i n aspects 
of a e s t h e t i c response and performance. 
One of the problems t h a t Westland associates w i t h 
experimental psychology i n t h i s area i s that t e s t s are often 
dependent on 'reports' by subjects about t h e i r experience. They 
deal w i t h the way people claim t h a t they respond. Apart from 
eye-movement which can be o b j e c t i v e l y observed, these reports 
necessarily involve an element of s u b j e c t i v i t y . Westland 
concludes t h a t because of t h i s the experiments can only ever 
r e a l l y provide o b j e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n about how people say they 
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p e r c e i v e r a t h e r than about how they a c t u a l l y p e r c e i v e . However, 
I would argue t h a t i f reasons have t o be g i v e n f o r r e p o r t s ; and 
i f these t e s t s were conducted upon a l a r g e enough group; and i f 
t h e r e s u l t s were t r e a t e d s t a t i s t i c a l l y ; then the r e p o r t s would 
e n t a i l a degree o f o b j e c t i v i t y . I t c o u l d be argued t h a t , i n a 
s i m i l a r manner, sci e n c e i s the p o o l i n g t o g e t h e r of i n d i v i d u a l 
a t t e m p t s t o understand e x p e r i e n c e . S c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s , i n 
t h i s sense, the a c c u m u l a t i o n of p e r s o n a l ' r e p o r t s ' . I t i s the 
agreement of these ' r e p o r t s ' - o r , as suggested i n the p r e v i o u s 
c h a p t e r , ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ' - t h a t makes f o r o b j e c t i v e 
s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. Here, though, t h e r e i s a s h i f t of 
emphasis from p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s i n t h i s t h e s i s . The p o i n t here 
i s whether or n o t the t e s t s can e s t a b l i s h the o b j e c t i v i t y of 
t h e a e s t h e t i c judgements of the s u b j e c t . I t does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y o b t a i n t h a t the o b j e c t i v i t y o f the a e s t h e t i c v a l u e 
o f t h e o b j e c t i s a l s o b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d . What i s being 
i n v e s t i g a t e d here i s the response o f the s u b j e c t t o the 
o b j e c t , n o t the o b j e c t i t s e l f . 
Westland proposes an o b j e c t i v e process of measurement 
which may a f f o r d a s t a n d a r d of judgement a g a i n s t which 
i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n a p p r e c i a t i o n might be measured. He 
proposes such a t e s t a long the f o l l o w i n g l i n e s : L i t e r a r y 
s e l e c t i o n s from v a r i o u s a u t h o r s - some aut h o r s r e p r e s e n t e d by 
one p i e c e o n l y , some by two or t h r e e - would be presented t o a 
s u b j e c t i n a p r e d e t e r m i n e d sequence, the s u b j e c t has t o then, 
match the p i e c e s a c c o r d i n g t o common a u t h o r s h i p . Thus the 
s u b j e c t i s e i t h e r f a c t u a l l y r i g h t or wrong i n h i s or her 
s e l e c t i o n s . The s c o r i n g would be f r e e from s u b j e c t i v e judgement 
and the t e s t would t h e r e f o r e be o b j e c t i v e l y d e f i n a b l e . Because 
the s u b j e c t i s n o t asked t o make va l u e judgements, but r a t h e r 
t o d e c i d e on a s c e r t a i n a b l e f a c t , t he experimenter would be able 
t o score the r e s u l t s a c c o r d i n g t o f a c t s . 
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T h i s t e s t i s a u s e f u l one, as f a r as i t goes. The problem 
w i t h t h i s t e s t , though, i s t h a t , s t r i c t l y speaking, i t i s not 
the s u b j e c t ' s a b i l i t y t o make sound a e s t h e t i c judgements t h a t 
i s b e i n g t e s t e d . I t i s something more a k i n t o an a b i l i t y t o 
d i s c r i m i n a t e s t y l e . Perhaps a more u s e f u l t e s t c o u l d be 
c o n s t r u c t e d u s i n g more than one a r t form, and by a s k i n g more 
q u e s t i o n s of the s u b j e c t . By t h i s I have i n mind a s i m i l a r t e s t 
o n l y u s i n g s e l e c t i o n s o f p a i n t i n g s , and passages of music, as 
w e l l as t h e s e l e c t i o n s o f l i t e r a t u r e proposed by Westland. This 
m i g h t a f f o r d a b e t t e r i n d i c a t i o n of the s u b j e c t ' s j u d g i n g 
a b i l i t y . ( I am assuming h e r e , f o r the sake of argument, t h a t 
s i m i l a r a e s t h e t i c q u a l i t i e s are t o be found i n the t h r e e 
d i f f e r e n t a r t forms.) 
I n t h i s t e s t t he s u b j e c t would have t o arrange the 
s e l e c t i o n s , a c c o r d i n g t o a r t i s t , composer and a u t h o r , f o r each 
se p a r a t e t e s t . He or she would then have t o p r o v i d e reasons f o r 
s e l e c t i n g as he or she d i d . Because some s u b j e c t s might be l e s s 
a r t i c u l a t e than o t h e r s these reasons c o u l d be s e l e c t e d from a 
m u l t i - c h o i c e of s i x reasons, o n l y one of which i s ' c o r r e c t ' . 
For i n s t a n c e , w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o s e l e c t i o n s of Van Gogh's work, 
reason 1, might be; 'Because the a r t i s t uses a monochrome 
p a l e t t e ' ; whereas reason 6., the c o r r e c t reason, might be: 
'Because the a r t i s t e x p r e s s i o n i s t i c a l l y a p p l i e s the p a i n t i n a 
t h i c k i m p a s t o ' o F i n a l l y , the s u b j e c t c o u l d be asked t o arrange 
the a r t i s t s , composers and a u t h o r s i n o r d e r of t a l e n t . This 
would be judged a c c o r d i n g t o c r i t e r i a x, y and z, ( f o r 
i n s t a n c e , those suggested i n Chapter Four; t e c h n i c a l a b i l i t y , 
e x p r e s s i v e n e s s , and so f o r t h ) . 
I f t h e s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t which these judgements were made 
was s e t by the e l i t e - o f competent c r i t i c s , j u d g i n g over 
s e v e r a l g e n e r a t i o n s - t h a t I proposed i n Chapters F i v e and 
Seven; and i f t h e group d o i n g the t e s t was l a r g e enough; and i f 
t h e r e were obvious d i f f e r e n c e s i n the s t y l e s (and indeed the 
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t a l e n t s ) o f the a r t i s t s , composers and a u t h o r s s e l e c t e d ( f o r 
example, Raphael compared t o Lowry, Mozart compared t o John 
Cage, T o l s t o y compared t o S h i r l e y Conran) t h e n , a r g u a b l y , the 
t e s t would measure more than an a b i l i t y t o d i s c r i m i n a t e s t y l e . 
I t would measure whether or not the s u b j e c t had d i s c r i m i n a t i n g , 
'mature' t a s t e , w h i c h , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d i n 
terms o f an a b i l i t y t o make sound a e s t h e t i c judgements. ( I do 
accept h e r e , however, t h a t d e f i n i n g a e s t h e t i c v a l u e i n terras of 
a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e may l e a d t o c i r c u l a r i t y . By t h i s I mean 
one might o n l y be a b l e t o d e f i n e the n a t u r e of a e s t h e t i c 
e x p e r i e n c e by c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t and the 
n a t u r e o f t h i s a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t might o n l y be d e f i n a b l e i n 
terms o f i t s c a p a c i t y t o e l i c i t a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e . ) 
Arguably though, what t h i s t e s t would i n d i c a t e i s t h a t 
competent judges a r r i v e a t ( o r ought t o a r r i v e a t ) the same 
c o n c l u s i o n s ; and t h a t i f t h e r e i s a s i g n i f i c a n t l e v e l of 
agreement among the members of the group f o r which the t e s t i s 
designed then the t e s t c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d o b j e c t i v e . 
A d m i t t e d l y , t h i s may o n l y be a measure of the s u b j e c t ' s 
agreement w i t h s t a n d a r d . I n o t h e r words, f a c t s r a t h e r than 
v a l u e s are b e i n g measured; and a e s t h e t i c judgements i n v o l v e 
more than f a c t s . A l s o , i t c o u l d be argued t h a t t h i s t e s t does 
n o t take i n t o account the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t : 
( 1 ) S u b j e c t s may judge a c c o r d i n g t o how they t h i n k they 
ought t o j u d g e , t h a t i s , they may c l a i m t o p r e f e r T o l s t o y to 
S h i r l e y Conran when r e a l l y , s u b j e c t i v e l y , they do n o t . 
C e r t a i n l y t h i s would undermine the o b j e c t i v i t y of t h e i r 
judgement ( a l t h o u g h the f a c t t h a t they have a concept of how 
they ought t o j u d g e , would be r e v e a l i n g ! ) by the same token, 
though, i t would a l s o undermine the s u b j e c t i v i t y of t h e i r 
judgement. A l s o , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o determine the e x t e n t t o 
w h i c h i n t r o s p e c t i o n a f f e c t s the r e p o r t , t h a t i s , the s u b j e c t s ' 
e x p e r i e n c e might be d i f f e r e n t from what they would be 
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e x p e r i e n c i n g i f they were n o t paying a t t e n t i o n t o themselves. 
Perhaps i t must be accepted, t h e n , t h a t t h e r e w i l l always be 
room f o r e r r o r - a percentage o f those t e s t e d , say 25%, whose 
judgements have t o be d i s c o u n t e d . 
( 2 ) The members o f the group who judge ' i n c o r r e c t l y ' may 
be proved t o be c o r r e c t by f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s of competent 
c r i t i c s . But perhaps t h i s p r o v i s o c o u l d be s e t aside i f we were 
t o add the q u a l i f i c a t i o n t h a t our s t a n d a r d was c o n t e x t -
s p e c i f i c , t h a t i s , not an a b s o l u t e t i m e l e s s s t a n d a r d , but 
r a t h e r a h i s t o r i c a l l y and c u l t u r a l l y r e l a t i v e one. 
A few words a l s o need t o be s a i d about the c o n d i t i o n s i n 
which these experiments are conducted. The s u b j e c t s should be 
p r e s e n t e d w i t h the s e l e c t i o n s of l i t e r a t u r e , music and 
p a i n t i n g , i n i s o l a t i o n from the o t h e r members of the group. I 
say t h i s because, as w i t h the problem mentioned above ( o f 
s u b j e c t s c l a i m i n g t o have responses t h a t they do not have) 
t h e r e c o u l d be a tendency, i n l i s t e n i n g t o the music a t l e a s t , 
toward mob psychology. 
A f u r t h e r c a u t i o n a r y note suggests i t s e l f h ere. To analyse 
a r t i n t h i s way i s t o murder i n o r d e r t o d i s s e c t . A good 
i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s i s t o be found i n one of l a s t year's 
b i g g e s t and most s u r p r i s i n g Hollywood b o x - o f f i c e h i t s , Dead 
Poets S o c i e t y . I n t h i s f i l m Mr K e a t i n g , a r o m a n t i c E n g l i s h 
t e a c h e r p l a y e d by Robin W i l l i a m s , r a i l s a g a i n s t the 'armies of 
academics g o i n g f o r w a r d measuring p o e t r y ' . He i n v i t e s h i s 
p u p i l s t o r i p out a c h a p t e r from t h e i r t e x t books e n t i t l e d 
'Understanding P o e t r y ' . The a u t h o r of t h i s c h a p t e r , Dr J. Evans 
P r i c h a r d , b e l i e v e s t h a t the greatness of a poem can be 
measured by p l o t t i n g i t s ' t o t a l area' on a graph, w i t h i t s 
f o r m a l ' p e r f e c t i o n ' on t h e h o r i z o n t a l , and the 'importance' of 
the poems c o n t e n t c a l c u l a t e d on the v e r t i c a l . K e a t i n g concludes 
t h a t t h i s i s 'excrement', t h a t p o e t r y cannot be d e s c r i b e d i n 
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terms of American Bandstand: ' I l i k e Byron,' he mocks, ' l gave 
him 42 b u t you c a n ' t dance t o i t ' . . . 
W i t h t h i s p o i n t t a k e n , t h e n , would such a t e s t as I have 
o u t l i n e d above (on the Westland model) p r o v i d e a means by 
which a e s t h e t i c v a l u e judgements o f the form 'X i s more 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y v a l u a b l e than Y' c o u l d be made? According t o what 
c r i t e r i a , i f any, can T o l s t o y ' s w r i t i n g be s a i d t o be more 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y v a l u a b l e than t h a t o f S h i r l e y Conran? Beardsley, 
among o t h e r s , p r o v i d e s an answer. The key word i n these s o r t 
o f judgements i s ' c a p a c i t y ' . ^ ^ Beardsley argues, r i g h t l y i n my 
view, t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t 'X i s a good a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t ' should 
be taken t o mean 'X i s capable o f p r o d u c i n g b e t t e r a e s t h e t i c 
e x p e r i e n c e s ' , where ' b e t t e r ' means 'of g r e a t e r magnitude'. 
Thus X can be s a i d t o be a b e t t e r a e s t h e t i c o b j e c t than Y i n 
v i r t u e o f X's c a p a c i t y t o produce b e t t e r a e s t h e t i c experiences 
than Y i n an a e s t h e t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e person. I t f o l l o w s t h a t 
the a e s t h e t i c v a l u e o f X can be measured i n terms of a 
comparison w i t h Y and t h a t the statement 'X i s a good a e s t h e t i c 
o b j e c t ' means t h a t 'X has a e s t h e t i c v a l u e ' . To paraphrase 
B e a r d s l e y , t h e n , a good a r t o b j e c t has v a l u e i f i t has the 
c a p a c i t y t o produce a v a l u a b l e a e s t h e t i c experience. The v a l u e 
o f 'good' a r t , i n t h i s case, i s an i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e . 
Mr K e a t i n g might o b j e c t t h a t t o attempt t o c o n s t r u c t 
t e s t s t o analyse a e s t h e t i c judgement i s t o t r i v i a l i s e the 
a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e and t o miss the p o i n t . To the e x t e n t t h a t 
I t h i n k s t a t i s t i c s c a r r y l i t t l e w e i g h t i n the f i e l d o f 
a e s t h e t i c s I must accept t h i s c r i t i c i s m . However, the e x e r c i s e 
i s n o t e n t i r e l y f u t i l e . I t enables us t o e x p l a i n and t h e r e f o r e 
b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d the phenomenon o f a e s t h e t i c judgement by 
analogy from the s i m p l e t o the complex. The Mr K e a t i n g approach 
can never be a n y t h i n g o t h e r than s i m p l e . 
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B e f o r e c o n c l u d i n g t h i s t h e s i s i t w i l l be w e l l t o o f f e r a 
few comments by way o f r e f i n e m e n t and c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f my 
p o s i t i o n . I w i l l do t h i s t h r o u g h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h r e e 
q u e s t i o n s t h a t i t has r a i s e d . 
Q u e s t i o n : How can a e s t h e t i c judgements be a n y t h i n g o t h e r 
t h a n s u b j e c t i v e ? Answer: By b e i n g supported by r e l e v a n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f form and c o n t e n t . Such i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s may 
be r e l a t i v e t o a g i v e n a r t i s t i c , l i t e r a r y or m u s i c a l genre, and 
r e l a t i v e t o a g i v e n c u l t u r e , b u t not r e l a t i v e t o any g i v e n 
i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i n the c u l t u r e unless the s u b j e c t i v e 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the i n d i v i d u a l c o i n c i d e w i t h the 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the c o l l e c t i v e . There i£ 
such a t h i n g as an ' e x p e r t ' c r i t i c and those who share the 
s u p e r i o r i n t e l l e c t u a l equipment o f the ' e x p e r t ' c r i t i c , and are 
s i m i l a r l y c o n s t i t u t e d , ought t o share h i s or her considered 
o p i n i o n . 
Q u e s t i o n : What i f two such ' e x p e r t ' c r i t i c s disagree? 
Answer: The i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y o f i n t e r p r e t i v e c r i t i c a l 
judgements i s n e g o t i a b l e , r e l a t i v e t o a g i v e n community. 
I n i t i a l l y t h e judgement i s f a c i l i t a t e d by a s u b j e c t i v e 
response, i t then a c q u i r e s a more o b j e c t i v e s t a t u s through 
' s t r e n g t h o f argument'. U l t i m a t e l y , i t must stand the t e s t o f 
t i m e . That i s , s u r v i v e p r o t r a c t e d d i s p u t e s among an e l i t e o f 
e x p e r t s w i t h i n the c r i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s ( i n t h i s r e g a r d the 
judgements o f c e r t a i n 'eminent' c r i t i c s such as Ruskin on 
W h i s t l e r , or T o l s t o y on King Lear, or E l i o t on Hamlet have not 
w i t h s t o o d t h e t e s t o f t i m e ) . 
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Que s t i o n : How i s t h i s 'judgement' d i f f e r e n t from a 
response o f t a s t e ? Answer: The a e s t h e t i c judgement i s made i n 
the form o f a c l a i m supported by a reasoned j u s t i f i c a t i o n which 
r e f e r s t o the o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s o f the work of a r t . I can 
o n l y a e s t h e t i c a l l y e v a l u a t e Supper a t Emmaus i f : Supper a t 
Emmaus, the o b j e c t , has a e s t h e t i c a l l y v a l u a b l e p r o p e r t i e s ; I 
e x p e r i e n t i a l l y take p l e a s u r e i n c o n t e m p l a t i n g these 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y v a l u a b l e p r o p e r t i e s ; and the a e s t h e t i c a l l y 
v a l u a b l e p r o p e r t i e s o f Supper a t Emmaus and my e x p e r i e n t i a l l y 
t a k i n g the Supper a t Emmaus t o have a e s t h e t i c a l l y v a l u a b l e 
p r o p e r t i e s a re c o g n i t i v e l y r e l a t e d . R e s p o n s e s o f t a s t e occur 
w i t h i n t h e s u b j e c t i v e d i a l e c t i c on a more s i m p l e , lower l e v e l 
t han t h e a e s t h e t i c judgements (qua c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s ) which 
they i n f o r m on th e h i g h e r , more complex l e v e l . T his d i s t i n c t i o n 
between t a s t e and judgement might be cons i d e r e d i n terms of 
the d i f f e r e n c e between an a r t o b j e c t being admired and 
s a t i s f y i n g , and i t s b e i n g a d m i r a b l e and s a t i s f a c t o r y . Taste may 
l e g i t i m a t e l y concern i t s e l f w i t h t h i s m y s t e r i o u s 'Factor X' 
known as 'beauty' b u t i t i s t o the l e v e l o f judgement t h a t we 
must l o o k t o decide what i s 'good'. 
Judgements about the v a l u e o f a r t are bei n g made a l l the 
ti m e . From A r t s C o u n c i l d e c i s i o n s about which dance companies 
are most d e s e r v i n g o f sub s i d y ; t o the Booker P r i z e committee 
a r r i v i n g a t a 'democratic' d e c i s i o n ; t o simple domestic choices 
as t o what p a i n t i n g s we can ' l i v e w i t h ' . A e s t h e t i c judgements, 
t h e n , are the c o n s t a n t form o f a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e . They are 
the means by which we seek t o answer t he p e r e n n i a l q u e s t i o n : 
What i s a r t ? My arguments c o n c e r n i n g the n a t u r e of these 
judgements have taken two forms: 1. That judgements i n v o l v e the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between a s u b j e c t and an o b j e c t ; and 2. t h a t i n 
or d e r t o judge a p p r o p r i a t e l y we must f i r s t be able t o 
a p p r e c i a t e , and t h a t i n ord e r t o a p p r e c i a t e we must make 
a p p r o p r i a t e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f , and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f , our 
sensory p e r c e p t i o n s o f p h y s i c a l or phenomenological p r o p e r t i e s . 
Nigel Famdale Page 167 of 192 
Chapter Twelve ConckisLon 
A e s t h e t i c v a l u e i n p a i n t i n g and l i t e r a t u r e i s n o t something 
t h a t n e c e s s a r i l y r e v e a l s i t s e l f t o the u n t u t o r e d eye. These are 
educated a r t forms which demand a degree of i n s t r u c t i o n . The 
v a r i o u s a r t s p e r t a i n i n g t o the Modernist movement, f o r 
i n s t a n c e , r e q u i r e , f o r t h e i r comprehension, t h e o r e t i c a l 
c r i t e r i a d i f f e r e n t from those a p p r o p r i a t e t o t r a d i t i o n a l 
movements - as w i t h , f o r example, the t h e o r i e s of 
' f r a g m e n t a t i o n ' and 'stream-of-consciousness' . How en j o y a b l e 
would E l i o t ' s The Wasteland be f o r someone who does not have 
th e background knowledge r e q u i r e d t o understand i t s 
re f e r e n c e s ? L i t e r a t u r e , p a i n t i n g and, t o a l e s s e r e x t e n t , music 
are c o n c e p t u a l because they employ an i n t e l l e c t u a l and 
a f f e c t i v e language. And a l l language i s c o n c e p t u a l . 
To sum up: I began, i n Chapter One, by d e f i n i n g the terms 
s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e , and by making a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s o f c o n t e n t , and responses o f t a s t e t o 
form. I compared the d i f f e r e n t types o f statement u t t e r e d i n 
each case, namely 'This i s good' as oppose t o ' I l i k e t h i s ' . 
I n Chapter Two I gave an e x p o s i t i o n o f Hume's o b j e c t i v i s t 
Standard o f Taste and c r i t i c i s e d i t on the grounds of i t s 
c i r c u l a r i t y . I discus s e d Hume's c r i t e r i a f o r what makes a 
q u a l i f i e d judge - a d e l i c a t e s e n t i m e n t , p r a c t i c e , a s t r o n g 
sense, and l a c k of p r e j u d i c e - and agreed w i t h Hume's 
s u g g e s t i o n t h a t n o t everyone shares the same c a p a c i t y t o 
a p p r e c i a t e . I a l s o agreed w i t h h i s a s s o c i a t i o n i s t theory 
i n s o f a r as i t concluded t h a t g e n e r a l a e s t h e t i c terms c o u l d be 
used i n r e f e r e n c e t o the p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t i e s of the o b j e c t t o 
the e x t e n t t h a t the meaning o f the words was u n i v e r s a l l y 
u n d e r s t o o d . A l s o , i n r e l a t i o n t o t h i s , I discussed the 
E i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y B r i t i s h E m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n , w i t h 
p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e t o Burke's ' p s y c h o l o g i c a l ' t h e o r i e s on 
i m a g i n a t i o n and reason. I n Chapter Three I o f f e r e d an 
e x p o s i t i o n o f Kant's ' s u b j e c t i v i s t ' C r i t i q u e of Judgement and 
c r i t i c i s e d i t on the grounds t h a t i t s c l a i m t h a t judgement d i d 
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n o t i n v o l v e concepts was u n c o n v i n c i n g and p a r a d o x i c a l . This 
t h e o r y i n t r o d u c e d t h e terms i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , u n i v e r s a l i t y and 
d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s , and argued t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements were 
l o c a t e d i n t h e f a c u l t y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g r a t h e r than the 
f a c u l t i e s o f reason or s e n s i b i l i t y . I took a c r i t i c a l l o o k a t 
Kant's f o u r moments - r e l a t i o n , q u a l i t y , q u a n t i t y , and m o d a l i t y 
- and c r i t i c i s e d h i s t h e o r y on the grounds t h a t ( i ) 'the 
b e a u t i f u l ' does n o t admit of degrees o f beauty; t h a t ( i i ) h i s 
d i s t i n c t i o n between beauty and non-beauty i s inadequate because 
th e procedures f o r d e t e r m i n i n g them are the same i n each case; 
t h a t ( i i i ) judgements o f non-dependent, non-conceptual beauty 
are i p s o f a c t o non-communicable; and t h a t ( i v ) the 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f beauty cannot r e s t on p l e a s u r e alone because 
u g l y o b j e c t s can be p l e a s u r a b l e a l s o . For t h i s reason I found 
h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f 'the good', as oppose t o 'the agreeable' or 
'the b e a u t i f u l ' more u s e f u l i n v i r t u e o f i t s b e i n g c o n c e p t u a l . 
I a l s o d i s a g r e e d w i t h Kant's argument t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements 
o f t a s t e a re concerned e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h form. On the ot h e r 
hand, I was s y m p a t h e t i c t o h i s view t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements 
ought t o meet w i t h agreement i n v i r t u e of t h e i r u n i v e r s a l 
s u b j e c t i v i t y . I argued t h a t no 'ought' judgement can l a y c l a i m 
even t o q u a s i - o b j e c t i v i t y unless r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n s i b l e (pace 
Kant's procedure t o r a t i o n a l l y defend the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e 
v a l i d i t y o f a e s t h e t i c judgements i n g e n e r a l w h i l s t i n s i s t i n g 
t h a t t h e r e a re no u n i v e r s a l i s a b l e reasons why any p a r t i c u l a r 
o b j e c t s h o u l d be deemed b e a u t i f u l ) . I a l s o agreed i n p a r t w i t h 
h i s a t t e m p t e d r e s o l u t i o n o f the antinomy o f t a s t e , b u t noted 
t h a t t h e r e s o l u t i o n would be rendered more c o n v i n c i n g i f i t 
were accepted t h a t concepts were i n v o l v e d . 
I n Chapter Four I suggested t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements 
i n v o l v e d more than t h e p l e a s u r a b l e c o n t e m p l a t i o n of beauty. I 
argued t h a t n o t a l l judgements are e q u a l l y v a l i d , and I 
s u p p o r t e d t h i s argument by an analogy w i t h the procedures of 
s c i e n t i f i c judgement. I then o u t l i n e d some ' r e l e v a n t ' concept-
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c r i t e r i a by means o f which a s t r i c t l y d e t e r m i n a t e q u a s i -
o b j e c t i v e a e s t h e t i c judgement might be made. I gave some 
examples o f these c r i t e r i a , such as genre c r i t i c i s m , 
' i m p r o v a b i l i t y ' , and degrees o f c o m p l e x i t y , i n t e n s i t y and 
u n i t y . T h i s was f o l l o w e d i n Chapter F i v e by a d i s c u s s i o n of the 
reasons t h a t can be g i v e n i n support o f a judgement when two 
' e x p e r t ' c r i t i c s d i s a g r e e . I argued t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements 
must be support e d by ' r e l e v a n t ' reasoned j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; and 
t h a t disagreements can be r e s o l v e d t h r o u g h the t r a d i t i o n s o f 
p r o t r a c t e d d i s p u t e p r a c t i s e d by the c r i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . I 
d i s c u s s e d t h e r e l a t i o n o f g e n e r a l i t i e s t o p a r t i c u l a r s and 
c o n s i d e r e d whether or n o t the procedures o f i n d u c t i v e and 
d e d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g c o u l d be a p p l i e d t o a r t e v a l u a t i o n . I 
argued t h a t they c o u l d , b u t o n l y i n an ext r e m e l y l i m i t e d sense. 
I c o n s i d e r e d t h e case f o r g e n e r i c judgements and concluded t h a t 
a r t o b j e c t s need n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be 'unique'. I n chapter Six I 
argued t h a t judgements as t o whether an a r t w o r k i s 'good' or 
'bad' a r e c o m p a r a t i v e , i n v o l v e common-sensical, 'educated' 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , and, inasmuch as they r e f e r t o 'examples', are 
c o n c e p t u a l . I n Chapter Seven I argued t h a t ' v a l i d ' a e s t h e t i c 
judgements can be based upon a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of 
sym b o l i c meaning. I examined the d i s t i n c t i o n between seeing and 
'seeing as*, and between r e a d i n g and 'reading i n t o ' . I a l s o 
examined t he procedures i n v o l v e d i n a r t and l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m 
and concluded t h a t a e s t h e t i c judgements operated on two l e v e l s , 
w i t h e m o t i o n a l responses on the f i r s t l e v e l i n f o r m i n g the 
c o n c e p t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and e v a l u a t i o n s on the second. I 
concluded t h a t inasmuch as music, p a i n t i n g and l i t e r a t u r e 
i n v o l v e d 'language' codes t h a t had t o be l e a r n e d , n o t everyone 
was capable o f making sound c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s on t h i s second 
l e v e l . 
I n Chapter E i g h t I suggested t h a t because judgements are 
made w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t i v e p r o p e r t i e s they c o u l d n o t be 
c o m p l e t e l y s u b j e c t i v e . T h i s was argued along s i m i l a r l i n e s t o 
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S i b l e y ' s t h e o r y t h a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f a e s t h e t i c 
terms are dependent and, as such, do not r e q u i r e a b s o l u t e p r o o f 
b u t , r a t h e r , c o n t i n g e n t agreement among an e l i t e o f ' e x p e r t s ' . 
S i b l e y ' s comparison of a e s t h e t i c terms w i t h c o l o u r terms was 
c r i t i c i s e d a l ong s i m i l a r l i n e s t o the c r i t i c i s m a l r e a d y 
l e v e l l e d a t Kant's term 'beauty', namely t h a t c o l o u r terms do 
no t admit o f degrees - whereas p a i n t i n g A can be ' g r a c e f u l ' 
compared w i t h B b u t not C. I a l s o argued t h a t d i f f e r e n t genres 
and a r t forms i n d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s r e q u i r e d d i f f e r e n t 
' e x p e r t s ' , b u t t h a t n o t a l l e x p e r t s enjoyed the same s t a t u s , as 
f o r i n s t a n c e w i t h teenyboppers compared t o opera b u f f s . I then 
went on, i n Chapter Nine, t o argue t h a t judgements can be 
r e l a t i v e l y o b j e c t i v e a c c o r d i n g t o the c o n t e x t i n which they are 
u t t e r e d . A judgement may t h e r e f o r e be s a i d to be 
p a n a e s t h e t i c a l l y r e l a t i v e t o a g i v e n community. A l s o , because 
judgements r e f e r t o b o t h p r i m a r y p r o p e r t i e s which are o b j e c t i v e 
and t e r t i a r y p r o p e r t i e s which are subject-dependent, they admit 
o f a degree o f s u b j e c t - r e l a t i v e o b j e c t i v i t y . I n Chapter ten I 
compared t h i s r e l a t i v e o b j e c t i v i t y t o the supposedly a b s o l u t e 
o b j e c t i v i t y o f s c i e n t i f i c judgements and concluded t h a t the two 
were more a l i k e than d i f f e r e n t , t o the e x t e n t t h a t b o t h 
i n v o l v e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I concluded t h a t the o b j e c t i v i t y of 
a e s t h e t i c judgements need n o t be a b s o l u t e and d e f i n i t i v e . I 
then argued t h a t t he procedures by which we i n t e r p r e t and 
judge are l e a r n e d r a t h e r than i n t u i t e d . F i n a l l y , i n Chapter 
Eleven, I suggested t h a t r e l e v a n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s can not o n l y 
be made w i t h r e g a r d t o c o n t e n t , b u t a l s o t o form. I n l i g h t o f 
t h i s I d i s c u s s e d the G e s t a l t phenomenon of seeing p a t t e r n s as 
m e a n i n g f u l l y o r g a n i s e d wholes. I gave examples of c e r t a i n 
f o r m a l a e s t h e t i c p r o p e r t i e s , e m o t i o n a l q u a l i t i e s and f e e l i n g 
tones t h a t have u n i v e r s a l c o n n o t a t i o n s f o r our o c c i d e n t a l 
u n i f i e d p s y c h o l o g i c a l ' e n t i t y ' . I concluded t h a t our 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are n o t a r b i t r a r y , b u t , r a t h e r , t h a t c e r t a i n 
a s s o c i a t i o n s and ways of seeing are a r c h e t y p a l and ' u n i v e r s a l ' . 
I then a t t e m p t e d t o convey t h i s t h e o r y i n more p r a c t i c a l terms 
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- i n the form o f h y p o t h e t i c a l t e s t s - and concluded t h a t a 
c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n i s a p r o p o s a l o f knowledge t h a t becomes 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e t h r o u g h i t s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e e f f i c a c y . 
E s s e n t i a l l y , t h e t h e o r y I have advanced i s b o t h an 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t and an ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s t ' t h eory ( i n the 
E m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n ) , t h a t i s , a t h e o r y which holds t h a t 
d e f i n i t i o n s o f a r t are s o c i a l l y determined. I f I have a t times 
seemed g u i l t y o f p a p e r i n g over the cracks - what W i t t g e n s t e i n 
might c a l l 'a c r a v i n g f o r g e n e r a l i t y ' - and i f I have a t times 
seemed t o p r e s e n t an c o m p i l a t i o n o f 'evidence' on the one 
hand, and a l a c k o f f i n a l i t y i n the c o n c l u s i o n s t o be drawn 
from t h i s evidence on the o t h e r , then perhaps the time has 
come t o take a deep b r e a t h and s t a t e q u i t e c a t e g o r i c a l l y the 
c o n d i t i o n s under which t he type o f a e s t h e t i c judgement I have 
been d i s c u s s i n g can be made. T h i s , i n a s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d sense 
( t h a t i s , a c c o r d i n g t o c e r t a i n s o c i o - c u l t u r a l c o n v e n t i o n s ) w i l l 
suggest c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c c r i t e r i a a c c o r d i n g t o which a 
c o n t e x t u a l , c o m p a r a t i v e , i n s t r u m e n t a l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l , e c l e c t i c , 
hermeneutic and p a n a e s t h e t i c c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n of an a r t 
o b j e c t might be made. The main p o i n t s o f t h i s d e f i n i t i o n are 
as f o l l o w s : 
1. That t he judgement i s an e v a l u a t i o n based upon the 
p e r c e p t i o n o f an a r t o b j e c t . 
2. That the e v a l u a t i o n i s based upon a r e l e v a n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a f f e c t i v e , c o n c e p t u a l and/or symbolic meaning 
of form and c o n t e n t . That i s , t h a t the judgement i s r e l e v a n t t o 
a g i v e n o b j e c t and t h a t i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s o b j e c t the 
judgement can be ' t e s t e d ' and understood. 
3. That i t i s not enough f o r a c r i t i c t o be simply a 
person o f ' t a s t e ' as t h i s i s too vague a term t o be of much 
use. The c r i t i c must a l s o be s u i t a b l y q u a l i f i e d . That i s , be 
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educated i n the p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d ( c u l t u r a l l y s o p h i s t i c a t e d ) ; 
have a e s t h e t i c s e n s i b i l i t y , and be p e r c e p t i v e , d i s c r i m i n a t i n g , 
r a t i o n a l ( c o m p e t e n t ) , c r e a t i v e ( i m a g i n a t i v e ) , u n p r e j u d i c e d , and 
a e s t h e t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e ( c o n t e m p l a t i v e ) . 
4. That t he j u d g i n g s u b j e c t s t a t e s q u i t e c a t e g o r i c a l l y 
what the a r t o b j e c t i s b e i n g judged a^. That i s , as an example 
of i t s g e n e r i c k i n d - so t h a t , f o r i n s t a n c e , a piece o f music 
i s n o t judged a c c o r d i n g t o the c r i t e r i a o f p a i n t i n g . And t h a t 
t h e o b j e c t s h a l l be judged a c c o r d i n g t o i t s ' c a p a c i t y ' w i t h i n a 
h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t , t h a t i s , i t might be r e l a t i v e _to a gi v e n 
age o r c u l t u r e - e t h n o c e n t r i c - b u t not r e l a t i v e w i t h i n t h a t 
g i v e n age or c u l t u r e . [ B e a r d s l e y makes a d i s t i n c t i o n , i n t h i s 
r e s p e c t , between a r e l a t i o n a l and r e l a t i v i s t i c d e f i n i t i o n . ] 
5. That, i n the above r e s p e c t , such judgements w i l l be 
p a n a e s t h e t i c , t h a t i s , c u l t u r a l l y r e l a t i v e and u n i v e r s a l l y 
v a l i d f o r a l l members of a s p e c i f i e d s o c i a l group to the 
e x t e n t t h a t a l l members 'ought' t o agree w i t h them. 
6. That c e r t a i n r e l a t i v i s t i c q u e s t i o n s are s a t i s f i e d . For 
example, who i s i t good f o r ? what i s i t good f o r ? what i s i t 
good as? 
7. That the j u d g i n g s u b j e c t has the burden of p r o o f , 
meaning t h a t t h e c r i t i c a l ( a e s t h e t i c ) judgement w i l l be the 
p r o d u c t o f an i n t e l l e c t u a l process i n v o l v i n g concepts which 
leads t o a p r o p o s i t i o n which i s s u b j e c t t o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . 
T h i s i s i n v i r t u e o f the r e l e v a n t and r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n s 
t h a t are v o l u n t e e r e d i n su p p o r t o f i t . These 'reasons' might be 
c o r r i g i b l e and prima f a c i e r a t h e r than a b s o l u t e , but must r e f e r 
t o c e r t a i n c o n c e p t - c r i t e r i a o f v a l u e . 
8. That , i n the above r e s p e c t , d i s p u t e s a r i s i n g from 
disagreement - about g e n e r i c and i n t e r p r e t a t i v e m atters - among 
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q u a l i f i e d c r i t i c s might be r e s o l v e d through s t r e n g t h of 
argument, and w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i f i c and g e n e r a l canons. 
Some judgements w i l l , i n t h i s r e s p e c t , be b e t t e r than o t h e r s . 
The b e t t e r t h e judgement t h e more l i k e l y i t w i l l be t o s u r v i v e 
p r o t r a c t e d d i s p u t e s over s e v e r a l g e n e r a t i o n s , w i t h i n the 
c o n t e x t o f ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' c r i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . T his t e s t - o f -
time p r i n c i p l e might be c o n s i d e r e d i n Darwinian terms as 
n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n , or s u r v i v a l o f the f i t t e s t . To t h i s e x t e n t 
the judgements must be c o m p a r a t i v e , and r e l e v a n t t o the degree 
o f c e r t a i n a e s t h e t i c v a l u e s . A judgement of t h i s s o r t c o u l d be 
d e s c r i b e d as r e g u l a t i v e , n o r m a t i v e and canonic. Furthermore, 
the more ' t e s t a b l e ' a judgement i s , the more c r e d i b l e and v a l i d 
i t w i l l be, and the more competent w i l l be the c r i t i c who made 
i t . Judgements are o b j e c t i v e i n c h a r a c t e r i f t h e r e i s p o t e n t i a l 
or a c t u a l agreement between many c r i t i c s w i t h i n a s t r i c t l y 
d e l i m i t e d c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t . 
9. That, i n the above r e s p e c t , the p r o p e r t i e s r e f e r r e d 
t o i n s u p p o r t o f t h e judgement are p u b l i c l y i n s p e c t a b l e . 
10. That the j u d g i n g s u b j e c t e c l e c t i c a l l y takes on board 
a l l r e l e v a n t , c o r r o b o r a t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n about the a r t o b j e c t , 
and t h a t he or she c o n s i d e r s v a r i o u s c r i t i c a l approaches and 
t h e o r i e s , t h a t i s , he or she makes a judgement ' a l l t h i n g s 
c o n s i d e r e d ' . 
A l t h o u g h t h i s reads l i k e a m a n i f e s t o i t i s not i n t e n d e d as 
such. The i n t e n t i o n i s t o show t h a t when P says ' I am no a r t 
e x p e r t , b u t I know what I l i k e ' , h i s mere l i k i n g does not 
c o n s t i t u t e a c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n . I n o r d e r t o a v o i d t r a v e l l i n g 
down the s o l i p s i s t i c road of s u b j e c t i v i t y I appeal t o a 
communal a u t h o r i t y which i s a l m o s t , b u t not q u i t e , o b j e c t i v e . 
I t might be t h a t the ' o b j e c t i v e t o an e x t e n t ' type of 
judgement I have i n mind i s , t o a l l i n t e n t s and purposes, an 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e judgement. But, a g a i n , i t i s not q u i t e . 
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I n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i s a branch o f s u b j e c t i v i t y , i t does not 
r e a l l y t a ke account o f the p r o p e r t i e s o f the o b j e c t . 
Are a e s t h e t i c judgements o b j e c t i v e or s u b j e c t i v e ? From the 
f o r e g o i n g d e l i b e r a t i o n s I draw the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t they are 
f a r from b e i n g w h o l l y s u b j e c t i v e . My t i t l e , more p r o p e r l y , 
s h o u l d be: How o b j e c t i v e are a e s t h e t i c judgements qua c r i t i c a l 
e v a l u a t i o n s ? However, as mentioned i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , I 
wanted t o a v o i d s t a r t i n g t h i s t h e s i s w i t h the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t 
a e s t h e t i c judgements had t o be one t h i n g or the o t h e r . Upon r e -
r e a d i n g t he t h e s i s i t s t r i k e s me t h a t t h i s has, n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
been my c o n v i c t i o n . I have attempted t o e s t a b l i s h c r i t e r i a by 
means o f which t he o b j e c t i v i t y o f a e s t h e t i c judgements can be 
c o n c l u s i v e l y demonstrated. This I have s i g n a l l y f a i l e d t o do. 
As my r e s e a r c h progressed I i n c r e a s i n g l y came round t o the 
o p i n i o n t h a t u n l e s s the c o n d i t i o n s f o r o b j e c t i v i t y were 
s t r i c t l y d e l i m i t e d (as i n t h e t e n - p o i n t s o u t l i n e d above) the 
c l a i m c o u l d n o t r e a l i s t i c a l l y be made. Moreover, i n l i m i t i n g 
t h e c o n d i t i o n s I was s i m p l y moving the g o a l posts and a r r i v i n g 
a t a d e f i n i t i o n o f something which, a l t h o u g h i n t e r e s t i n g , c o u l d 
no l o n g e r be rea s o n a b l y c a l l e d ' a e s t h e t i c v a l u e judgement'. As 
a consequence o f t h i s I became much g i v e n t o the use of scare-
quotes, anecdotes, r h e t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n s , and f a c e t i o u s 
a n a l o g i e s . I a l s o found t h a t , t o some e x t e n t , I was c o u n t e r i n g 
my own arguments as I went a l o n g . T h i s s t y l e o f q u e s t i o n 
f o l l o w e d by argument and counter-argument f o l l o w e d by 
r h e t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n , seems t o have l e f t me s i t t i n g on the 
fe n c e . But t h e n , as A r i s t o t l e observes, the accuracy o f 
c o n c l u s i o n s n e c e s s a r i l y v a r i e s a c c o r d i n g t o the f i e l d under 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . ^ I o f f e r t h i s by way of an excuse f o r the 
wo o l i n e s s o f my c o n c l u s i o n s . 
I suggested i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s a dichotomy 
between o b j e c t i v e c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n s which are concerned, f o r 
the most p a r t , w i t h c o n t e n t , and s u b j e c t i v e responses of t a s t e 
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which are concerned, f o r the most p a r t , w i t h form. Now, i n most 
a r t forms i t i s o f t e n d i f f i c u l t , and sometimes ( i n the cases of 
music or dance) i m p o s s i b l e , t o separate the form from the 
c o n t e n t . I n my o p i n i o n , t h e r e f o r e , good ' a e s t h e t i c s 
judgements' s h o u l d take i n t o account b o t h form and c o n t e n t , 
thus r e s o l v i n g t he r e s p o n s e / e v a l u a t i o n dichotomy, and t h u s , i n 
t u r n r e s o l v i n g t he s u b j e c t / o b j e c t dichotomy. I conclude t h a t 
t h e assumed-to-be p o l a r o p p o s i t i o n o f s u b j e c t and o b j e c t i s 
a r t i f i c i a l . Good a e s t h e t i c judgements occur a t the p o i n t where 
th e ' A p o l l o n i a n ' o r d e r of o b j e c t i v i t y meets t h e , as i t were, 
' D i o n y s i a n ' chaos of s u b j e c t i v i t y . Such judgements are 
s y n t h e t i c a l l y b o t h o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e . But not i n equal 
measure. The sc a l e s are d e c i d e d l y t i p p e d i n favour of 
o b j e c t i v i t y . I have t e n t a t i v e l y v o l u n t e e r e d the term 
' i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e ' t o d e s c r i b e t h i s s t a t e o f compromise, b u t , 
w i t h i t s K a n t i a n a s s o c i a t i o n s , i t i s n o t e n t i r e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
I t i s w i t h a p o l o g i e s , t h e n , f o r the a e s t h e t i c a l l y d i s p l e a s i n g 
use o f language, t h a t I must s e t t l e f o r the term 'quasi-
o b j e c t i v e ' . 
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perception. 
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elsewhere, what Gombrich refers to as the 'physiognomic fallacy', 
toth of which I shall discuss in a Chapter Eleven, 
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1 7 . In certadn cases, however = Clement Greenberg's defence of 
Abstract Exparessionism, for instance = i t could be argued that the 
theory precedes the practiceo I shall pursue this question in 
Chapter Four. 
1 8 . In A PhilDsophical Enquiry into the Ori^'n of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and the BeautifuL 
1 9 . Burke, op. cit., p. 1 3 . 
2 0 . Ibid., p. 2 3 . 
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C h a p t e r T h r e e 
I . The second part of Critique of Judgement is entitled 'Analytic of 
the SubUme'o For Kant the sentiment of beauty is applicable to our 
sense of oneness with nature. Beauty is rdated to the 
purposiveness of nature. When we are overwhelmed by the magnitude 
of nature, we experience the sentiment of the sublime. However, I 
shall not dwell on the subject of 'the subUme' here. 
2 o Kant, 'Critique of Judgement', in An Anthology of Aesthetic 
Theory, ed. Ross, p. 1 0 9 . 
3 o Ibid., p. 1 1 3 . 
4 . Ibid., p. 1 1 8 . 
5 . Ibid., p. 1 2 0 . 
6 . Kant seems to as equally apply the term 'beautiful' to objects 
in nature as to man-made art objects. In fact he considers that 
natural or 'free" beauty is superior to art = and should therefore 
be the central object of aesthetic interest - because i t is not 
dependent on intellectual concepts. 
7 . Kant, Had,, p. 1 0 3 . 
8 . Mccloskey, in Kant's Aesthetic 
9 . N.B. Moral judgements are interested in Kant's sense, but not 
prejudiced in any pejorative sense. 
1 0 . In Chapter Six I suggest ways in which Kant's objective and 
logical concept of the object as 'the good', can afford a more 
relevant criterion for the judgement and appreciation of art, than 
is presently afforded by Itis exclusive use of the term 'the 
beautiful'. In brief, my point is this, that in appreciating art we 
make value judgements as to whetiier or not an artwork is 'good', 
not morally but aesthetically / artistically - this amounts to an 
assessment of whether or not i t is an 'artwork'. To an extent 
these judgements are comparative and intellectual (for reasons I 
shall explain) and consequently objective and 'logical'. I hope to 
suggest that i t is therefore meaningful to talk of a hierarchy 
within the category of 'good' art, as for instance with 'great' art 
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communicable because i t is a disinterested jixigeraent seems to me 
analogous to saying my statement 'this bus is red' is universally 
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23. McCloskey, op. cit., p. 16. 
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the production of the work of art, that is, whether the critical 
vocabulary is invented in response to the work, or whether the work 
Is produced in accordance with (in order to test) the theories, is 
anotiier matter which I shall not take up here. 
3. Theodore A. Gracyk Having Bad Taste BJA 2, 30, 1990. 
4. I t may be that two paintings can reflect the same theories and 
have the same meaning, and that this meaning can be expressed in 
words. This would not necessarily mean, though, that the painting 
would become redundant once this meaning had been grasped (as in 
'the heresy of paraphrase') because aesthetic value consists of 
more than the meaning of the narrative or the symbols. There are 
other considerations such as form and technique which I shaU. go 
on to discuss later in this chapter. 
5. Wain Wright, Journals m, p. 96. 
6. CHld, The SociaFlSstarical Relativity of Esthetic Value, in The 
Problems of Aesthetics, p. 447. 
7. Eichner, BJA, 3. " 
8. C.E.M. Joad., in Vivas, The Problems of Aesthetics. 
9. Ibid., p. 302. 
10. BeardsLey, Reasons in Aesthetic Judgements, in Aesthetics, ed. 
Hospers, p. 245. 
11. Ibid., p. 250. 
12. I t wiLL be remembered that BeardsLey's theory is an 
instrumentalist one in wWch the aesthetic value of a work of art 
can be measured in terms of its capacity to produce aesthetic 
experiences over ' a period of time and under specified 
circumstances. 
13. Morawski, On the Obiectivity of Aesthetic Judgement, BJA, 6, p. 
324. 
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12. Cf. Helen Knight, ed. Elton, p. 158. 
13. I also go along with what Tormey goes on to say, with the 
proviso that i t should not necessarily be assumed that everyone 
has the competence to corroborate tests and so, until they do, are 
not really qualified • to make 'independent' aesthetic judgements qua 
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22. Jarvie, op. cit., p. 78. 
23. This said, however, I am by no means sure that such a 
reassessed tradition of criticism or taste will always mean an 
improvement on the origional tradition, nor am I sure that there 
can be progress in criticism even i f there is not in art. Progress 
for its own sake has Kttle to commend i t . 
23. Ibid., p. 81. 
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2. Plato, Laws 669 A - B, trans. Bury. 
3. I shall not pursue this distinction between 'good' and 'great' art 
here. However, I believe the distinction Walter Pater makes is a 
useful one. 
4. Even Kant can be said to make an appeal, albeit a veiled one, to 
'examples'. As McCbskey puts i t (in Kant's Aesthetics, p, 72): 
Kant, unlike the man in the street, believes that there is a 
proper procedure for correcting judgements and settling 
disputes which is not a matter of appealing to generalisations 
about how other people judge, nor of adducing a priori, but a 
procedure which is based upon appeal to examples. 
5. Interestingly, and irorax^ally, for a response to be instinctive i t 
must meet with four conditions, one of wMch is that i t must be 
universal to a species. Instinctive responses (which are the 
paradigm of subjectivity) could therefore be said to have an 
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6. Jefferson and Robey, p. 12. 
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8. This may only be trivially true in the sense that language 
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Meditations on a Hobby Horse, p. 97. 
10. In his essay Having Bad Taste (BJA 2, 30, 1990) Theodore A 
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is worth quoting at length: 
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Knowledge of eighteenth-century chamber music is not very 
helpful when one first encounters twelve-tone serLalism or 
nineteen-forties bebop. When Western musk: scholars have 
studied the traditijonal musics of West Africa, they have 
imposed European concepts of basic pulse and metre (together 
with measures and bars) on the African rhythms. One scholar 
was then surplsed to discover the widespread presence of 
rhythmic unevenness and irregularity in African music, and 
postulated an African 'tolerance' for i t and an unconscious 
abLHty mentally to correct these urantenticnal irregularities. 
But the cultures in question do not empby the Western notion 
of linear time, and some scholars therefore suspect that 
there is no rhythmic irregularity to 'correct'. We 
misunderstand and distort traditional African music in 
assimilating i t to our Western convention of constructing 
rhythms from short, repeating, even patterns. African music is 
also misunderstood by Westerners who think i t deficient in 
melody, owing to our familiarity with a convention of not 
employing 'percussive' instruments to play melodies. 
11. Just as the word 'sky' is not a statement, because i t is not a 
proposition that can be true or false, so nribher is a blob of blue 
paint on a canvas, cf. Gombrich, op. cit-
12. Although perhaps in this strictiy Umited sense i t could be said 
to be 'false' when analysed in terras of our objective experience of 
the 'true' colours of landscapes. 
13. Gombrich, On Physiognomic Perception, p. 54. 
14. Berger, Permanent Red. 
15. In a seminar given in 1988. 
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incorrectness, St. Augustine would argue, is not only apparent to 
the senses but also to the intellect •= in virtue of our having a 
concept of ideal order. 
9. Cf. Northrop Frye's theory in The Stubborn Structure that there 
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are two ways of 'knowing' literature. The first is by having 
knowledge of literature, 'nous'; the second is by having knowledge 
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instance, when we can see the duck/rabbdi figure as either a duck 
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discussed at greater length in Chapter Eleven. 
13. Gombrich, op. cit. 
14. Ibid, p. 68, 
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1. Sibley, in The Proceedings of the Aristoteli/an Society, 
supplement, voL XUL 
2. Ibid,, p. 35 
3. Righter, Logic and Criticism, p. 17. 
4. NB Osbome defines a" connoisseur as being someone who is of 
discerning perception who can discriminate, compare and describe 
those qualities of which he is a connoisseur and reject things in 
which they are not present, But, in accordance with Sibley, Osbome 
adds that the connoisseur is not as a rule a man whose Hkings 
coincide with tliose of the majority. Appreciation Considered as a 
Skill, BJA, 9, p, 342, 
3r^jid,, p, 40, 
6, Ibid., p. 41. 
7, Ibid., p. 42. 
8, I am not saying here that 'graceful' is a relative term in the 
sense in which such terms as 'big', 'heavy' or 'expensive' are. I 
accept that i t makes sense to say that, for example, every member 
of the Royal Ballet is a graceful dancer, even i f some are more 
graceful than others, (and none is as graceful as the leading dancer 
of the Bolshoi). Another sense in which a judgement can be relative 
without being subjective is in the case of panaesthetic judgements 
discussed in the next chapter, that is, relative to a given culture 
yet stUl quasi-objective within that culture. 
9, A criticism of this approach should be registered here. According 
to this reasoning the more experience the group has with objects of 
this kind, and the more agreement the group comes to, the 'more 
factual' will be the 'fact ' . I balk at the Siea that facts themselves 
may admit of degrees, as oppose to the evidence in support of the 
facts. Surely facts only differ in degrees of hardness in relation 
to the supporting evidence. I t clearly makes no sense to talk of 
slightly false facts, so how can i t make sense to say 'this is more 
of a fact than that'? When we describe one text as being more 
factual than another, we only mean that i t contains more true 
statements and so more facts. 
10, Sibley, Ibid., p. 42. 
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judgement of Community B fails to be disinterested; similariy i t 
woidd be tempting to be drawn into a debate concerning the 
objective status of moral judgements in this case, regrettably 
though, for reasons of space, these issues are too large to be 
canvassed here. 
2. Cf, Tadeusz Pawlowski's lecture in 1988 about the 'Panaesthetic 
Conception of Value'. 
3. Child, The Problems of Aesthetics, p. 453, 
4. Bl£ich,~Subjective Criticism, p. 296. 
5. Judgements can Be said to be relatively objective in another 
sense also. The properties do not belong to the self and so are 
objective and yet are relative insofar as they depend upon 
individuals. As Professor Koffka puts i t , they are phenomenally 
objective and functionally subjective (or relative). The real object' 
of atoms and electrons is but a set of conditions which produce the 
phenomenal art-object in the spectator. See Heyl, New Bearings in 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, p. 110. 
6. Dickie, Evaluating Art, BJA, 25, p. 3. 
7. Reid, Philosophical Works p, 492, 
8. Berkeley took issue with this account on the grounds that we 
are only ever able to apprehend the object rather than have direct 
access to i t =• in other words we only ever apprehend tertiary 
properties. According to this account all we can ever apprehend are 
ideas. 
9. Manns, BJA, 28, p. 122, 
10. Osborne, Aesthetics, p. 14. 
11. Manns, op. cit,, pr'128, 
12. A comparison might also be made here with BeardsLey's notion of 
specific and general canons. See Chapter Four, 
13. However, as Osborne points out, descriptive terms imply 
evaluation and evaluative terms rely upon description. Cf, also 
Wittgenstein's assumption that i f we apprehend alike we will 
evaluate alike. 
14. Osborne, op. cit., p. 17, 
15. Sibley, Philosophk.al Review, VoL 68, No 4. 
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aesthetic distance - probably the most significant Twentieth 
century interpretation of Kant's theory of disinterestedness. 
Bullough agrees with Kant that the aesthetic experience should be 
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divorced from practical concerns and suggests four ways in which we 
are distanced from a painting: 1. actual spatial distance; 2. 
represented spatial distance (as with perspective in the painting) 3. 
temporal distance; and 4, aesthetic distance, BuUough s theory 
provides interesting criteria for making value judgements, in that 
we can say an art work is bad i f : the work of art is under-
distanced so that its subject matter is too realistic (we experience 
real terror and therefore are not disinterested); or i f the work of 
art is over-distanced so that i t seems empty, absurd or artlfijdaL 
19. By this I mean that although Kant might concede that 
interparetations of content may be either correct or incorrect, and 
to this extent objective, whether or not an individual finds the 
content aesthetically pleasing, is a subjective matter, 
20. Davies, The Rationality of Aesthetic Responses, BJA, 23, p. 40. 
21. Ibid,, p.43: 
C h a p t e r T e n 
I . Best, The Objectivity of Artistic Appreciation, BJA, 20. 
3. I t could be argued that aH works of art have meaning, be i t in 
the narrative or allegorical content of traditional art, or in the 
'statement' being made by a blank canvas in abstract art, as in 'the 
medium is the message'. I t could be argued that even abstract 
painting is meaningful in the Gestalt sense of seeing patterns as 
meaningfully organized wholes. Also, to the extent that musu: 
expresses the composer's emotion of, say, melancholy, i t too can 
be considered meaningfuL Needless to say literature is, by 
definition, meaningful - form being inseparable from content 
4. Best, ibid., p. 122. 
5. Shahn, The Shape of Content 
6. Best, op. c i t , p. 126. 
7. Cf. Hume's 'delicacy of taste' here = viz. wine tasting is clearly 
a teachable sldH and i f this 'teachability' applies to such an 
obviously ' subjective' activity i t must also apply to aesthetic 
evaluation. 
8. Winterboume, BJA, 21, p. 255. 
9. I t should be noted here that this only means that correct 
information is a necessary condition of correct explanation and not 
that i t is a sufficient conditinn. 
10. Best, A Reply to My Critics, BJA, 23, p. 152, 
I I , Winterboume, op, c i t , p. 259. 
12, This needs qualifying. There are, of course, many 'facts' (such 
as 'oxygen is combustible') but they are only relatively true, that 
is, true until they are disproved (wMch they may never be, of 
course). I t is difficult to think of any indisputable 'high level' 
theories though. After aU, a theory is only considered to be 
factual relative to the theories that may supersede them in the 
future as, for instance, with Newton's theory being replaced by 
Einstein's. Also, along similarly relativistic lines, i t could be 
argued, albeit perversdy, that a 'fact ' , such as 'the sun will rise 
in the East tomorrow', is only reaUy factual according to the laws 
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of probability, and even then i t is relative to where you are in the 
world . . . 
I gave some rough drafts of this thesis to a friend of mind 
who, despite being trained as a scientist, is what I would call a 
radical subjectivist. After reading my notes he concluded that 
although my arguments were appealing they were, nevertheless, built 
on sand. He justified this criticism on the grounds that we simply 
cannot make judgements about art because any 'reasoned 
justification' that is offered in support of a judgement wiU. be at 
best superficial and at worst spurious. Order, he argued, cannot be 
imposed upon the subjective chaos of taste because there are no 
absolute laws to govern i t . In mathematix:s, he argued, there are 
five irrefutable laws ( A + B = A + B , A - B = A - B , A x B = A x B , 
A divdded by B = A divided by B, and zero = zero) which amount to 
saying that Hke equals Kke. There is, he went on to argue, no 
equivalent to these laws in aesthetics (no two critics can be alike) 
and hence no possihilLty of objective judgement. He dismissed any 
coincidence of judgement (agreement among the elite of critics) as 
the workings of random improbability. The factors involved in human 
judgement (including, he argued. moral judgement, the relativity of 
defining concepts like 'torture and so forth) are too many and 
varied to be anything but spurious - even i f they are supposedly 
'qualified*. I countered that I was not claiming absolute universal 
objectivity but rather seeking to answer the question: I f the 
compromise of relative objectivity is the best we can hope for, is 
i t enough to justify the practice of criticism? He doggedly 
maintainea that i t is not (thus rendering an entire academic 
industry redundant) and we agreed to differ. 
13. Seldon, Criticism and Objectivity, p. 25. 
14. OsbomerThe Art of Appreciation, p. 31. 
15. Ibid., p. T7T. 
16. McAdoo, Aesthetic Education and the Antinomy of Taste, BJA, 27, 
p. 317, 
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2. As, for example, when we enter a stiinge room we assume the 
floor is going to be level, until and unless our receptor organs 
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4. Stevenson, 'Nonrepresentational Arts', in Aesthetics, ed. Hospers, 
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5. Arguably these associations have more to do with the 'meaning' of 
the work of art than with its 'aesthetic value'. However, as I 
suggested in Chapters Six and Seven, the interpretation and 
understanding of a work of art may well be integral to our 
appreciation and evaluation of i t , and, after all, there may be more 
than one form of interpretation, that is, of form, as well as 
content. 
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6, Such emotion-causing qualities are sometimes referred to as 
physiognomic qualities, 
7, Bleic.h, Subjective Ciiticism, p, 98. 
8, Garden, A Crltdciim of Two of Kant's Criteria of the Aesthetic', 
in Essays in Honor of John Dewey. 
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Judgements, JAAC, 15, p, 7. 
10, Osbome, op, c i t , pp, 142-3, 
11, Gorabrdch, Psycho-Analysis and the History of Art, op, c i t , p. 33, 
12, Ibid., p, 43, 
13, In some respects similar to the 'pathetic fallacy' of attributing 
human characteristics to animals and inanimate objects in nature, 
14, Aldrich, BJA, 18, p, 211, 
15, Ibid,, p, 213, 
16, Pratt, op, c i t , p, 7, 
17, Beardsley, The Instrumental Theory. 
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